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December 8, 2002
Enigmatic Kashmir
While examining Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, Iffat Malik writes that Islamabad has periodically tried to incite rebellion in Indian-held Kashmir — generally without success. The current Kashmir insurgency was not the result of Pakistani instigation. But once underway, Pakistan became a vital source of moral and practical support to the Kashmiri Muslims in their struggle to break away from India
What then is Pakistan’s Kashmir policy? Basically, refusal to compromise on its claims to Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir. In international fora this claim tends to be expressed in the following manner: the whole of Jammu and Kashmir is disputed territory and, in accordance with UN resolutions, a plebiscite should be held to determine whether the people of the state wish to join India or Pakistan. In other words, rather than openly demanding the whole state for itself, Islamabad presses for the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris — confident that most would then volunteer to join Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistani leaders condemn India’s integration of its part of the state into the Indian Union, and voice their support for the Kashmir insurgency.
It is important to note that Pakistan (and India for that matter) does not acknowledge a third option for Jammu and Kashmir — that of independence. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, this position is a hang-over from Partition thinking, when the subcontinent was to be divided into just two new political units, India and Pakistan, and all the princely states had to join one or the other. Secondly, a Kashmiri struggle for independence, rather than to join Pakistan, would lose much of its political value at home.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, if Pakistan were to agree to independence for Jammu and Kashmir, it would have to give up those parts of the state currently under its control: Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. The loss of these regions would be a massive blow, both to Pakistan’s economy and its strategic interests (cutting it off from China, for instance), not to mention national pride (after almost thirty years still smarting from the secession of East Pakistan)....
Pakistan’s opposition to Kashmiri independence has influenced its role in the insurgency. Islamabad has been highly selective in its support of militant groups, encouraging groups that are fighting for Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan, and discouraging those fighting for independence. Since militant groups in Kashmir cannot survive without outside backing, this has resulted in the insurgency being dominated by pro-Pakistan groups.
The other point to note, about Pakistan’s involvement in the Kashmir conflict, is that its support has been much less than it could have been. Providing overt support to the Kashmiri militants would obviously place Pakistan in a difficult position internationally, but covertly through the Azad Kashmir administration, or agencies like the ISI, it could give them a lot more practical assistance. By not doing so, it reflects the motives of Pakistani policy-makers: as seen above their support for the Kashmir insurgency arises more from self-interest (justifying arms expenditure, to win popular support, etc.) than genuine concern for Kashmiri Muslims.
Pakistan’s impact on Kashmir
The numerous ways in which Kashmir has come to feature in Pakistan’s domestic politics have been described, as have the ways in which these, in turn, determine Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir. How has Pakistan affected Kashmiri politics? Pakistan’s role in Kashmiri affairs has been both indirect and direct. The former is, as a potential homeland for Kashmiri Muslims, and the latter is, in its promotion and support of secessionist elements. Consider Pakistan’s indirect impact first:
Kashmiri Muslim attitudes to Pakistan have been most influenced by three aspects of the country’s domestic politics. One, the role of Islam in Pakistan. Two, Pakistan’s record with respect to democracy and regional autonomy. And three, Pakistan’s treatment of Azad Kashmir.
The first of these is important because one of the main reasons why Kashmiri Muslims might consider joining Pakistan would be their belief in Jinnah’s two-nation theory. Pakistan was formed as a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent: Kashmiris belong in it because they too are Muslim. It is obvious that this argument can only hold if Pakistan remains true to its Islamic nationhood. If Pakistan were to become a secular state today why should Kashmiri Muslims join it? Apart from Islam, they have little in common with other Pakistanis.
Pakistan’s record on democracy and regional autonomy is important because a major reason for Kashmiri Muslim alienation from India has been New Delhi’s persistent refusal to allow them political participation and autonomy. Kashmiri Muslims are not likely to be drawn toward Pakistan if they are to be denied these rights here as well. Pakistan’s treatment of Azad Kashmir is significant for the same reason. It gives Kashmiri Muslims in India an indication of the kind of treatment they can expect if they join Pakistan. Plus, being the other half of the pre-1947 state of Jammu and Kashmir, it allows for easy comparison between Pakistani and Indian rule.
Taking Islam first, over the last 50 years Pakistan has made very little progress on the path towards becoming an ‘Islamic’ state. What progress it has made has largely been cosmetic and has been motivated by political ambition rather than a genuine desire to implement Islamic government. Pakistan has not even succeeded in persuading its citizens to see themselves primarily in terms of their religion and to unite on this basis; proof of this lies in the country’s limited success in bringing about national integration and in the escalating ethnic and sectarian tensions. A Kashmiri Muslim looking to move from secular (Hindu) India to an Islamic country — as in one run in accordance with the Quran and Sunna — would, therefore, find much in the Pakistan State that contravened Islamic principles.
On the other hand, a Kashmiri Muslim looking to move to a Muslim country — as in one where the majority of inhabitants are Muslim — would feel totally at home in Pakistan. For such a Kashmiri, other factors such as Pakistan’s democratic credentials and its record on regional autonomy would be significant. Pakistan’s record on democracy can at best be described as dismal vis-a-vis changed circumstances. For most of its first 40 years it has been run by the bureaucracy or the military; popular governments were dismissed over the last decade and, finally, on October 12, 1999 military rule was directly established. However, the damage done to the political process by four decades of undemocratic rule was so great that even though democracy was restored for a time, it hardly proved a great success in dealing with the country’s problems.
Turning to the third factor likely to influence Kashmiri Muslim attitudes to joining Pakistan: its treatment of Azad Kashmir. This has not differed greatly from India’s treatment of its Kashmir. Lack of autonomy, intolerance of opposition-led state governments, and (in the case of the Northern Areas) escalating integration have been common elements of both. As such, Indian Kashmiris would have little to gain from exchanging New Delhi’s control for Islamabad’s.
The above would suggest that Kashmiri Muslims would not be interested in joining Pakistan. However, when assessing Kashmiri Muslim views on Pakistan, a number of other points need to be borne in mind. One, that while the major political developments in Pakistan, e.g. the secession of the East Wing to form Bangladesh, changes in government, etc, are reported in the Valley, events such as ethnic and sectarian clashes, anti-government protests, loadshedding, price hikes, etc., are not. This is significant, because it is the latter which give a better indication of public feeling — of how content ordinary Pakistanis are with the state of affairs in their country.
In general, it would be correct to say that the Valley Muslims are not fully aware of what is going on in Pakistan; they are ignorant of many of the problems faced by people there. The consequence of this is that most Kashmiri Muslims have a somewhat rose-tinted picture of Pakistan — their perceptions of it correlate more with the ideal of what it was meant to be, than with the reality of what it actually is.
Second, since the conflict in Indian Kashmir started with its accompanying security clampdown (including human rights abuses) by the authorities, Azad Kashmir and Pakistan undoubtedly appear in a more favourable light to the Valley Muslims. For people living in fear of their sons being dragged off to torture centres, their women raped, or their houses burnt down, the grievances of native Azad Kashmiris will seem insignificant. From their perspective, the most important point will be that Azad Kashmir and Pakistan are places where Muslims are safe.
This combination of lack of detailed information about what is happening in Pakistan and its being seen as a far more secure place for Muslims than India, counteracts the negative feelings that Kashmiri Muslims are likely to host towards Pakistan, because of its far from perfect 50-year record and its treatment of Azad Kashmir.
Consider now, Pakistan’s direct impact on Kashmir. Kashmiri Muslims have been prompted to view Pakistan as an alternative homeland (not simply because it is there: Pakistan has deliberately encouraged them to think like this). It has kept the Kashmir issue alive in the UN and international community generally. It has persistently claimed that Jammu and Kashmir is not an integral part of India but disputed territory, and it has persistently pressed for the UN resolutions on Kashmiri self-determination to be implemented.
The effect of this persistent questioning of Jammu and Kashmir’s membership of the Indian Union on Kashmiris themselves, has, not surprisingly, been to keep the ‘exit door’ from India open. And as Kashmiri Muslims have become more alienated from India because of the various state policies, the Pakistan factor has gained significance.
Pakistan has periodically, most notably in 1965, tried to actually incite rebellion in Indian Kashmir — generally without success. The current Kashmir insurgency was not the result of Pakistani instigation. Once underway, however, Pakistan became a vital source of moral and practical support to the Kashmiri Muslims in their struggle to secede from India. Without active Pakistani support, India would probably have crushed the secessionist movement long ago.
Excerpted with permission from
Kashmir: ethnic conflict, international dispute
By Iffat Malik
Oxford University Press, 5 Bangalore Town, Sharae Faisal, Karachi-75350 Tel: 021-4529025
Email: ouppak@theoffice.net
ISBN 0-19-579622-5
392pp. Rs450
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