BY joining the war against the self-styled Islamic State, Turkey has strengthened the US-led coalition; but by simultaneously lashing out against the PKK, the Kurdish separatist group, Ankara has also weakened it.

Under the deal worked out with Washington, allied jets will be able to operate out of Incirlik, the air force base in south-eastern Turkey. This will increase their time over Syria greatly as thus far, they have been operating from distant aircraft carriers, as well as bases along the Gulf.

The quid pro quo for Turkey is the creation of a 60-mile IS-free zone along its border. Ostensibly, this would provide a safe haven for Syrian refugees fleeing violence from war-ravaged areas. But Turkey’s real reason appears to be the prevention of the emergence of a Kurdish proto-state similar to the one in Iraq.

By attacking PKK bases in Iraq, Erdogan has effectively buried the peace initiative he had begun a few years ago, and that had resulted in over two years of peace. Predictably, in the aftermath of the Turkish strikes in northern Iraq, the PKK has struck back with a number of attacks against army and police.

In the sweep against PKK and IS activists and supporters within Turkey, hundreds have been scooped up, including left-wing opponents of the government. IS websites that had operated freely for years have been shut down, and jihadi networks that openly facilitated the cross-border movement of foreign volunteers have been smashed.

Thus far, the Kurds have proved to be the most effective fighters against IS, and there has been much dismay expressed in the West about Turkish air attacks against the PKK. But this is apparently the price Erdogan has extracted for opening Turkish airspace to allied jet fighters.

So why has Turkey opened two fronts simultaneously? After all, both the PKK and IS have sizeable assets within Turkey to do serious damage. Thus far, before the IS suicide bombing in the border town of Suruc near the Syrian border, the jihadis had a cosy relationship with Turkish intelligence. But now, in the wake of the crackdown, they are likely to retaliate ferociously.

Analysts see internal Turkish politics behind the decision to go to war with both the PKK and IS. In the recent general elections, Erdogan’s AK Party received its first setback in a decade when it failed to get an outright majority. And for the first time, the Kurdish party, the HDP, received over 10pc of the vote, allowing it to be elected to Parliament. But if the PKK now reverts to its decades-long terrorist war against Turkey, this would delegitimise the HDP. The extreme right and left would also be demonised should the IS and the underground leftists lash back.

All this would play into Erdogan’s hands as he could then portray himself as a bulwark against terrorists of every stripe. As no coalition has yet been formed, Erdogan has the powers to call for fresh elections after the stipulated period is over. As it is, his AKP has shown no great hurry in negotiating with possible partners. In case elections are called again, AKP could well win a majority, especially if the HDP does not cross the 10pc barrier. In this situation, most of its votes would be redistributed to AKP.

This might be speculation, but opposition journalists are convinced there is some substance behind such a scenario. However, perhaps more pertinent is the century-long Turkish preoccupation with its ‘Kurdish question’. After the end of the First World War and the defeat and breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Versailles called for a homeland for Kurds, but this was never ratified. Nevertheless, the demand for Kurdistan has been repeatedly raised since then.

Kurds — who inhabit Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran — have been badly used and abused by their respective states over the last century. Saddam Hussein gassed thousands of his Kurds to death. In Turkey, they were barred from using their own language in schools, radio and TV. In fact, they were officially referred to as ‘mountain Turks’ to prevent them from claiming a separate ethnicity.

But following the American-led occupation of Iraq in 2003, Iraqi Kurds used the opportunity to form their own autonomous region in the north. Under this quasi-independent state, the Kurds have thrived. They have also resisted the incursions of the IS, and have provided Christians and Yazidis sanctuary from persecution.

In Syria, the civil war has provided Kurds there with a similar opportunity, and they, too, have established a virtually independent state under the YPG, a group allied to the PKK. When the IS besieged the border town of Kobani, it was heroic Kurdish men and women fighters — aided by US air strikes — who kept the extremist killers at bay. It was with great reluctance and after an international outcry that the Turkish government permitted some Iraqi Kurds to use its territory to come to Kobani’s aid.

The Turkish establishment has watched the emergence of these two quasi-independent Kurdish regions with growing alarm, fearing that they would encourage their Kurds to seek independence. The HDP’s performance in the recent elections confirmed these fears.

But why would the Americans go along, knowing that Turkey’s recent moves risk losing Kurdish support for the war against IS? Probably, Washington has calculated that in Iraq, the Kurds have no choice as they are getting American arms and air support. Also, the Kurds are fighting to defend their homeland, and would continue to do so, whatever happened to their Turkish cousins.

For decades now, the Kurds have been double-crossed and betrayed. So the Turkish attacks now would not have come as a surprise.

Published in Dawn, August 3rd, 2015

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