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May 26, 2002
REVIEW: The untold story
ON picking up the book one gets the impression that this is yet another of the memoirs that the Oxford University Press seems extremely fond of publishing. But on reading Mansoor Shah’s The gold bird one is pleasantly surprised by the genuine tone of the book and the author’s fairly honest analysis of the PAF and its history. Mainly covering the period from 1947 to the 1970s, the book provides an assessment of Pakistan’s Air Force and the country’s military planning based on years of experience in the service.
More than any book by army generals or military sponsored analysts, the discussion in this study on the two major wars of 1965 and 1971 with India presents a picture that one had never seen before regarding the strengths and weaknesses of planning and the manner in which personal biases or organizational politics affected the outcome of conflict.
Divided into two chapters of about 150 pages each, the book also gives an insight into the air force’s culture not just that of the organization but of the people as well. The environment, as depicted in the book, was far more relaxed in the earlier years. Those who have experienced the service and have known it in days when the top management was less bigoted can best enjoy the sections where the author describes the social culture, as in Rear Admiral Mian Zahir Shah’s recently published book Bubles of water.
The comparison, however, ends here because Mansoor Shah’s book also provides what the other book doesn’t: a clear-headed analysis of the blunders made during military operations.
There were many gaps in planning. According to this narrative there were five problems: (a) there was a lack of joint planning with the army taking the front seat without bringing other services fully on board, (b) lack of understanding by the other two services of the capabilities, strengths and weaknesses of the PAF, (c) the gap between national strategy and planning at the service headquarters, (d) general inefficiency leading to an inability to capitalize upon the enemy’s weakness, and (e) organizational friction creating situations where initiatives were lost.
For instance, the initiative in the famous Khemkaran operation in 1965 was lost on account of the top management’s inefficiency. If the PAF failed to perform well in 1971 as it did in the 1965 war, it was because of the change of guard at the top which led to the replacement of Asghar Khan by Nur Khan. The new air chief marshal was slow in planning and responding to enemy incursions because he had returned to the service after spending a few years outside in the PIA. Hence he was unable to utilize the service’s capability to the fullest.
Similarly, one learns the reason why the army failed to achieve the objective of invading Jaisalmeer during the 1971 war. Having planned the operation, the army was slow in moving and had not taken the PAF on board. Therefore, the air force could not bail out the land forces when they were stranded in enemy territory.
On reading the book, one also understands how intelligence agencies manage to gain extreme power. Given the quantitative and qualitative imbalance with the adversary, military planning was totally dependent on the intelligence gathering to devise counter measures to thwart a superior enemy.
As compared to the official PAF histories, Shah’s book also provides a better analysis of PAF’s capabilities or the problems it encoutered. For instance, the quantitative imbalance vis-a-vis the enemy was a great disadvantage that was always exacerbated by repeated American embargoes. The service tried to fill such gaps through its peculiar tactical planning whereby the enemy air force would be drawn to areas where it was easier to target intruding aircraft. It was this tactical planning combined with adversary incompetence that allowed the PAF to survive in situations where the enemy had an edge. The narrative presents India and Pakistan as good second world war militaries but wanting in planning bigger operations and joint planning.
The book also provides information previously unavailable to readers of accounts of South Asian armed forces such as the contribution of foreign mercenary officers. The contribution of the Polish officers that served in the PAF after Independence is a subject that one hadn’t heard of. The author is also appreciative of the tradition and training provided by the British officers.
In this respect, the book is original because it does not thoughtlessly criticize the British but also cherishes the service they rendered. In fact, going through the book one is struck by the contrast between the British officers and Pakistani officers. The latter had lesser values in terms of protecting their subordinates or not deflecting responsibility on their juniors for any errors in planning. The author does not fail to criticize the VIP culture in Pakistan. He narrates anecdotes about senior generals who found themselves out of sorts in foreign countries because they were not provided assistance they were used to at home.
Apart from the military analysis, one is also provided interesting information about other issues as well. Unbeknownst to most, one learns how Zulfikar Ali Bhutto removed the air and army chief. He had them arrested by the armed goons of the Pakistan Peoples Party after having invited them for lunch. Another incident narrated about Bhutto relates to the rebuke of his close friend Mustafa Jatoi.
Notwithstanding, these incidents, the author does not shirk from admitting Bhutto’s charisma. An interesting description of the Saudis and their failed defence planning is also available in this book. Even though the author mentions this discreetly, it is easy to assess the inefficiency of the Saudis especially in such cases as their involvement in procuring weapons for kickbacks. The stories regarding the accession of Gwadar and Chitral to Pakistan are informative for readers interested in the country’s history. For once, someone dares to tell the untold stories.
This book is highly recommending. However, the author should have kept his focus on the air force rather than drift into history and politics of the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, the editing of the book is poor. Professional editors could have brought out the best in the book.
The gold bird: Pakistan and its Air Force — observations
By Mansoor Shah
Oxford University Press, 5 Bangalore Town, Sharae Faisal, Karachi-75350 Tel: 021-4529025.
Email: ouppak@theoffice.net
ISBN 0-19-579772-8
318pp. Rs495
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