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THE much-vaunted agreement at Shimla, on July 2, 1972, between India and Pakistan has wide scope as an ‘Agreement on Bilateral Relations Between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan’.
In 2015, given the impasse in the relations between the two countries, it acquires a relevance all its own. It provides a compass with clear directions. Its core is continuing dialogue, without preconditions by either side. Shake off the dust that covers the text, and you will discover its sharp relevance now as well as its expectations for the future. “So that both countries henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples.”
Events soon thereafter put paid to that expectation. The agreement envisaged another summit shortly thereafter but it was not held. Para six reads: “Both governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.”
The much-talked about ‘spirit of Shimla’ rejects preconditions.
That a Kashmir settlement was grouped with other matters of immediate concern reveals a lot. Despite Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s urging, Indira Gandhi declined to pay a return visit. Her principal aide P.N. Dhar, advised her to settle with Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah first in order to confront Bhutto with a fait accompli. The Indira Gandhi-Sheikh Abdullah accord was not signed till February 1975. By then Bhutto had forcefully revived Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. Pakistan’s foreign minister Sahibzada Yakub Khan told the National Assembly on June 3, 1986 that neither side invoked para six to propose talks on Kashmir.
India-Pakistan summitry acquired importance long thereafter; but only to move at an erratic pace. What is of enduring relevance is the injunction to talk. Para 1(ii) records this agreed understanding; “That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations. … That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means”; ie by talks, continuously and in earnest.
It does not sanction imposition of preconditions by either side. Unfortunately, India called off the foreign secretaries’ talks on Aug 18, 2014 and those of the national security advisers on Aug 22, 2015 citing the Pakistan high commissioner’s meeting with the Hurriyat leaders in the first case and Ufa’s narrow remit on the other. Ufa cannot override Shimla. The much-talked about ‘spirit of Shimla’ rejects preconditions.
Diplomacy abhors deadlocks. They soon dissolve themselves after painful, protracted soundings with foreign powers’ intercession on the quiet. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri’s book records their efforts during Operation Parakaram when India massed its troops across the Radcliffe Line and the LoC in Kashmir. The climax was the joint statement issued on May 27, 2003 by then US secretary of state Colin Powell and Britain’s foreign secretary Jack Straw. It had been finalised at Camp David by president George W. Bush and prime minister Tony Blair. It prescribed a road map which India and Pakistan followed.
“Both sides should consider immediately implementing a ceasefire and taking other active steps to reduce tension including by moves within the Saarc context. The differences between India and Pakistan can only be resolved through peaceful means and engagement.” The US and Britain knew that a Saarc summit was due in Pakistan.
Sure enough PM Vajpayee made overtures to Pakistan and to Kashmiris at a public rally in Srinagar and proposed talks with Pakistan on April 19, 2003. Prime minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali called him to ask how they could begin. Pakistan announced a ceasefire along the international border, the LoC and the Working Boundary in Siachen. And Vajpayee attended the Saarc summit in Islamabad. A joint statement was issued with president Pervez Musharraf on Feb 6, 2004 to resume the talks. This is the source of the myth of Vajpayee as a spontaneous author of the peace process. The choreography was excellent. Do we want a repeat of the tamasha now?
Once preconditions are shed, Kashmir can be put on the agenda as part of the dialogue along with terrorism. It helps neither the peace process nor a solution to that menace to make it a precondition to talks. That violates the Shimla pact.
The writer is an author and a lawyer based in Mumbai.
Published in Dawn, November 14th, 2015
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