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January 8, 2002
REVIEW: Last days of united Pakistan
AHMED Salim’s book is a collection of the personal impressions of leaders from Bengal and West Pakistan, press statements and excerpts from official documents. Instead of providing some clear answers about how and why Pakistan was dismembered in 1971, the book provides lessons in the do’s and don’ts of compiling documents in the form of a book. The structure of the publication is such that it does not seem to have had much intervention from the editor. Clearly, his primary contribution has been to collect the material for publication.
The foreword written by him does not accomplish the task of setting the scene for the events which are covered by the documents. Nor does he explain what he has tried to achieve through this publication. The foreword provides an insufficient summary of some developments - the level being that of college textbooks we have in Pakistan. Given the crucial nature of the material brought together in the book, its use is primarily for the researcher collecting information on the 1971 crisis.
The book, which comprises four parts, doesn’t help to clear the reader’s confusion about the events of 1971. With no real analysis, the publication presents a collection of documents and personal views of those locked in the political conflict of the time. Hence, there are articles and excerpts which reflect a clear divide between the thinking of political leaders from East and West Pakistan. Students of Pakistan’s politics have been were always been aware of this political divide, hence, it is difficult to comprehend what contribution was intended by the publication of another 387-page book. One also hopes that, perhaps, one day someone will write a lucid and objective history of Pakistan in 1971 — the year of crisis.
The first part of the book comprises four sub-sections. The first sub-section contains articles of three Bengali leaders followed by the second section comprising views of two PPP leaders including Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Abdul Hafeez Kardar. The third section is a copy of the official white paper on East Pakistan followed by the last section containing excerpts of statements of General Yahya before the Hamoodur Rahman Commission and the Lahore High Court. The difference of opinion between the Awami League and the People’s Party leaders is most pronounced. While the former blame Bhutto and the West Pakistani military for their barbaric treatment of the East Pakistani populace, and the devious manoeuvring which characterized politics of that period, the latter place all the blame on Sheikh Mujeeb. According to them, he insisted on dividing Pakistan into two.
Additionally, Dr Kamal Hossain and Rehman Sobhan’s pieces describe how the Bengali leadership conducted a diplomatic onslaught internationally against the West Pakistani government. They also provide their impressions of Yahya’s political tactics. The blame is put squarely on Yahya and Bhutto.
The pieces by the PPP leaders, on the other hand, describe how Pakistan was dismembered primarily because of the political ambitions of Sheikh Mujeeb. Bhutto says he was strongly opposed to Mujeeb’s peculiar formula of power-sharing, and, in fact, the slogan of idhar hum udhar tum was primarily Mujeeb’s and not Bhutto’s. These pieces project an image of Bhutto, in his own words, as a considerate politician who had instructed the Army to treat Sheikh Mujeeb with kindness on the eve of the Bengali leader’s arrest.
Yahya’s statement published in the book appears to exonerate Bhutto of any responsibility. In his view, Bhutto was the one leader who opposed the division of power formula.
The views/statements of political leaders like Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Mufti Mehmood in the second part of the book provide an assessment from a different angle. The excerpts from Wali Khan’s statement to the Hamood Commission put the blame squarely on Bhutto for putting the country’s politics on the course of a division. In his view, it was Bhutto alone who supported the idea of an independent Bangladesh in order to get control of power in the western wing. Mufti Mehmood’s statement to the Commission appears simplistic in treating the postponement of the National Assembly session as the primary cause of the dismemberment.
The third part of the book comprises a number of press statements of different political leaders and government officials in the last ten days followed by the last part containing the text of General Yahya’s broadcast and an article on events prior to the genocide in East Pakistan. The third part of the book almost gives an impression that the book was hurriedly put together because one fails to understand the criterion used by the editor in including some press statements while dropping others.
Indubitably, the political scene in 1971 was complex and the crisis was deeper than is believed. Without an understanding of the issues, the political personalities and the background of the political and constitutional developments of that period, a reader would not gain much comprehension of the 1971 crisis by reading these personal accounts about the last days of united Pakistan.
It would be of greater help to a reader and a researcher if a comprehensive analysis of the crisis on the basis of these documents had been written as an introduction to the book informing the reader about the genesis of the crisis and how it evolved with greater focus on the last ten days. All the material that forms the main text of the book could have then been included with an explanatory note about the context in which it appeared.
A number of doctoral theses have been written on the 1971 crisis while many people, who were active participants in the events of those days, have published their memoirs. There is still a dearth of succinct study on the dismemberment of Pakistan. One is reminded of Farida Aziz’s doctoral thesis on the subject which has not been published and (late) Brigadier Siddiq Salik’s book, Witness to surrender and Tiger Niazi’s The betrayal of East Pakistan which present a one sided view of events. Hasan Zaheer’s The separation of East Pakistan is by far the best enunciation and analysis of the 1971 crisis.
But the subject has not been exhausted. What was the role played by the West Pakistani civil and military bureaucracy in leading to the eventual crisis? What was the response of the different leaders? What was the Pakistan Army’s approach towards the entire political crisis? How did the Army feel about a wing that was a strategic liability and did it have an impact on the way the military operated in East Pakistan? These are some of the vital questions that must be answered in an extremely objective and unemotional analysis of the subject. As a reader, one only hopes that one day someone musters the courage to present an unbiased analysis.
Ten days that dismembered Pakistan: March 15-March 25, 1971 — the real story of the Yahya-Mujib talks
Compiled and edited by Ahmad Salim
Dost Publications, 8-A Khayaban-e-Suhrawardy, Islamabad.
ISBN 969-496-141-6 387pp. Rs250
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