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March 30, 2003
Excerpts: Nuclear terrorism
How safe and secure is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? Rajesh M. Basrur and Hasan-Askari Rizvi give their assessment
THE most pessimistic and alarming scenario for the future of Pakistan and the safety and security of its nuclear arsenal is that Pakistan will increasingly become ungovernable. The writ of the government will be extremely limited or nonexistent as socio-economic pressures intensify, ethnic and regional discontinuities sharpen, and cultural and religious-sectarian intolerance overwhelms the polity. As sophisticated weapons are easily available and several Islamic groups have sufficient experience and motivation to resort to violence in pursuit of their agendas, the competing groups can attempt to settle their scores by resorting to violence. This will further erode the writ of the already tottering government’s authority. This can produce acute political instability, economic turmoil, and societal anarchy. A high degree of turbulence can cause serious threats to the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
However, the probability of such a scenario unfolding is minimal. Pakistan’s state structure may be under stress, but two of its institutions, the military and the bureaucracy, are sufficiently strong and cohesive to ensure the functioning of the state, although they lack the vision to transform it. The changes in Pakistan’s policies after September 11 and especially the availability of international diplomatic and economic support offer new opportunities to Pakistan to reverse the political and economic drift. Pakistan’s economy has shown reasonable improvement in the post September 11 period, although it is still not out of trouble.
The probability that extremist Islamic groups will overwhelm the state is also low. While they do have an ideologically committed cadre, the weaponry, and the experience to engage in violence, they are not expected to succeed in a head-on collision with the Pakistani state. They owe a good part of their strength to the patronage extended to them by Pakistan’s military and intelligence authorities. The non-availability of this support has weakened them. Furthermore, these Islamic groups are not a united or monolithic entity. They differ sharply because of denominational differences and personality clashes. Not all Islamic groups have violent agendas. A number of Islamic groups and parties and leaders of Islamic seminaries (madressahs) maintain that these extremist groups have undermined Islam by engaging in terrorism within and outside Pakistan.
There is hardly any prospect of an extremist Islamic movement led by a cleric, like Khomeini in Iran, taking over the Pakistan state and declaring war on India and the United States. However, the extremist Islamic elements have sufficient capability to resort to violence or engage in terrorist activities from time to time and thus threaten political stability and civic order. Alternatively, they can create enclaves for themselves in far and remote areas (especially close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border) where the writ of the government may be restricted.
A third possible scenario is a coup or counter-coup led by an Islamist general. While the theoretical possibility of this development cannot be ruled out, its chances are remote in the near future. The consensus among Pakistan watchers is that the Pakistan military continues to be a highly professional, hierarchical, and disciplined force. The top command and army headquarters led all previous coups. The Army Chief, Principal Staff Officers, and the Corps Commanders, who meet periodically to deliberate on domestic and security affairs, share decision making in the army. They function on the basis of consensus that is implemented by the Army Chief in a given situation. Internal cohesion is also helped by the fact that the military looks after the material interests of its personnel in service and after retirement. The monitoring of “personnel reliability” for senior officers is strict, and they are not allowed to develop linkages with political groups or leaders or engage in religio-political activism.
Furthermore, the army may use the Islamic elements to advance its goals but the senior commanders are not expected to let the initiative slip into the hands of the Islamic elements. The probability of a pro-Islamic counter-coup against a sitting Army Chief is extremely low. If a general assumes power, he is expected to represent the interests of the military as an institution rather than the agenda of a non-military political or religious group...
The most likely scenario is that power will alternate between the generals and civilian leaders and Pakistan will continue with its off-again, on-again march towards participatory governance. The Pakistani state will be able to function as a political and administrative entity, although its efficacy will vary, depending on internal and external pressures.
What are the implications of these scenarios for the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, fissile and other radioactive materials, and nuclear installations? The apprehensions expressed about their safety and security are exaggerated but not totally unfounded. Given the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear programme began in a clandestine manner, both civil and military governments have always been very sensitive about its confidentiality and security. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is under the security control of the army with a clear command, control, and communication system. The nuclear programme is viewed as a matter of pride and excellence, and is integral to Pakistan’s security. The military authorities thus take its safe custody very seriously. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not expected to fall into unauthorized hands.
Excerpted with permission from
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia
By Rajesh M. Basrur and Hasan-Askari Rizvi
CMC Occasional Papers, US Department of Energy, Oak Ridge TN 37831, USA
Tel: 001-865-576-8401.
Email: reports@Adonis.osti.gov Website:
www.doe.gov.bridge
79pp. Price not listed
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