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ONE often wonders how a police organisation tailored to colonial needs can meet the ideals of democratic policing. Public satisfaction is the benchmark for police effectiveness, yet this cannot be accomplished with mere cosmetic measures and quick-impact projects. Viable transition from the colonial model to democratic policing is not possible without structural adjustments within the policing edifice.
After defence, policing is the second most important priority of the state. Civilised societies have extensively debated the options between bureaucratic and democratic accountability models. To control the police, tight bureaucratic control, accountability to government and accountability to autonomous public oversight bodies are a few global practices. The standard of police control determines the quality of policing and standards of human rights.
Increased involvement of the government in policing not only hampers policing but also affects the image of the state. In countries where governments alone control the police primarily to protect the interests of the elite, the interests of the common people are compromised. The advocates of democratic policing plead that power to control the force should not be the exclusive domain of the government, but should also involve the public.
Since independence, our policing model has not focused on public safety. Public safety, justice and service delivery are public expectations but these cannot be satisfied by a poorly trained, ill-equipped and barely motivated police force.
Parties need to add police reforms in their manifestos.
Democratic policing can be defined as an amalgamation of internal control, state control and social control. In our case all three tiers of control require more coordinated, synergised efforts. The Police Order 2002 provided safety valves at the federal, provincial and district levels but vested interests did not allow these bodies to operate.
Participation of communities in preventive policing strategies, allocation of financial resources and accountability of police guarantees democratic policing. In established democracies the police are accountable to multiple apparatus, but this does not mean the police are slaves of such bodies.
Accessibility is another important prerequisite of democratic policing. In our scenario, a police station is difficult to access. Owing to the police’s rigid chain of command, the energies of the victim are often exhausted. A victim’s woes are further aggravated by the lethargic criminal justice system. Police stations are not established on the basis of criteria defined by the Police Rules 1934 but primarily cater to other considerations.
Our policing czars are too possessive of outdated colonial methods. Our police are also reluctant to employ technological solutions. However employment of technology will bring convenience and transparency. Accountability is another important component of democratic policing. Accountability doesn’t mean silent compromise between the senior police bosses and the ruling elite. In a democratic polity, the police leadership shall be accountable to independent public oversight. Though the Police Order called for such bodies, they merely proved to be paper tigers.
Quick police response reassures citizens in distress while delayed, poor or no response is interpreted as ineffectiveness of the government. Even those citizens who are not victims of crime keenly monitor the response, professionalism and services police provide.
Without effective internal departmental control democratic policing will remain a far cry. To monitor undesirable elements within the police, the establishment of background units is required. Such apparatus will be helpful in weeding out black sheep within the ranks. In Pakistan, often police misconduct is not included in our priorities. To rectify this, investigators should not be from the same police investigation or operations units.
The quality of supervision is another neglected area. Continuous brief training cycles will better equip the field staff to understand the lapses between police practices and public expectations. Merit-based appointment of police chiefs is one of the essential requirements that can bring positive change in the organisational culture. However, police chiefs appointed on other considerations compromise merit, professionalism and transparency.
To bring the police under the control of public representatives in 2002 an experiment was conducted: to handle law and order situations and disposal of public complaints the district police was brought under the influence of district nazims. Owing to rigidity within the police, poor capacity of the nazims to understand their role and non-functional public safety apparatus, the system failed to meet the set ideals. Experience suggests that without capacity building of local government officials such bodies cannot work optimally.
Ultimately, without political ownership dreams of democratic policing will remain unfulfilled. Political parties need to incorporate police reforms in their manifestos. After assuming power a party needs to convert those ideals into reality.
The writer is a police officer.
Published in Dawn, June 11th, 2015
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