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September 29, 2002
REVIEWS: On the snowy heights
When I met Lt General Raghavan in Delhi before reading his book on Siachen, his claim that he had written the first definitive work on the subject sounded pompous. However, after reading the book, I can understand where the author’s confidence came from. This is, indeed, the first respectable piece of research on the subject. Prior to reading the book, one was also unsure of the research and writing skills of army generals, particularly from the Indian subcontinent. Raghavan’s book should dispel this scepticism.
Although presenting an Indian perspective, the 350 page monograph is an excellent study of what the armies of India and Pakistan have been doing at the glacier since 1984. More important, it tells the story of why an insane battle is being fought at such ridiculous heights —and tells it in a readable style. Of course, one does not expect an Indian general to present Pakistan’s perspective. However, the publication makes one wish that a Pakistani military officer could also write a readable and honest account of Siachen or other military adventures/ operations that remain a mystery to the public.
The study analyses the history of the conflict and the conduct of the war. Both Pakistan and India had an eye on the glacier. Contrary to the perspective that launching an operation to take control of the Siachen glacier was a unilateral decision on India’s part, the author’s claim is that Islamabad had started to make the necessary moves to establish control of the glacier and that the Indian military operation was basically to upstage the Pakistan army’s military manoeuvres. Thus, as rightly pointed out by the author: “The Siachen dispute is a prime example of geopolitics influencing policies and strategic choices.”
Apparently, Pakistan wanted to draw a line connecting the point NJ 98428 a point where the LoC and the CFL terminated, with the Karakoram pass. This move was an extension of an earlier move whereby Pakistan had acceded some of its territory to China as per the 1963 boundary agreement between Islamabad and Beijing, a development contested by New Delhi. The initial move was made by Pakistan through changing the lines on the map and exhibiting its control over the glacier through granting mountaineering permits to foreign mountaineers. The author claims that the Indian move, hence, was retaliatory.
Despite the lucid assessment of why the two armies decided to engage each other at such dangerous and unforgiving heights, one still fails to fathom why both sides tend to underestimate each other’s resolve not to allow the other side an inch of extra land. Seemingly, through an occupation of Siachen glacier, which is a fact and not the author’s imagination, Islamabad had hoped to take a roundabout way to solving the Kashmir issue. However, it soon discovered that the issue cannot be solved by either side through a military operation.
According to Lt General Jahandad Khan, who has been cited in this book, the reason for Pakistan’s interest in the glacier was political. The fear was that had the army not responded to Indian moves, the Pakistan army’s lack of initiative would have been exploited by the political opposition. However, the fact is that the armies and the people of both countries are stuck with the conflict in Siachen.
Another significant aspect of this book relates to what it has to say about Pakistan not having control of or a presence in the Siachen glacier. In fact, the author’s claim is that Pakistani troops have been confined to the lower and western slopes of the Saltoro ridge. Furthermore, the Pakistani Army post closest to the Siachen glacier is at a distance of about 15-16 kilometres. Interestingly, the author gives details of the Indian army’s tactical operations describing the manner in which such a target was achieved. This far, there is no authentic research in Pakistan to challenge this claim. With lack of analysts in Pakistan that write on conduct of war it would be difficult for someone to present the picture from this side of the border.
This is the first time that one has come across a study that helps a reader comprehend the complexity of planning an operation at such painful heights. The description of how both Pakistani and Indian troops used dangerous, often suicidal, methods to climb up certain heights or reclaim some land from the other, is nauseating and makes one anxious about the sanity of the policymakers. To be fair to the author, he has given due credit to Pakistani troops for achieving the impossible on certain occasions.
Reading the description of the tactical operations one not only wonders what this insanity is worth, but one can also understand why soldiers fighting at and around Siachen would have little regard for the media’s need for information on this war. Raghavan has an entire section dedicated to the media’s coverage of the conflict and the way journalists are shipped to such heights to cover the ongoing battle. Although one can sympathize with General Raghavan’s own sense of bitterness at how little does the media understand the pain that his men have gone through, the fourteenth chapter seems a bit superfluous. It fails to connect with the rest of the book or the argument in the study.
The negotiations on Siachen have been of significance. What might be of interest to the Pakistani readership are details of the occasions when political governments in Islamabad found themselves at variance with the army during discussions on the issue. There are more than three cases mentioned in the book in which Pakistan’s political governments were at odds with its armed forces. They only reinforce the view that the military keeps the civilian leadership out of the bargaining process on key issues.
Of course, it is hard to imagine a book that is perfect and this study has its problems too. One of the areas where the author might have contributed more was the section on the cost of this conflict. Raghavan cites several people and the figures provided by them. However, he is almost silent on the subject and one does not believe that he did not have access to the information. The cost of conflict is a very important issue in any evaluation of its worth. What makes it doubly important is that the people of India and Pakistan have a right to know the price of their leadership’s insanity. It is only by disclosing the costs can one hope to strengthen the hands of civil society on both sides of the divide to fight their battle with their establishments.
Siachen: conflict without end
By Lt Gen V.R. Raghavan
Viking, Penguin Books, 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi 110 017, India.
Website: www.penguinbooksindia.com
ISBN 0-47-004922-0
240pp. Indian Rs395
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