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May 25, 2003
Review: How the Muslims reacted
PAKISTAN lost no time in joining the US-led war against international terrorism declared by President Bush immediately after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001. But Islamabad could not escape the aftermath of the event now commonly referred to as 9/11. The US felt it could not quite trust Pakistan because of the support it had earlier provided to the Taliban in establishing its government in Afghanistan. In American perception the Taliban were the field force of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden who had been the mastermind behind the 9/11 outrage.
At the same time, the BJP-led Hindu fundamentalist government in India seized upon 9/11 as an opportunity to settle scores with Pakistan for what it believed to be its strong support to the militancy in the Indian occupied Kashmir. Within Pakistan, the militant elements among the Islamist groups subscribing to the ideology of the Taliban strove hard to destabilize Gen Pervez Musharraf’s government, which they suspected of being a supporter of secular ideas.
In India, the large Muslim population also could not remain untouched by the event and the consequent anti-Muslim character of American policy. Altogether it was a very complex situation that developed in the subcontinent after 9/11. New Delhi’s French-sponsored Centre de Sciences Humaines has done a commendable job of publishing this most insightful study under the title of The Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent after the 11th September Attacks.
The four detailed chapters deal with the radicalism among the Indian Muslims in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack and the war in Afghanistan, the impact of 9/11 on the Muslims from the subcontinent in New York, Islamism and stability in Pakistan after 9/11, and changes and developments in Kashmir after 9/11. Altogether they provide a comprehensive view of how the Muslims of India and Pakistan have been affected by 9/11.
However, the fact is that the situation practically all over the world, and especially all over the Muslim world subsequent to 9/11, cannot yet be said to have fully crystallized as yet. The war in Iraq in any case took place after the study had been undertaken and it should not be seen as a final verdict on the consequences of 9/11.
The chapter about the Muslims in India by Prof Adil Mehdi of Delhi’s Jamia-i-Millia-i-Islamia makes some interesting and even unexpected observations. The author contends that while 9/11 was generally condemned as “mindless terrorism” and as unIslamic, the subsequent American invasion of Afghanistan by the US brought about a sea-change and the Indian Muslims began to “openly express their full sympathy with the Taliban and the Afghan people”.
It was said that though a large number of Muslims shared this feeling not all of them expressed themselves as such for fear of a Hindu backlash. The internationally renowned secular-minded historian Prof Irfan Habib held the same view and said that “a Hindu can criticize the US but if a Muslim does so, he is vulnerable to attack; the Sangh Parivar sees every Muslim as a potential terrorist”.
Fatwas condemning the US-led war against Afghanistan were issued by the Dar-ul-Uloom of Deoband (which has pawned a very large number of the madressahs in the subcontinent) and by the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind. They called for a boycott of America and its products but, significantly, did not call for a jihad. The fear of Hindu backlash, according to Prof Adil Mehdi, was “the key factor” behind the relatively mild and haphazard reaction of the (Indian) Muslim organizations.
Significantly, it was left to the Leftists and the Marxist-Maoists to lead the bigger public rallies and protest marches in India. The professor also discloses that the few anti-American demonstrations in the Indian occupied Kashmir were led by human rights and civil liberties groups. Prof Adil Mehdi points out that the Kashmiris’ insurgency in the disputed state “has received hardly any active or moral support from Muslims in the rest of India”.
Dr Frederic Grare, director of the Centre de Sciences Humaines, who also edited the volume under review, has provided a most interesting and thought provoking chapter on “Islamism and political stability in Pakistan”. He believes that the militant Islamist elements in Pakistan were firmly opposed to President Pervez Musharraf’s policy of falling behind the US and they hoped to, but could not, destabilize his government. They were effective enough to the extent to make him “moderate his policy”, especially his support for the Karzai government of Kabul.
However, Dr Grare points out that a major factor of concern has been the Pakistani Islamists’ strong opposition to the American persistent hunt for the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the Pakistani territories adjoining Afghanistan. This made the job difficult and embarrassed the army.
Dr Grare concludes, and correctly so, that Gen Pervez Musharraf has had no significant setback owing to his pro-US policy; on the other hand, he has been able to give a positive turn to Pakistan’s “sick” economy because of the support extended by the US, the IMF and the World Bank and helped him create a better understanding of his policies among the people. However, the long-term stability of Pakistan remains a question mark.
A freelance writer and journalist, Impreet Singh Oberio has dealt with the impact of 9/11 on the Kashmiris. She contends that the “separatist organizations” in the occupied state have been weakened by the development in Afghanistan and the Kashmiris there can no longer be sure of the support for their separatism from “foreign” elements. A veteran Kashmiri freedom fighter Abdul Ghani Lone even said that the “foreign militants should go back and allow the Kashmiri Muslims themselves to decide their fate. “However, she believes an emerging view is that with the weakening of the Taliban in Afghanistan the “moderate and intellectual class” among the Kashmiris feel that this is the right time for the international community “to mediate and settle the Kashmir issue”.
Meanwhile the situation in the Valley continues to be “alarming”. Oberoi says with an obvious sense of despair that “as the Kashmir uprising drags on ... one of the outcomes is the growing enmity between Hindus and Muslims which never erupted before”. She is clearly uncertain about the future, but concludes that the defeat of fundamentalist forces in Afghanistan will “definitely create space for the indigenous voice of the people to take centre stage again ... The international fight against terrorism will not just target terrorist groups but will also promote an atmosphere of reconciliation and justice in Jammu and Kashmir.”
One would want to believe she is right when she says that as a result of the coalition-building, there is hope in Kashmir that the west can engage both India and Pakistan stressing the need to resolve this (Kashmir) dispute and emphasizing the dividends that can be had from a peace process. It is encouraging that despite its growing proximity with India in the aftermath of 9/11 the US is not prepared to equate the freedom struggle in Kashmir with international terrorism.
This indepth study painstakingly conducted by the Centre should add to a better and clearer understanding of the attitudes of Muslims as well as non-Muslims in the subcontinent in the aftermath of 9/11. It should also create a better and more positive comprehension of the factors which go into the making of the Muslim mindset both in India and Pakistan by developments and issues transcending national boundaries.
The Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent After 11th September Attacks
Edited by Frederic Grare
India Research Press, New Delhi Distributed in Pakistan by Paramount Books, 152/O, Block 2, PECH Society, Karachi-75400 Tel: 021-4310030
Email: paramount@cyber.net.pk
ISBN 818794307-6
138pp. Rs725
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