THE criticism levelled by the Afghan High Peace Council — tasked for many years now to engage the Afghan Taliban in talks — against its government’s decision to allow American forces to delay the final drawdown of troops from Afghanistan is yet another indication that neither Kabul nor the US appears to have anything resembling a plan to deal with the Taliban.

Half the US troops in Afghanistan were scheduled to depart at year’s end with the other half likely to have gone by the time US President Barack Obama leaves the White House in January 2017.

Know more: Afghan peace council assails decision to slow down US pullout

To the extent that the US forces are staying on in higher numbers for a longer period than originally planned, it will officially be cast by the Afghan and American sides as a decision aimed squarely at not allowing Afghanistan to become a sanctuary for global terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.

In truth, however, the decision is about shoring up the Ashraf Ghani-led Afghan government in the face of the Taliban threat.

But to what end? As suggested in the US-Afghanistan joint statement at the end of President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to the US late last month, “reconciliation and a political settlement remain the surest way to achieve the full retrograde of US and foreign troops from Afghanistan”.

Without reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban, there will be no real stability or relative peace in Afghanistan. But the Afghan government seems unable to interest the Afghan Taliban in talks at the moment while the US seems too preoccupied with strife in other parts of the world. Who then is to lead the multidimensional and multiplayer push for talks with the Taliban?

It is little wonder that the HPC appears to be frustrated. Then again, in the murky world of Afghan politics, the HPC could simply be trying to distance itself from an Afghan government decision that could complicate its task of engaging the Taliban.

As ever, and as also underlined in the joint US-Afghan statement (“need for an Afghan-led peace process, enjoying regional support, in particular from Pakistan”), the key remains Pakistan.

Despite the increased cooperation in terms of taking on anti-Pakistan militants on both sides of the Durand Line, there seems to have been little attempt by Pakistan to even create the conditions for dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban leadership.

The fear, and it is hardly an unfounded one, remains that the massive push against anti-Pakistan militants has not changed the strategic perspective within the military leadership on what needs to be done in Afghanistan.

If that is in fact the case, it would be a significant, possibly insurmountable, hurdle in achieving regional peace. A settlement in Afghanistan is as urgent for Pakistan as is the dismantling of militant groups inside the country. Will the military accept this?

Published in Dawn, April 2nd, 2015

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