|
|
January 15, 2002
In quest of solutions
Kashmir and the Middle East are two crisis spots in the world today. These disputes have remained unresolved for over five decades. Here Jehangir Pocha suggests a solution for the South Asian hotspot and Blake Lambert has some thing to say on Palestine and Israel
KASHMIR’S independence, the result of choice for many Kashmiris, must be acknowledged to be impossible. The reverberation in both India and Pakistan would be too great. The very concept of a new Islamic state at the heart of Central Asia with a restive and militarized populace would be anathema as much to the West as to both India and Pakistan. Foreign and fundamentalist organizations have penetrated Kashmir even as it lies within India; in an independent Kashmir it is they who would call the shots. Even Kashmiris realize and fear this, for their own brand of Sufi Islam is far removed from the extremist creed evangelized by the terrorists. An independent Kashmir would also be too weak to withstand the influence-peddling that surely would descend on it from China, Pakistan, India, the US, Russia, and possibly Iran.
The key to negotiation in Kashmir is that while both Pakistan and India must be allowed to leave the table feeling able to declare victory at home, care must be taken to show that terrorism itself proved a failure. Any act that could be seen in the Islamic fundamentalist world as victory for the mujahideen would re-ignite the passions the US hopes the new government of Afghanistan will quell and embolden it to explore new grounds.
If a cessation in Pakistani-sponsored terrorism and a corresponding Indian ceasefire could be quickly followed by further confidence-building measures, the process could eventually lead to a demilitarization of the Line of Control. India already has a precedent for this kind of demilitarization: its long-running border dispute with China over the portion of eastern Jammu and Kashmir under Chinese control was defused using a similar strategy. This must be the minimal level of de-escalation the West must aim for, and it would be achievable.
By inserting a “cooling off” period of five years (as in Chechnya) before continuing negotiations, leaders could be given the opportunity to test goodwill on both sides, to prepare their nations and mould public opinion for the final concessions needed for a real peace. These could include Pakistan and India agreeing to surrender all claims to the portion of Kashmir held by the other and accepting the Line of Control as the international (and perhaps open) border, and both beginning a political process in their Kashmiri states that would result in greater autonomy for the local people. In particular, both must also be required eventually to withdraw their armies from Kashmir and to conduct a process of truth and reconciliation.
The net result of this would be a Pakistan surrendering its fundamentalist dimension to win peace with its neighbour and the sturdy friendship, protection, and aid of the West. In Kashmir, it would also retain its existing territory and be able to declare victory credibly by getting India to keep its promise to return autonomy to the Kashmiri people.
India also would have the leeway to declare victory, by saying it has vanquished the terrorist threat while preserving its borders. Within India, both these would serve as the sufficient and necessary conditions to allow the democratic, secular principles to retain relevance and for the union to grow in strength along lines the rest of the region could emulate.
A Russia-China-India alliance is tenable only with India’s participation. A resurgent India reassured of Western intentions by recognition of its national interests would emerge as a principal and strategic ally, which also would help keep Russia firmly within the Western alliance while leaving China somewhat peripheral but cooperative, greatly contributing to America’s view of a stable global order.
It would be disingenuous to fudge the fact that the Kashmiri people would walk away with less than anyone else. They would get neither their independence, nor their unification. But they could get an internationally guaranteed peace with open borders, self-governance, self-respect, and democratic freedoms. The process of economic revival and social reconstruction would be long and hard, requiring international aid and federal grants from New Delhi. But it should work, for more than anything the Kashmiris yearn for normality to return to their daily lives.
Clearly, achieving this scenario would prove difficult. But never before has it been more possible. In addition to the conditions created by September 11, the world is fortunate that the BJP and the Pakistani army rule their respective countries today, for in much the same way that the US Republicans were the only party that could have opened up to China, these parties are the only ones that can bring a solution to Kashmir. Leaders whose personal views are wise, practical and moderate currently lead both. While no one will leave the table entirely happy, one must remember what the great soul of South Asia, the Dalai Lama teaches: all nations have their own karma. No one has played clean in Kashmir, so no one can come out a total winner. And as Professor Jay Spiegel of Harvard University teaches, a good negotiation is one where all players leave the table a little bit unhappy. Wisely and steadfastly communicated so that it appeals to the innate rectitude of most South Asians, this could come to be accepted by most people on all sides. It is said that the Statue of Liberty was originally meant to be erected in the Suez Canal, but chance disruptions in the French colony brought change to the area, so Bartholdi’s copper masterpiece was gifted to the US. Even if this less than flattering story is true, it does not make the Statue of Liberty any less meaningful. If disruptions elsewhere can bring gifts to South Asia’s shores, we should welcome them and use them well.
Middle East
The two sides now are locked in a low-intensity war and a diplomatic crisis. At times, the basic parameters of the solution appear within reach: two states for two people, with Jerusalem as the shared capital. It is a seductive idea for both sides: the Palestinians get an independent state; Israel gets a border separating itself from the Palestinians. Then reality sets in, and the problems return: defining what both sides mean by the words “Jerusalem”, “borders’, and “refugees.” Even Sharon said in November that he supports the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
But Sharon and the Israeli right are committed to Jerusalem as a united capital and are unwilling to uproot many settlements in the West Bank. Forget about a compromise on Palestinian refugees. Sharon has said he will never offer what Barak put on the table at Camp David. The Palestinians rejected the Barak proposal that gave them about 90 per cent of the West Bank and parts of Jerusalem because it failed, they say, to give them a viable state, satisfy their rights to East Jerusalem, and adequately address the right of return for refugees to inside Israel.
Arafat may not be prepared to make major concessions on the right of return; Israeli Jews across the political spectrum favour, at most, a very restricted return. Proposing to divide Jerusalem, as demonstrated by the pro-unification rallies and rhetoric after Barak put the holy city on the table in late 2000, will be difficult enough. Of course, all of this assumes that the two sides will eventually resume peace talks. It also assumes an Israeli government willing to negotiate.
Meanwhile, the Palestinians will not give up their intifada any time soon. There is widespread support for the revolt against the Israeli occupation, though there’s an internal dispute under way about whether it should continue as it is or adopt forms of non-violent resistance. Palestinians will not trade in their last weapon, the intifada, for general statements and promises from the US and the international community, asserted Andoni [physics professor at Bir Zeit university and head of the Rapprochement Centre]. According to him, there can be no ceasefire until Israel demonstrates a genuine interest in talks, or until the international community is serious enough to implement a solution. Israel rejects the idea of any international intervention, whether that involves sending observers to the occupied territories or imposing a settlement. “Americans cannot deliver or impose or promise a solution, because America works by its own interests,” said Diker [a Harvard educated Israeli-American who lives in a settlement southwest of Jerusalem]. “America’s interests are not Israel’s interests, and therefore there must be just direct negotiations between the parties.”
If that’s the solution, then there is no solution, according to Andoni. He told me a modified version of the plan presented by Bill Clinton at the end of 2000 — a “Clinton plan plus” — presented the only option. Those principles called for Israel to hand over the Gaza Strip and 95 per cent or more of the West Bank. Jerusalem would be divided: Jewish neighbourhoods would remain Israeli, Arab neighbourhoods would be under Palestinian sovereignty. The status quo would continue on the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif, where the Palestinians would hold custody over all areas except the Western Wall. Andoni said the plus plan would have to deal more seriously with refugees; if painfully accepted by the Palestinians, it would not solve the issue justly or ideally. But it could be the only chance for an imposed peace both sides could finally live with.
Otherwise, he predicted the war of attrition that has killed hundreds of people will continue. The US plans for a stable ceasefire, confidence-building measures — the Palestinians crack down on terrorism and incitement; Israel freezes settlement construction — and an eventual return to the negotiating table will never happen. “You can come to a situation where it’s relatively calm, but the next day a settler is killed there. And the other day, a couple of Palestinians are shot dead there,” said Andoni. “If Israel accepts that [situation], we accept it. We are willing to live with that so that we will negotiate, but this is the situation. And if it’s left to the two parties to solve (the crisis), this is the way we’re going to do it.”
Excerpts from
Dispatches from a wounded world
Edited by Ethan Casey and Leah Kohlenberg Booksurge Com
Tel: 1-866-308-6235.
Website: www.booksurge.com
ISBN 1-59109-066-0.
258pp. US$14.99
|
|
