Trying to change the thinking of Pakistan's geo-strategic warriors must rank as one of the more difficult intellectual undertakings in the Third World. This thinking gave us the doctrine of strategic depth in Afghanistan and that of jihad in Kashmir.

When under the threat of George Bush's ultimatum our military command ditched the Taliban, 'strategic depth' straightaway flew into the trashcan of history.

Any government with its wits about it would have ditched the Taliban and its mediaevalism long before September 11. But it had to take a major catastrophe and an ultimatum for Pakistan's generals to be converted to a new way of thinking.

Any government at all capable of clear thinking would have reassessed the doctrine of Kashmiri jihad at the same time if not much earlier. But it has taken the Pakistan military two years before realizing the need for a rethink.

American pressure has been a factor plus the growing sense of disenchantment among the jihadists themselves. Having been used as cannon fodder for the last 15 years and now being dubbed as a threat to the country, they have every reason to feel betrayed. Is it any wonder if they are turning against their erstwhile masters?

Pakistan's rulers, especially those gifted to the nation through coups and other constitutional innovations, have honed the talent of not doing the right thing at the right time.

If, occasionally, they have done the right thing it has not been on their own, or on the basis of their own thinking, but as a result of outside pressure. So it has been with jihad.

This is not abrupt u-turnism but being compelled to come to the right conclusions four years too late. Kargil had exposed the bankruptcy of the military's Kashmir policy. There should have been no reason to continue with jihad after that especially when the entire concept of jihad was based on wrong premises.

India could be bled up to a point but not forced to the negotiating table. Nor could the status quo be altered. So what was the Pakistan army trying to achieve? No one knows, not even the masterminds of this policy.

After these debacles you would probably expect some sense of contrition among the samurai who have been inflicting their geo-strategic theories on a hapless nation.

For 20 years in the case of Afghanistan and for 15 in the case of Kashmir they promoted policies whose bankruptcy is now proven. If this were the corporate world - say if General Motors or Toyota had produced a car which didn't sell - there'd be a Stalinist purge of the management cadres. And desperate questions would be asked as to how the corporate gurus had got it so wrong.

But this being the hallowed world of the Pakistani samurai no questions will be asked. No questions were ever asked about the loss of East Pakistan. (The Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report was an academic treatise leading to no action against anyone.) No soul living or dead can claim to have ever detected any contrition on the countenance of Pakistan's eastern commander, Lt Gen Niazi.

No questions were asked about the folly of our Afghan policy. Most of the generals who beat the drums of that disastrous policy are still around (in good health), some of them regular nuisances on the seminar circuit. Rest assured no questions will be asked about Kashmir.

There is a school of thought which says Gen Musharraf should be commended for his boldness, applauded for taking the bull of extremism by the horns. Firstly, no bull of any kind is being taken by the horns.

Jihad may be on the verge of being wrapped up (and a good thing too) but on the political front Musharraf has come to terms with the nearest thing Pakistan has to the Taliban, the mullahs of the MMA. What kind of a modern republic can such an alliance portend?

Secondly, the decisions now being taken should have been taken four years ago. Should Musharraf be applauded for boldness or exposed for procrastination? This is not hairsplitting. The mother of all Pakistan's problems is the military's shadow on every aspect of national life. Unless this shadow recedes Pakistan will not find the holy grail of an enduring democracy.

Why did we cut such a lousy deal with the Americans? Because with a military government in charge and Pakistan over-stretched in Afghanistan and Kashmir, we were in no position to press for better terms from the US. We had to do what we were told. And we had to be content with whatever payment we received.

We have sacrificed other things in order to keep up our guard against India. But far from strengthening us this policy has only made us more vulnerable to outside pressure.

It is good we are now opening up to India, good that fresh winds are blowing across the subcontinent. But this should have happened long ago. If the military had not been in charge this rapprochement would have come sooner.

Meanwhile on the domestic front, as if to prove Pakistan's inability to learn anything from its troubled past, another parliament and another set of politicos have endorsed the consequences of another coup d'etat. This move is being hailed as a step towards democracy. If Pakistan's past is any guide, it is no such thing, merely more trouble laid up for the future.

It's not a question in bad taste but one going to the heart of our predicament: suppose, God forbid, either of the two assassination attempts on Musharraf had succeeded? Who would have stepped into Musharraf's shoes? A Musharraf clone, another general? Is this the stability we have achieved in four years?

Four years is a pretty long time. The First World War lasted for four years. Hitler made Germany ready for war in four years. What has Musharraf's military government to show for itself in four years? (Not that Hitler should be taken as an example.)

Another thing: what's happening to our nuclear programme? General Musharraf says only a traitor would roll it back. Reassuring words but what's the reality on the ground? Two top officials of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) which gave Pakistan its uranium-enrichment capability have been picked up for questioning in connection with charges that rogue elements in Pakistan's nuclear community may have sold, "for personal gain", nuclear secrets to Iran.

Both officials are close associates of Dr A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's uranium-enrichment programme. Until removed by Gen Musharraf from KRL, Dr Khan was everything in KRL, its godfather, operational head and foreign minister. Not a pin could move there without his permission.

This is a dangerous slope for Pakistan to walk on. It's no use pretending that anything our scientists/officials reveal will not be known to the Americans. If a Pakistani connection to Iran's nuclear programme is established, it'll be another stick in American hands with which to beat Pakistan.

Conclusion: (1) Pakistan has not been made stronger by the parliamentary endorsement given to Musharraf's rule. Its polity remains as fragile as ever. (2) All our history teaches us that a civilian not a military dispensation is the best guardian of what we choose to call the national interest. Can the military be expected to heed this lesson? To judge by the past, the answer is no.