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May 19, 2002
REVIEW: Victory complex
IN his wide-ranging study, the military historian Brian Bond analyzes the meaning of ‘victory’ in war from the eighteenth century to the present. Notwithstanding its first publication predating the acts of sabotage in America and the latest conflict in Afghanistan by a few years, his book is of immense relevance to today’s world.
Beginning with the ‘Cabinet’ wars, or dynastic conflicts between the European powers of the eighteenth century, the author takes us on an interesting journey down three centuries of warfare. Such wars were common between monarchies in non-ideological, pre-mass-mobilisation times and were fought with conscripted and mercenary armies.
The choice of period is not arbitrary, since this era of what may be called relatively ‘civilized’ limited war with clearly-defined territorial gain as its aim contrasts sharply with the age of religious wars preceding it on the one hand, and the nationalist and revolutionary upheavals of the following two centuries resulting in the unleashing of ‘total’ war, loss of political control and widespread destruction on the other.
The rationalism of the eighteenth century with its Frederick the Great is favourably compared with the romantic spirit of the nineteenth, with Napoleon as its personification.
The thought and influence of great military theorists and historians of the time, such as Clausewitz, are discussed in detail. The wars of German unification (1866 and 1870-71) or the last of the ‘Cabinet’ wars are shown to have been fought according to Clausewitzian principles under Bismarck’s leadership: realizable war aims were achieved by military means under outstanding political guidance, bringing lasting political gains to the victor, i.e. German unification.
Ironically, as the pendulum swings back with the build-up to the First World War, it becomes evident that the very nation that boasted outstanding and pragmatic generals and statesmen like Frederick the Great and Bismarck would also unleash the two world wars.
The author makes technological advancement, jingoism and dwindling political control over the military in most European states and especially in Germany, responsible for the outbreak of the First World War. He argues that Germany lost those wars because they fell far short of the Clausewitzian requirements, mainly due to the over-ambitious war aims of the aggressors. The Entente’s sense of victory after the First World War was greatly qualified by the sheer horrors of its long attritional nature.
Moreover, it came to be seen as a war fought in vain due to the unrealizable ideals of future peace that American participation in the war brought with it. A weak anti-German coalition failed to enforce the peace terms and to prevent German resurrection. Within two decades Germany and Japan made another bid for European and Asian domination respectively, but following in Napoleon’s path, both failed because their aims were unachievable. This time victory was more final for the Allies, followed by the successful integration of the former aggressors into the post-war international system and hence, a more durable peace.
In the last chapter, the author discusses the difficulties of achieving a clear victory in the nuclear age, both as regards nuclear and conventional warfare and the increasing unpopularity of resorting to offensive war in pursuit of national interest. We learn that the significance of the media in creating winners and losers had its origin in the Vietnam war. Of great relevance to the post-September 11 world is his reference to Martin van Creveld’s remarkably accurate prediction that the role of the state in waging war would be taken over increasingly by terrorist organizations in the future, and that the Clausewitzian theory of war in which states are the only participants was therefore outdated.
Before going on to Bond’s notion of what constitutes victory in war, it is only fair to the reader to point out some of the drawbacks of the book. Interestingly, the author does not connect the terms of the Treaty of Versailles with the creation of conditions in Germany favourable to the rise of Hitler and of Nazism, which, when compared with his treatment of Napoleon’s crushing defeat of Prussia in 1806 and the imposition of similar harsh terms that made Prussia determined to rise again, does suggest an Anglo-Saxon bias. This is also evident in his discussion of the Second World War, where he defends controversial decisions such as the British refusal to deal with the internal German resistance to Hitler, the dropping of the atom bomb on Japan by America and the unecessary destruction wrought on German cities by British bombers and the insistence of the allies on unconditional surrender.
And finally, while bemoaning the introduction of morals and ideals into principles of warfare, he falls into the trap of using such words as “evil”, “barbaric” and “immoral” with great frequency, though never for the deeds of the victors.
On the plus side, the reader interested in military history will find a wealth of detail on the comparative strategic and tactical conduct of various battles and on the technical developments in weaponry down the ages. It is also a valuable source of literature related to the subject, both as regards the political context of war and its more operational aspects.
Now to Bond’s concept of victory. On the assumption that the world will never be entirely war-free, and that, therefore, victory, however imperfect, is preferable to defeat, the author stipulates the following conditions under which victory can be hoped for: clear, limited and attainable aims, in both defensive and offensive operations; the constant subordination of military considerations to political guidance, the willingness of the weaker side to accept defeat and most importantly, the ability to work out peace terms that are acceptable not only to the defeated, but to the victor’s allies.
In the light of this, it is easy to see the difficulty of achieving a durable peace in Afghanistan, since the aggressor was a terrorist organization and not a state, the war aims, that is, the capture of OBL, have not been achieved as yet and there was no peace worked out with the defeated, that is, the Taliban. Therefore, they cannot be expected to endorse it, and peace will remain elusive.
In his concluding words, the author makes the prediction that unilateral resort to force and indeed the pursuit of victory in the manner of Napoleon will be rendered more difficult by the compulsions on states to act as “members of international coalitions”. What the US has demonstrated in the case of the Afghan conflict, however, is just the opposite: the creation of a dispensable umbrella of international support to legitimize its action in Afghanistan instead of acting within the framework of NATO. In other words, a thinly disguised tendency to act unilaterally. The disregard of powerful states for the constraints of collective action thus sets dangerous precedents for others to follow, as seen lately in the case of India and Israel.
When asked during a recent interview if certain world leaders were not being tempted to settle other scores under the guise of the war on terrorism, for example with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev replied “the victory complex is one of the most difficult psychological complexes (to understand)”. Certainly, clear-cut and decisive victories may have become impossible to achieve in an increasingly complex world. But the pursuit of victory, however opaque it may seem, is still very much in evidence.
The pursuit of victory: from Napoleon to Saddam Hussein
By Brian Bond
Oxford University Press, 5 Bangalore Town, Sharae Faisal, Karachi-75350 Tel: 021-4529025
Email: ouppak@theoffice.net
ISBN 0 19 579797 3 240pp. Rs200
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