December 11, 2001

Did Pakistan have to explode a nuclear device in May 1998? Kamal Matinuddin looks at the happenings of that eventful month after India had conducted its own nuclear tests

Nawaz Sharif, prime minister of Pakistan at the time, was under intense pressure from foreign powers not to give a tit for tat reply to India. President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke several times to Nawaz Sharif on the telephone. While recognizing Pakistan’s right to self-defence, they urged him to refrain from conducting a nuclear test in response to that by India. Clinton indicated that a show of restraint would produce economic, political, and security benefits. The Japanese ambassador in Islamabad, after delivering a personal message from his prime minister, told reporters: ‘We share Pakistan’s concerns but we have asked Islamabad to act with utmost restraint.’

Unlike Germany, Japan, and South Korea, all of whom were provided with security guarantees by the United States, Pakistan was given no such assurances. Nor was India likely to adhere to the universal concept that nuclear weapons should not be used against non-nuclear weapon states. Michael Mandelbaum, professor at John Hopkins University, correctly argued that since India had detonated a series of nuclear weapons, a stable nuclear equilibrium in Asia would only be possible if Pakistan were to also become a nuclear power.

The pressure on Sharif from within Pakistan to immediately detonate a nuclear device was mounting. It was made more intense when India began to warn Pakistan to roll back its anti-India policy and vacate Azad Kashmir. Advani asked Islamabad to realize the change which had occurred in the regional geostrategic situation now that India had become a nuclear power. ‘India’a bold and decisive step to become a nuclear weapon state has brought about a qualitative new stage in Indo-Pakistan relations, particularly in finding a solution to the Kashmir problem. It signifies India’s resolve to deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan’s hostile designs and activities in Kashmir,’ thundered India’s interior minister. Very few in Pakistan could remain calm when such provocative statements were being issued by the Indian leadership.

Madan Lal Korana, India’s minister for parliamentary affairs, during his visit to Indian-held Kashmir is reported to have asked Pakistan to nominate a time and place where it wanted to fight the fourth round. Farooq Abdullah, the puppet chief minister of IHK, advised the government of India to launch a very strong and decisive battle against Pakistan and taunted Pakistan to detonate its nuclear device if it had one.

The Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat, who was also the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee at Joint Staff Headquarters, remained in constant touch with the Prime Minister. He is believed to have apprised him of the shift in the strategic balance, which now had tilted heavily in favour of the adversary. The military establishment was justifiably becoming more concerned at the belligerent attitude adopted by the BJP after the atomic blasts. Already numerically superior to Pakistan in conventional forces, a nuclear India had become a serious threat to the security of the country.

The army also put pressure on the government to let India know, in no uncertain terms, ‘that Pakistan also possessed weapons of mass destruction. The army brass was, however, conscious of the economic fallout of a nuclear blast by Pakistan and, therefore, had left the final decision to the prime minister.

Although President Ronald Reagan had once said, ‘We hope to address through conventional means the source of insecurity that prompt nations like Pakistan to seek a nuclear capability in the first place,’ but when the crunch came, the United States had shown no willingness to boost Pakistan’s economic situation nor strengthen its conventional military capabilities in the face of the new threat from India. The reported offer of releasing the twenty-four F16s (for which Pakistan had already made the payment and which had become useless while parked on the tarmac for a decade), if Pakistan did not follow suit, was spurned by Nawaz Sharif.

According to a poll taken by Gallup Pakistan (an organization of the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion) on May 25, 1998, among a nationally representative sample of more than 1000 statistically selected urban men and women, 64 per cent favoured an immediate response, or a response, within a few months, to India’s nuclear blast, 30 per cent favoured restraint and only six per cent were totally opposed to a nuclear test by Pakistan.

As time went by, the demand within the country for Pakistan to also carry out a nuclear test was growing, particularly because India was not being punished by the world community for having blown the nuclear non-proliferation and the disarmament process to bits. Almost all editorials in the daily newspapers were in support of a nuclear blast. The right wing parties were becoming restless at the indecision of the prime minister. The Jamaat-i-Islami began to doubt Dr Abdul Qadeer’s claim that he was only waiting for the green signal from the government. It was pressing Sharif to give a befitting reply to the Indians and threatened to bring down his government if he did not listen to the voice of the people. Gohar Ayub somewhat pacified the Jamaat-i-Islami chief, Qazi Husain Ahmed, by saying that it was no longer a question of if, but, when Pakistan would explode its own nuclear device.

American spy satellites, which had either not picked up the preparations of the Indian scientists at Pokhran or the information they had obtained was deliberately disregarded by the Clinton administration, now hovered over Pakistan’s possible nuclear testing grounds in Balochistan. On May 26, CNN reported that atomic devices had been placed underground and that concrete was being poured to stabilize them.

What precipitated the decision was a perceived threat of an air strike on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities at Kahuta. A report that Israeli aircraft had been spotted landing on Indian airfields on May 27, 1998, and that they were planning to carry out an air strike hours before Pakistan detonated its five nuclear devices, was taken very seriously. Gohar Ayub is believed to have informed the United States about the Israeli plans on the same day.

Israel confirmed that its cargo aircraft had flown to Uzbekistan on May 27 and was carrying two armour-plated cars for the visit of prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to that country. No one in Pakistan believed the story and people were convinced that Israel did intend to destroy the Kahuta nuclear facility. After all, it had done so in the case of the OSIRAK nuclear establishment in Iraq. The stage was set for a befitting response to India’s nuclear tests. The mountains of Ras Koh range in Balochistan had been chosen earlier for a nuclear detonation, if ever it became necessary, to demonstrate to the world that Pakistan had the technological skill to gate crash into the exclusive nuclear club.

The site of a nuclear explosion must fulfil a number of conditions. The area has to be desolate so that no one is exposed to the ill-effects of any residual radio activity. The rocks surrounding the underground tunnel should be strong enough to withstand the tremendous pressure exerted by the atomic explosion, and should be able retain the radio activity within itself. The ground around it must be bone dry as wet conditions are not conducive to get accurate data. After an extensive survey of several possible sites, Chagai was selected in the early 1980s. Like Nevada in USA, Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union, Lop Nor in China, and the Rajasthan desert in India, Chagai was also located on barren land, away from all habitation and the prying eyes of foreign intelligence gathering agencies. A tunnel around 1000 metres long, 4 metres wide, 3.5 metres high and 230 metres below the mountain range was then dug by army engineers. The tunnel at the far end was shaped like a fishhook to prevent any leakages of radio activity. By 1991, the site was fully ready for a nuclear explosion, and was finally put to use in May 1998.

Dr Ishfaq Ahmad, Chairman of the PAEC, was lying in a United States hospital when he got the news of India having detonated a series of nuclear devices. He also heard of the threatening statements being made by the Indian leadership, asking Pakistan to accept the new realities and to vacate Azad Kashmir. Realizing that his presence in Pakistan at this critical juncture would be necessary, he slipped out of the hospital against his doctor’s advice and reached Pakistan to carry out the necessary preparations for nuclear tests, if ordered by the government to do so.

Dr Samar Mubarakmand, Member (Technical) Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and head of the Chagai team, was asked by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to prepare for the tests some time in the third week of May 1998. The team worked day and night to complete the task as soon as possible. They were working under extreme weather conditions and had only make-shift tents to live in. Infrastructure was totally absent, and even drinking water had to brought in from the nearest town which was hundreds of kilometres away. The device and all the necessary sophisticated equipment had to be transferred by air to Chagai.

Preparations for the detonations could no longer be carried out in complete secrecy as American satellites were constantly passing over Balochistan and transmitting photographs of the site to all those agencies which were monitoring developments around Chagai. But no one was bothered, as they had only one thing on their mind — to see that every thing was in place and that no step was left out and every connection was checked and re-checked to avoid the possibility of any failure.

After the device was placed just below the highest portion of the mountain, referred to as zero point, and all wiring was attached to the respective equipment, the tunnel was closed at several places by thick cement walls. The telecommand station was located ten kilometres from the zero point.

H-hour was drawing near. At 3:15 p.m. on 28 May 1998, the button that set in motion the steps needed to detonate the weapon was pressed by the team leader. Samar Mubarakmand says, ‘Instead of the Western count-down system, we pressed the button with the slogan Allah-o-Akbar. It took another thirty-one seconds for the computer to relay all the messages. Every one was praying for all things to go right. All eyes were on the mountain. Thirty-five seconds after the activation of computer control, a big jolt was felt and the mountain peak began to change colour as the temperature of the rocks rose to 3000 degree Celsius.’

In addition to the main test, four sub-kiloton tests were also conducted in the same mountain range at the same time.