THE Quetta attack, and subsequent statements and analyses, have once again revealed that issues of national security remain mired in confusion. This confusion largely springs from our obsession with internal delusions, and our externalisation of even this country’ existential threats. While ‘externalisation’ provides an excuse for incompetence and failure, ‘internal delusions’ all concern swollen-headed authority that, supposedly, can magic away all our problems.

Every major terrorist attack triggers a series of responses from different state institutions. Nonetheless, many question these institutions’ preventive responses despite frequently issued early warnings. Public debates usually remain rhetorical and one-dimensional, ultimately reaching the same conclusions, identifying the same problems and suggesting identical solutions.

Part of the debate tries to explore who should be held responsible for what has happened to Pakistan’s internal and regional security over the last four decades. Was it the mistake of one institution, a policy error, or is the whole system guilty of creating this ‘security crisis’ in Pakistan? Some may argue that there is no security crisis in the country. They have evidence to support their claim: there has been a visible decline in the number of terrorist attacks inside the country. But does this decline bring the security guards down to normal?

This does not mean that military operations against terrorists in tribal areas were not successful. Nor does this mean that other security and law enforcement institutions are doing nothing to eradicate the menace of terrorism in the country.

Sometimes, mere statistics do not help to remove ambiguities. People demand substantial testimonies.

The military operations in Fata have certainly weakened terrorist networks and hampered militants’ capacity to operate freely. A series of military operations, especially the 2009 Swat operation and the ongoing Zarb-i-Azb, have contributed significantly to damaging local terrorist infrastructures.

A recent media briefing by the national coordinator of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority on the implementation of the National Action Plan reflects on the successes of law-enforcement agencies. He stated that since the launch of NAP in early 2015, 122,772 combing and 2,000,000 stop-and-search operations were conducted across Pakistan — in which 1,400,000 suspects were arrested, most among those arrested were released after preliminary investigations. About 126 bank accounts linked to financing terrorism were closed and more than one billion rupees seized.

As many as 4,230 intelligence-based operations were also conducted against militants. Highlighting some other NAP successes, the head of Nacta claimed that over 400 people were convicted, including 380 from Punjab, 18 from Sindh, six from KP, five from Balochistan and two from AJK.

After the recent terrorist attack in Quetta, the government has also decided to set up a high-level task force to monitor implementation on NAP. Although the exact structure of the proposed body is not known, one can hope that this initiative will not face the same fate as that of the Joint Intelligence Directorate, which has yet to materialise despite many announcements made by the interior minister.

No doubt, these successes and responses are real and visible. However, the problem is that the common man is still confused. He is confused because he sees that, despite such dedicated responses, new terrorists are still coming from somewhere, breaching security structures and carrying out major attacks.

Part of this confusion could be due to the public’s and media’s perceptions that the threat of terrorism is over and normalcy is just one step away. However, the continuing activities of militants in different parts of the country show that the threat is still far from over. Fata and KP remain vulnerable to terrorism even though most militants there have either fled to Afghanistan or relocated to other areas within Pakistan. For instance, of reported terrorists attacks in Pakistan this July, 22 out of 39, or 56pc, were concentrated in KP and Fata.

Jamaatul Ahrar is a new offshoot of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, which has reorganised some of its factions and commanders since the launch of Zarb-i-Azb. The JuA has managed to carry out some 66 terrorist attacks in Pakistan since its inception in 2014. The group launched about half of these attacks in 2016, which included the deadly attacks on Gulshan-i-Iqbal Park in Lahore, the Shabqadar sessions court, and a Nadra office in Mardan.

Sometimes, mere statistics do not help to remove ambiguities — people demand substantial testimonies. That puts pressure on those who sit in parliament and represent the people. In the aftermath of the Quetta blast, some among the opposition parties and government allies in parliament have shown bitterness towards the security establishment. Maulana Sherani of JUI-F and PkMAP’s Mehmood Khan Achakzai strongly criticised the security institutions for their ‘inability’ to check the menace of terrorism. Maulana Sherani was even blunter, stating that our enemies are from within, not without.

Although the interior minister rejected the criticism, one cannot ignore the presence of networks of banned militant groups operating across the country. Most assessments on Pakistan’s security threats agree that these banned organisations — whether they attack Pakistan or not — are the recruitment bases for lethal anti-Pakistan militant groups and international terrorist organisations, including Islamic State and Al Qaeda.

In that context, recent criticisms cannot be easily skimmed over. Many banned militant groups have taken refuge behind anti-Indian rhetoric. The recent summer unrest in India-held Kashmir provided the opportunity for banned militant groups to organise rallies across the country and openly collect funds for their violent agendas. State institutions have not even bothered to categorically disown these groups, which once again confuses the ordinary Pakistani citizen.

Externalising a problem is considered the easiest, scapegoat policy of shunning such criticism. Shifting blame on to external factors provides only temporary relief. It’s effective too, because many Pakistanis believe in this ‘externalisation’ narrative.

One might recall that both state and society took more than a decade to finally address the delusion of externalisation before launching the Swat operation in 2009. Now, we are once again trying to externalise what is visibly knocking us from the inside. An overemphasis on externalisation will further compound the existing confusion in people’s minds.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, August 14th, 2016