June 9, 2002

The only thing we can say with authenticity about the nuclear programmes and policies of India and Pakistan is the secrecy that surrounds them. The recent revelation by Bruce Riedel, an official in the Clinton administration, that Nawaz Sharif was kept in the dark about the movement of these weapons by the Pakistani military top-brass even when he was prime minister is the most recent evidence in this regard. Four years down the overt nuclear path (India went nuclear on May 11, 1998; and Pakistan followed suit on May 28, 1998) the causes and consequences of the Indian and Pakistani decisions remain an unsettled issue among analysts.

Given the topical nature of the nuclear issue in South Asia and the plethora of writings that is churned out locally, regionally, and internationally on the matter, few works would withstand the vagaries of the pace of unfolding events. Hilary Synnott’s booklet (originally published as an Adelphi Paper by the Institute of International and Strategic Studies in 1999) does this admirably by virtue of the sound analytical manner in which he conducts the study of the South Asian nuclear conundrum.

Synnott attempts to prescribe ways for the international community (read the Western world) to deal with the two key dilemmas posed by the nuclearization of India and Pakistan. Firstly, how to induce India and Pakistan to cooperate in nonproliferation efforts without legitimizing their possession of nuclear weapons. Secondly, how to reduce the risks surrounding nuclear weapons without assisting in their development.

The author assesses the utility of the sanctions against India and Pakistan in serving the stated goal of preventing nuclear proliferation. We know now that the sanctions did not achieve the intended goal. Synnott perceptively predicted this as early as 1999 by outlining problems inherent in the half-hearted sanctions regime against the world’s two newest nuclear powers. He argues that “pressure on India and Pakistan had historically relied on moral and ethical arguments” which was of little value once “South Asia’s nuclear genie had emerged from the bottle”.

Given the inefficacy of sanctions, I have argued that the initial nonproliferation puritanism propounded by the West, especially the United States, eventually gave way to acceptance of India and Pakistan as de facto nuclear weapon states.

Two points made in the section of the booklet titled “What next?” demonstrate Synnott’s deep understanding of the India-Pakistan rivalry and his balanced approach. He acknowledges that “Kashmir is at the heart of the differences between India and Pakistan”, but is not sure about the practicality of any third party mediation in the dispute as India is unlikely to agree to a direct outside involvement in the issue.

The second point relates to India’s portrayal of the Chinese threat which Synnott does not find convincing. These two points coming from the individual who in his present capacity is serving as the British High Commissioner in Islamabad should make it easier for the Pakistani officials to convey their legitimate concerns to London.

The final chapter discusses various aspects of nuclear capabilities and doctrines of India and Pakistan. Synott correctly observes, “neither India nor Pakistan has fully explained how nuclear weapons would enhance their security”. Four years after the tests with war hysteria yet again engulfing New Delhi and Islamabad, most analysts still have not got convincing answers from either country to the point raised by Synott three years ago.

India’s draft nuclear doctrine never took the shape of coherent nuclear policy and the decisionmakers in Islamabad have relied more on assumptions regarding the efficacy of nuclear weapons in strategic interaction with India than providing concrete evidence regarding the manner in which these weapons have enhanced Islamabad’s security.

For Synnott to “avert war between the region’s nuclear-capable countries” is the main priority of the world community. Once again the present crisis between India and Pakistan suggests that war is yet to become an obsolete means to pursue policies in South Asia. The secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons programmes and sketchy nuclear doctrines only worsen the uncertainty in the region. In such situation, works like Synnott’s should be mandatory reading for makers of security policies of India and Pakistan.

The causes and consequences of South Asia’s nuclear tests
By Hilary Synnott
Adelphi Paper 332,
The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London and Oxford University Press, 5 Bangalore Town, Sharae Faisal, Karachi-75350. Tel: 021-4529025
Email: ouppak@theoffice.net
ISBN 0-19-579766-3. 85pp. Rs195

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