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May 11, 2003
Review: Missed opportunities
FREDERIC Grare’s book is a well-researched study on the Afghan conflict — a bleeding wound in South Asia and a war without an end. Its six chapters describe and analyze retrospectively the crisis as it developed in 1985-2001. Afghanistan was a state whose society was based on traditional values. The writ of law was limited to a few cities while the rest of the country was mostly run as tribal fiefs. A strict control of their affairs by Kabul was traditionally resisted by the chieftains. However, Afghanistan’s tribal and unruly structure did not pose a threat to the internal stability of the country and the security of the region. All this changed in 1978 when the Saur (April) revolution took place in Kabul.
The Saur revolution was not an upheaval from below but was a coup engineered by a small group of officers who brought the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) into power. The party which had two factions was backed by the Soviet Union. Moscow had managed to penetrate the country in 1954 when it launched a programme of economic and military aid. Thereafter its influence had continued to grow.
The Pakhtoonistan issue had strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the conflict between the two also became a factor in Afghanistan’s close relationship with the Soviet Union, particularly after the establishment of SEATO and CENTO. Afghanistan was denied American assistance by the Eisenhower Administration which made the membership of the military pacts as a precondition for aid.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came in the wake of the popular resistance to the precipitate reforms the PDPA introduced in an effort to transform Afghan society and make it a modern and socialist state. The religious elements in Afghanistan were provoked and spearheaded the resistance which soon turned into a full-fledged counterrevolution which they termed as a jihad. The US and its allies, including Saudi Arabia, fanned the anti-PDPA movement and massive military and economic aid flowed to the seven resistance groups through Pakistan. The military regime of Ziaul Haq in Islamabad was also propped up as a consequence.
Thus Afghanistan emerged as a pawn on the chessboard of the superpower rivalry. It staked the security and integrity of Pakistan in the process. Three external actors played a key role in the overall destruction of Afghanistan, namely, the Soviet Union, the US and its allies, and Pakistan. The US abandoned Afghanistan as soon as the Soviets withdrew from the country after they felt it had become a quagmire and victory would be elusive.
The book fails to highlight the American involvement in the country and the role of Washington in supporting one group against another even after the civil war had broken out among the various resistance groups in the country. In fact the American policy was to a great extent responsible for the outbreak of the civil war in 1990 and the the emergence of the Taliban in 1994.
Pakistan had the option of concluding an accord with the Soviet Union in 1983-85 — much before the Geneva Accords were signed in 1988. This was a case of missed opportunity and it is a pity that the foreign policy of the country being in the hands of a military regime did not see the wisdom of exploring avenues for peace. Supported by the Americans, Islamabad was reluctant to resolve its dispute with Afghanistan lest it had to forego the massive economic and military aid it was receiving at that time. Pakistan’s Afghan policy was influenced by the Pentagon.
That is the 23-year-old story of Afghanistan’s emergence as a war-torn country with countless miseries inflicted on its population. A large number of Afghans have been displaced and many have been killed or crippled by the war and the mines. One aftermath of the adventures was the American military action against the Taliban in 2001 as an act of reprisal for 9/11. The US and its western allies managed to topple the Taliban. For their success they owe a lot to the support they received from Pakistan. Thousands of homes were destroyed and their occupants buried under the debris.
Since then Afghanistan has once again come under foreign occupation. Real peace is nowhere in sight. Reconstruction requires massive funding for development at the micro and macro level with popular participation.
The writer identifies, though inadequately, the security options available to Pakistan in the region. Pakistan’s stability was affected by the Afghan crisis. When it became the front-line state its insecurity, political uncertainty and economic unstability were aggravated as the military regime found itself strengthened against popular resistance.
Despite its shortcomings, this study is a valuable addition to the overall scholarly literature on the ongoing Afghan conflict. The author has spared no pains in elaborating the footnotes with an extensive bibliography in the end. It adds to one’s knowledge on the subject.
Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985
By Frederic Grare
Oxford University Press, Plot # 38, Sector 15, Korangi Industrial Area, Karachi.
Tel: 111-693-673.
Email: ouppak@theoffice.net Website:
www.oup.com.pk
ISBN 019-579793-0
222pp. Rs325
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