WHO would have thought only a short time ago that the supremely confident General Musharraf, taking a leaf out of the soiled books of General Zia-ul-Haq and Nawaz Sharif, would see the point of going to lowly roofs to offer prayers for the dead?

But this is precisely what he did this week, taking time out of his busy schedule to first visit Lahore to condole the death of the trader, Nadeem Akhtar, who fell a victim to the interrogating zeal of the Faisalabad Sales Tax Department and then, the same day, to fly onwards to Karachi to offer fateha at the house of the slain clerical figure, Maulana Yousaf Ludhianvi. While talking to the Maulana's family the general said that the demand being voiced by religious circles for declaring Friday a holiday would be given careful consideration. He also let it be known that he would be addressing the nation every month, something for which, until now, he has not felt the need.

These have been small gestures but in them can be seen the seeds of a reluctant turnaround. This was a government glorying in its insularity, sure of its power and convinced that it knew all the answers. Now it is learning politics the hard way, not from the press or discarded politicians but at the hands of traders and maulvis.

Over the anti-blasphemy law the military government was well-advised to beat a hasty retreat because in the circumstances it would have made no sense to get embroiled with the religious lobby. The issue was peripheral and should never have been raised at this stage. But how will the government fare in its coming battle with the traders?

There is no denying the need for documenting the economy and cracking down on tax evasion. But then there is also no denying the need for cracking down on illegal weapons, smuggling, drug trafficking, corruption, bribery, sifarish and the hundred other ills which plague Pakistan? The question is not one of desire, because all of us want to ride the moon and see Pakistan strong and prosperous, but of what is possible and what is not.

A man wanting to climb Everest prepares for it. In fact, if he is a dedicated mountaineer, his whole life will be a preparation for it. Before going onto the offensive an army builds up its strength and tries to acquire superiority in numbers and materiel over the enemy. This is not rocket science but elementary wisdom. The military government, however, right from the start has been embarking on half-cocked initiatives without thought or preparation. The subsequent retreats have thus come as no surprise.

Was some of this attitude born of the events of October 12? Having bundled out Nawaz Sharif very easily, was the army under the impression that solving other problems would be equally easy? If so, it has been labouring under a delusion. In Pakistan about the easiest thing to do is to oust a civilian government.

A few truckloads of soldiers from 111 Brigade stationed in Westridge and the trick is done. By contrast, getting a patwari or a thanedar, let alone anyone else, convicted for bribery or dereliction of duty is infinitely more difficult. The wisdom of the parade ground simply does not work that effectively in all situations.

Also instructive is the case of the interior minister now mercifully quiet these past few days. He has declared any number of offensives against illegal weapons, smuggling, Bara markets and even traders. What has become of them? Even otherwise, in the seven months that it has been around, the only conspicuous success that the military government can claim is against street vendors and hawkers who have been driven away from busy streets. For the rest, its achievement chart is singularly empty.

Is this too harsh a judgment? If so, what is the state of law and order? Is the economy reviving? Are people 'feeling' better, the feel-good factor being very important in evaluating any government? Is popular enthusiasm on the same high level as it was on the morrow of October 12? The accountability drive is in a shambles, its pace too slow, its direction increasingly unclear. The showpieces on display in the National Security Council and the various cabinets are curiously listless creatures. There has already been some bloodletting in Sindh with the governor gone and some faceless ministers having stepped down with him. But the vacuousness which is perhaps the most conspicuous feature of this government goes beyond a single province.

Part of the problem lies in the reality of power which lies elsewhere: in the shadows and in the hands of a very few key players. Juntas and wheels within them we have had before - most notably under Yahya Khan when a few generals called the shots. But those were different times and even though not a few politicians were veritable firebrands, and there was ferment in the eastern wing, Pakistan was a simpler place to run.

Today, the political class, especially its leadership, has acquired all the characteristics of dumb cattle but Pakistan's problems are infinitely more complex and intractable. As the last seven months have demonstrated, these problems are not amenable to parade ground solutions.

Will the documentation drive be any more successful? The signs are not auspicious. For one, the question forms required to be filled are much too intrusive. If this were happening in the United States, the US government would have an armed revolt on its hands spearheaded by the National Rifle Association. But this is a matter of detail. The more important question is: does the government have the capability to successfully carry out such a massive exercise?

The majesty of the Pakistani state, afflicted with various diseases, has fallen on bad times. It is still superbly equipped to make life difficult for its citizens. But securing public safety, dispensing justice, collecting taxes - arguably, its basic and foremost functions - it stopped performing a long time ago. Can it now go about documenting the economy?

Stalin did not proceed with the collectivization of agriculture, an article of faith with the Bolshevik party, before Soviet power had been fully consolidated. Indeed no successful revolution, if it wishes to remain successful, plays around with half-baked or premature plans of reform. In seven months time the military regime has been unable to touch, let alone reform, the administrative machinery. But with blunt instruments at hand, and again without adequate preparation, it is about to embark upon one of the most difficult ventures in Pakistan's history.

Since the art of communication is not one of the strong points of this government, there is a lot of confusion about what documentation is going to entail. From what has emerged so far, including the promulgation of the ordinances specifying punishments in case of not filling the survey forms or of providing false information, the impression created is of a massive exercise in coercion which the government has in mind. Will it work? The Sikhs made coercion a successful tool of taxation but then in the Khalsa kingdom it was only the Khalsa court, the Khalsa grandees and the Khalsa army which prospered. Nothing else, not even the trees by the side of the roads.

If we were doing all this ourselves it would still be some small consolation. But, as everyone knows, all this is being done at the behest of the IMF and on the strength of the strangest arguments.

Indeed, we are being told that in order to break the IMF's chains over the long term, we must strengthen those very chains in the short term.

True, our choices are limited. Despite our nuclear firecrackers, we are a nation of beggars waiting anxiously for the next international handout. But it is equally true that since the end of the Second World War more countries have been brought to ruin by the IMF than by wars or natural disasters. Are we so blind as not to see the writing on the wall?