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January 8, 2002
REVIEW: Pakistan’s nemesis
AFGHANISTAN is an enigma in the world community. It is Pakistan’s quagmire, a legacy of the British imperial times. The Durand Line divides the Pakhtuns into two international entities. The war against the imperialist ‘great game’ created movements, which ranged from the Khudai Khidmatgar to the Mujahideen and then the Taliban. The objectives were always mixed, and ended in chaos.
Ahmed Rashid, a well-seasoned journalist, has revamped his twenty-one years of reporting into a concise book, focused on the Taliban. He connects the growth of this movement with militancy and the oil politics of the Central Asia. In his quest for information about the Taliban (literally meaning students), he has travelled extensively, talking with relevant personalities in the region. Rashid’s writings are now becoming popular with the Europeans and the Americans who find themselves hopelessly outdated in their knowledge of Afghanistan. Now they want to know more about the country since the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989, and the emergence of the Taliban in 1994.
The Afghan story is a sordid and sad one. In 1973, the monarchy was replaced by a republic with the help of progressive elements, belonging to the socialist/communist streams. With the infighting and chaos in the ranks of the ruling groups, the Soviets intervened in 1979. The United States with the help of Pakistan created the Mujahideen to fight the ‘infidels’. The American CIA’s pouring in funds in the region also benefited the Pakistani ISI, which acted as the channel to the Mujahideen. Young men from Muslim countries from all over the world, including Saudi Arabia, made their way to Afghanistan and were recruited to fight the war against the Russians.
Special schools (madressahs) were set up to train the holy warriors from the refugee camps in Pakistan. Funds from the US and Saudi Arabia were used to train the Mujahideen but also helped corrupt the ISI and the government functionaries at all levels who were involved in Afghanistan.
After the downfall of Najibullah in 1992, a fierce power struggle broke out among the warlords. The Taliban triumphed and seized control of over 90 per cent of the country. They introduced a strictly orthodox version of Islam in Afghanistan, which transformed the social and political lives of the Afghans. The economy was in ruins, and the narcotic trade flourished corrupting the young generation with easy money and drug addiction. The global multinationals bribed the Taliban with the idea of gaining control of the possible gas pipeline through Afghanistan to the South Asian markets. Thus a new great game ensued in which the US got involved first on the side of the Taliban and subsequently against them.
In this Afghan saga, Pakistan has become its own worst enemy. Islamabad has sought to get involved in Afghan affairs. Z.A. Bhutto instigated young Afghans, including Engineer Hikmatyar, to fight against the pro-Soviet Daud regime. Ziaul Haq became an enthusiastic conduit for CIA arms and money to the Afghans to launch operations against the Soviet Union. When the Soviets left, the Mujahideen were encouraged to expand their missionary zeal to the world beyond Afghanistan.
The ISI, which grew in strength on the basis of its Afghan adventure, carried Zia’s legacy further. It became the architect of Pakistan’s Afghan policy under the civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. According to the author, Naseeruddin Babar, Bhutto’s Pakhtun Interior Minister, took credit for the Taliban’s success, telling journalists privately that the Taliban were “our boys”.
In a key chapter “Master or victim: Pakistan’s Afghan war”, Rashid observes that as the Taliban movement expanded, it became increasingly unclear as to who was driving whom. Pakistan rather than being the master of the Taliban, instead became its victim. The Taliban refused to recognize the Durand Line or drop Afghanistan’s claims to parts of the NWFP. They fostered Pakhtun nationalism, albeit of an Islamic character, and it began to affect Pakistani Pakhtuns. There were fears of the Talibanization of Pakistani society. There was even talk of the Pakhtunizing the Punjab army and Pakistan’s need for strategic depth against its primary enemy, India.
The euphoria, which characterized the military establishment’s approach to the Taliban created hostility among the immediate neighbours. Olivier Roy, a French scholar, noted:
“The apparent victor, Pakistan, would pay dearly for its success. The triumph of the Taliban has virtually eliminated the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan ... The de facto absorption of Afghanistan will accentuate centrifugal tendencies within Pakistan.”
After the American attack on Afghanistan in October 2001, the dynamics might have changed in the short run, but it remains to be seen, how Pakhtun solidarity across the border would crystallize in the years to come. It is imperative to understand the socio-ethnic structural compulsions of the region. Journalistic reporting is appetizing, like instant food for the news-hungry; but for strategic policy options structural analysis is vital. Dan Rather, (American) CBS news anchorman, after twenty years of reporting on Afghanistan makes this confession:
“Afghanistan is one of the most difficult places on earth to understand. Facts are few, opinions are fierce.The trouble is ignorance, and it manifests itself variously. Despite Afghanistan’s historic importance, I have met only a few people in any other country who are familiar with Afghanistan’s history. In my own country I have met only a few people who know where Afghanistan is..”
The dangers of inaccurate analysis with sensational reporting are far-reaching; the Afghan crisis has engulfed the Muslims around the world. Certain emotive words have been camouflaged into political vocabulary — Jihad, holy warriors, mujahideen, crusade, infinite justice, and the word Taliban itself. Although Ahmed Rashid is an insider, his Euro-American editors even changed words, which became meaningless. For instance, Talibs is used incorrectly as a plural, or Mujahideen for singular. (An American, Afghan expert wrote in a scholarly article about Mr Taliban). Proper use of the vocabulary is essential for making sense of the context in a story.
It is crucial to understand that all monotheistic religions are based on some godly power of revelation, but in daily life, that is mixed with rituals and cultural practices. The Afghan society is tribal and overwhelmingly rural, solidified by tribal loyalties. There is an urbanized population in Kabul, distinguished by ethnic origins of Pakhtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras or Uzbeks. Tribal and urban cultural habits are confused with religious decrees. Consequently, there is a constant bickering about the interpretation of Islam, or who is a good Muslim. The author also alludes to all this confusion, but the use of words like militant Islam, or fundamentalist Islam are emotive and create political problems. Afghanistan and its Taliban have to be understood on their own terms.
The author responded promptly to the international demand for a book on the Taliban, and has managed to put a lot of material in one small book. Such an enterprise proves to be a mixed blessings. It should be read carefully by Pakistanis to understand how Islamabad’s Afghan policy has changed the country dramatically.
Taliban: the story of the Afghan warlords
By Ahmed Rashid
Pan Books. Available with Paramount Books, 152/O, Block 2, PECH Society, Karachi-75400 Tel: 021-4310030
Email: paramount@cyber.net.pk
ISBN 0-330-49221-7 276pp. £7.99. Rs525
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