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May 18, 2003
Review: Are we secure?
AHMAD Faruqi’s recently published book is an indicator of how Pakistanis are getting concerned about the fundamental national security structure in this country. In 173 pages comprising fifteen chapters the author has tried to conduct an audit of national strategic planning which makes it an interesting reading. In fact, the subtitle of the book is aptly The Price of Strategic Myopia.
The various chapters dealing with issues such as Kargil, present a brief analysis of India-Pakistan wars and the country’s nuclear deterrence, evaluate the existing military establishment and the cost of militarization, and reviews various international cases of disarmament. The crux of the author’s argument is that the military desperately needs reforms to cater to the real security needs of the country. The argument is indeed valid since the manner in which the country’s armed forces are being run today means lesser security at a higher cost. It is this lack of strategic planning that makes Pakistan’s security even more problematic.
It seems that the research project was motivated by the abysmal state of strategic outcomes where Islamabad was forced to take an about turn on its Afghan policy and in other areas as well. The basic question posed in the prologue is that ‘can one be optimistic about Pakistan’s future security environment?’ The author tries to answer this question by viewing different events starting with the Kargil crisis. That chapter, however, does not present any analysis. It is in the second chapter that one finds the author’s basic framework. His argument is that the country’s political system being oligarchic, it were the different personalities that dominated policymaking who influenced both strategic planning and the economy according to their personal whims.
The third chapter focuses on the main driving philosophy behind Pakistan’s security planning: the will to counter India. However, here the author indulges in generalizations. For instance he writes that the majority of people in this country are convinced that India has never reconciled itself with the idea of an independent Pakistan. While analysts and policymakers tend to use public opinion mercilessly to present their own perceptions, there is a need to evaluate how intense is this image and whether it is shared by all.
The chapters outlining India and Pakistan’s comparative military capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively are perhaps the strongest chapters of the book. The analysis (it is in these two chapters that one finds the greatest depth) focuses on the strategic cultures of the two countries. The book abounds in generalizations. Thus it says that there have been changes in Pakistan-China relations and their bilateral relations have been downgraded. One honestly fails to follow the logic of inserting this chapter at this point in the book.
Moreover, the author fails to show any sensitivity towards the evolution of the international strategic environment. Indeed, the relations have not been the way they were during the 1960s, but to claim that these have deteriorated considerably is like falling in the same trap as those that think that Sino-Pakistan relations would always be at their best.
Although a good effort, the work suffers from some shortcomings. First, one fails to comprehend the order of the book and inclusion of certain material such as an independent chapter on General Niazi. In fact, Faruqui’s most important argument regarding security sector reforms is lost due to the peculiar structure of the book.
Second, the author seems to have not gone beyond a limited number of academic resources with greater concentration on newspaper articles or a few books. However, what one would like to appreciate is the fact that Faruqui has attempted this work although security or strategic studies are not his area of expertise. Perhaps, it would have been better had he employed his expertise of an economist to delve in a deeper assessment of the cost-benefit analysis of military ventures or adventures.
In fact, it would have been beneficial had he gone into greater detail in explaining the regression analysis in his fourteenth chapter so that it could have been comprehensible to laymen as well.
The tendency to address a lot of issues has, in fact, taken the author away from his main argument regarding military reforms. Furthermore, the study demanded more rigorous scholarship. It would have helped to bring greater clarity of thought even to the author before he embarked on this work. For instance, he has unwittingly sponsored the Turkish political model for Pakistan and has desisted from looking squarely at the issue of what is wrong with military and national security decision-making in the country.
His inability to desist from holding the military responsible for some errors of judgment or understanding how the military reforms require a political re-position of the armed forces exhibits a lack of understanding and analysis. One also wished that he had presented a better analysis of economic behavior. Simplistic statements that it was the US sanctions that drained the economy after Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests in 1998 do not carry much credibility. The sanctions had merely exposed the ills that the economy was suffering from at the hands of Nawaz Sharif’s government and its predecessors.
Again, the author’s suggestion that arms imports be frozen to release funds for economic development shows a lack of understanding of the military culture and some technicalities that would not allow major reduction in military expenditure incurred by lower imports.
Perhaps, the author has not looked into the fact that with a large standing force it is not easy to reduce defence spending beyond a certain point as huge personnel and maintenance cost is a fixed variable. Moreover, reduction would require some introspection by the military and the government regarding the role of the armed forces that has gone beyond what has been mandated by the 1973 constitution.
However, one must not lose sight of one of the strongest suggestions in the book regarding a joint civil-military analysis of the defence sector with the objective of reducing defence spending.
Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia
By Ahmad Faruqui
Ashgate, Hampshire, England Available at Pak American Commercial (Pvt) Ltd, Kashmir Road, P.O. Box 294, Rawalpindi.
Tel: (051) 5563709
Email: pacl@isd.wol.net.pk
and also Mr Books, 10-D Super Market, Islamabad. Tel: 051-2278843-5
Email: mrbooks@isb.comsats.net.pk Website:
www.mrbooks.com.pk
ISBN 0-7546-1497-2.
189pp. Rs2,995
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