Who is the enemy?

Published June 5, 2016
The writer is a security analyst.
The writer is a security analyst.

WHO is a bigger enemy for Pakistan? The terrorists or drones? The answer to this question may not be as simple as it appears.

The killing of the Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike in Balochistan has triggered a complex debate about different issues including sovereignty, regional stability, peace in Afghanistan and the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, etc. A negative impact on already deteriorating Pakistan-US relations was expected, but the incident also brought Iran into the picture; reportedly, Mullah Mansour was coming from Iran when he was hit by the drone.

For Pakistan, the Iranian factor is important both from the Indian and Middle Eastern perspectives. Pakistan uses the Middle East as a key balancing factor in its ties with India and Iran. More complex strategic and geopolitical implications linked with the death of Mansour can be found and linked to Pakistan’s internal and external challenges.

As much of the public debate in Pakistan on these issues projects Mullah Mansour as a ‘peacemaker’, it supports the suspicions of the outside world that the Afghan Taliban are Pakistan’s assets. The situation can also be interpreted in terms of geopolitical confusion the country has been in for decades now, with policymakers being unable to identify and aptly describe the country’s interests and policies.

Defence Minister Khawaja Asif’s statement that the drone strike in Nushki was an attack on Pakistan’s sovereignty was in line with the usual Pakistani reaction over drone incidents. But we have never challenged the legality of drone strikes at appropriate international forums.


There have been many grey areas in counterterrorism cooperation between the US and Pakistan.


The defence minister raised an interesting point: why do drones not target Mullah Fazlullah, the head of the anti-Pakistan militant group Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, based across the border in Afghanistan? Let’s not forget that drones helped eliminate some important TTP leaders including Qari Hussain, Baitullah Mehsud, Waliur Rehman and Hakeemullah Mehsud whose death the interior minister of Pakistan ‘mourned’.

Just a few days before Mullah Mansour’s death was confirmed, a renowned expert on military affairs, Aqil Shah, challenged the myth of the blowback effect of drones through his study. According to his findings, a significant majority of those in drone-hit areas support drone strikes. Shahbaz Taseer, who was abducted and remained in the custody of militants for more than four years, made an interesting point when he tweeted that he always found the terrorists worried about drones.

Mystery still shrouds Pakistan’s cooperation in drone operations. At one time, the international media linked the Mehran naval base attack in Karachi and the militants’ unsuccessful attempt to capture a warship to their efforts to weaken drone surveillance operations. Many grey areas have existed in counterterrorism cooperation between the US and Pakistan. Neither side appears willing to make the cooperation transparent.

On the other hand, an even bigger grey area exists within the realm of the Afghan Taliban and their links with anti-Pakistan terrorist groups including the TTP and Al Qaeda. The TTP has pledged allegiance to Mullah Haibatullah, the new head of the Afghan Taliban movement, and it is expected that Al Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri will extend his support to the new chief as he pledged allegiance to Mansour last summer. It is also possible that these grey areas exist only in our assessments while the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are very clear about their relations with each other.

It is not only the Afghan Taliban but also the Haqqani network that is depicted as a strategic asset of Pakistan; both have remained reluctant to use their influence over Pakistani militants to stop terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. They behave like rational actors and are open to broadening their allies’ network both with other non-state actors as well as states. When militants are perceived as proxies, it becomes difficult to treat them as rational actors.

This is a real dilemma for many experts — understanding Pakistan’s dichotomous relations with the US and the Taliban and what the country’s establishment really wants to achieve from this equation. For the US, it may be a question of terrorism and stability in Afghanistan. Washington may also have designs to use Pakistan as a scapegoat for its failure in Afghanistan, but for Pakistan, Afghanistan has a very different context. The Indian factor is important but most importantly, Pakistan wants not a hostile but a friendly and cooperative nation to its west.

The evidence on the ground does not support the notion that Pakistan will secure a friendly Afghanistan as anti-Pakistan sentiments are high in Afghanistan and Pakistan has not invested enough in the political sphere to win the hearts and minds of Afghans. Even Islamabad’s former ally, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, has joined the political mainstream. There should be no doubt that Pakistan does not have any political capital in Afghanistan. What alternative does Pakistan have?

The Taliban and the militants are the beneficiaries of these dichotomies. There is little hope that they would opt for peace in Afghanistan. Their lower cadre — in fact, even important field commanders — have fallen for the fallacy of victory. They also do not enjoy public support in the country and most importantly, they see no advantage in sharing power with Kabul. They have evolved their own economy and are increasingly behaving like a legitimate state on the pattern of the militant Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria. It is expected that their current attitude will continue as they are gaining power in Helmand province.

Recent developments indicate bleak chances of stability in Afghanistan and the region. The challenge for Pakistan would be to stop cross-border incursions by anti-Pakistan terrorists sheltering in Afghanistan. This would be a difficult and costly task. Instability in Afghanistan will continue to frustrate Washington, and the chances of drone strikes will remain high inside Pakistan. A common Pakistani will also remain confused about who our real enemy is: drones or terrorists?

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, June 5th, 2016

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