DICTATORS deposed by death largely become subjects of historical work subsequently. However, dictators who physically survive their deposition continue to haunt countries even after their political death, especially if they remain within the country.

While their victims demand prosecution, successor governments generally face internal and external pressures or even formal and informal immunity agreements reached before the dictator’s deposition. So, Chile’s Pinochet got lifetime parliamentary immunity before resigning while Yemen’s Saleh resig-ned after obtaining Saudi-mediated immunity.

Even when no explicit deal is signed, countries often don’t prosecute dictators for fear of upsetting army officers and foreign countries or implicating people in the current government, judiciary and army as accomplices.

Thus, Indonesia half-heartedly prosecuted Suharto. Turkey recently initiated trials against some generals, years after their original crimes. Bangladesh’s Ershad was imprisoned briefly but got bail while Egypt’s Mubarak is still facing trial.

This lack of prosecution creates several problems. Firstly, it deprives victims of a chance to get justice. Secondly, it creates an aura of impunity for future dictators nationally and regionally. Thirdly, it creates non-transparency in national history as their wrongdoings are never documented and publicly shared. Fourthly, it keeps elected governments weak in dealing with army officers on policy issues and hampers democratic consolidation. Finally, it affects national prestige globally.

Bringing ex-dictators to justice is thus a moral, legal, political and external imperative.

Pakistan is among the countries with the highest numbers of military interventions and has repeatedly faced the dilemma of how to deal with ex-dictators.

A comparison of the fates of Pakistan’s civilian autocrats, military dictators and elected leaders is educative. Among elected leaders, Liaquat Ali was murdered mysteriously. Bhutto was hanged following a controversial, globally criticised trial, which was ultimately labelled as unfair by even Pakistan’s own Supreme Court. Nawaz Sharif languished in jail for a conviction subsequently overturned. Benazir was murdered mysteriously.

In contrast, Ayub and Yahya only faced home confinement. Zia died mysteriously. Musharraf’s fate remains undecided. Similarly Pakistan’s civilian autocrats did not face prosecution. While these politicians probably deserved prosecution for other crimes, the comparison above still reveals vividly as to who has escaped justice the most.

This is lamentable since abrogation of the constitution is a far more serious crime than the usual allegation against politicians, i.e., corruption. Abrogation not only undermines the rule of law but also creates economic costs which may exceed political corruption.

So, after Musharraf’s Nov 3, 2007 emergency proclamation, Pakistan suffered nearly a 5pc fall in the Karachi Stock Exchange in one day and almost a quarter billion dollars of capital flight.

For the first time ever, Pakistan can prosecute a dictator. There may have been an informal agreement brokered by the army, America and the Arabs not to prosecute Musharraf immediately in 2008, as he lived in Pakistan without facing prosecution for six months before being allowed to proceed abroad.

Whether such an agreement is still in place remains to be seen. On its merits, prosecuting Musharraf is imperative because of all the reasons identified earlier.

But, even some pro-democracy advocates counsel against prosecuting Musharraf for fear of alienating the army and Saudi Arabia, and consequently derailing democracy. This fear is overblown.

The army is unlikely to overreact to save Musharraf. Too many other strategic considerations counsel against such adventurism just for protecting him or even the army’s prestige. In fact, a fair trial may even enhance the military’s prestige. At most, the army and Arabs may apply informal, quiet pressure against convicting Musharraf.

The other fear is about opening a Pandora’s box which may implicate serving, retired and dead generals, bureaucrats, judges and politicians. Why not prosecute every constitutional adventurer and their abettors from 1947 rather than only Musharraf?

While this is an interesting rhetorical argument, it cannot become a strong legal defence. Courts pass judgments based on the evidence in the present case rather than on whether everyone else committing the same crime since 1947 has been prosecuted or not.

Going too far in the past may be impossible now due to legal and other complications. Thus, instead of individual prosecutions, a truth and reconciliation commission would be the right option for pursuing earlier transgressors.

The focus must be on prosecuting the 2007 transgression. Here too, the question of abettors is pertinent. While the main transgressor is easily identifiable since the emergency proclamation was issued in his name, identifying abettors is less easy.

The dictionary meaning of an abettor is one who actively advises, instigates, or encourages another to commit crimes. But the question is who among the key Musharraf-era players actively abetted him and who passively accepted his decision fearing reprisals given how Musharraf dealt earlier with opponents. Perhaps, once Musharraf’s trial is completed, it may become easier to identify abettors. There is no compulsion on governments to pursue all transgressors simultaneously. But, obviously, the case of the main transgressor must be the first priority. It is also unlikely that his trial will leak any state secrets that Wikileaks has not already leaked. Even if it does, it will only enhance transparency.

However, Musharraf must be prosecuted and not persecuted. Thus, the tribunal for his treason trial must include upright judges not aggrieved at his hands. Acts like barring him electorally for life seem ill-advised since constitutionally only people convicted for at least two years can be barred and only for five further years after release. Persecuting Musharraf undermines the objectives behind prosecuting ex-dictators.

The writer is a political economist at the University of California, Berkeley.

murtazaniaz@yahoo.com