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THERE will be no accountability. There will be no serious questions asked of those at the top. These are your instructions, people: keep your head down, your eyes lowered, your shoulders drooped. Speak only in whispers, and nod vigorously as the prime minister speaks of committees and suspensions.
Going by the body language and actions of the cabinet through the two large-scale crises we have just been through, back to back, it appears that the country exists to serve the leadership, not the other way round. Any suggestion to the contrary will be seen as a political act of defiance, bordering on treason.
If the two-member commission can report that everyone in the oil supply chain is guilty of incompetence and indifference in the petrol crisis, doesn’t that automatically raise the question of who appointed so many incompetent and indifferent people to critical posts in the machinery that operates our oil supply chain?
If the power blackout was due to reasons beyond the control of the government, why do some ministers like Abid Sher Ali, the minister of state for water and power, squawk on and on about the shortcomings of others that might in equal measure be the consequence of factors beyond their control? Why are they so noisy and specific and indignant when pointing out the shortcomings of others but so quiet when it’s their own turn to take some responsibility?
Let’s for a moment grant them all the benefit of the doubt that they are asking us for, even though they have been famously stingy in granting the same benefit to others. Even seen on their own terms, the story they are trying to build up has enormous weaknesses.
The oil crisis has failed to galvanise the government towards making the necessary changes at the top.
Why is it that in the key document absolving them of high-level responsibility — the report of the two-member commission tasked by the prime minister to investigate the fuel shortages — there is mention of some long-term measures required but the key long-term measure — an integrated energy ministry — gets no mention?
The commission’s report makes for very sad reading overall. It gives so many different reasons for why the crisis occurred that one loses count after a while, but it is most dismissive of the financial reason. “The crisis has a lot to do with PSOs receivables outstanding” it says, before detailing what was owed by the power sector. “But then, this is not a unique situation for the PSO.”
So what about the other reasons given, are they unique? For instance, the lack of 20-day-long reserves in fuel stocks, is that a unique situation? Or the Oil Companies Advisory Council not holding weekly review meetings, is that unique?
In another place it says the crisis was the “result of structural issues and not only an event-driven situation” but then goes on to blame oil marketing companies who “may also be involved in creating this artificial shortage”. May also be involved? This was a report following an investigation, and if the best they can say is the OMCs may be involved, it means they have no evidence and are only speculating. Why do speculative reasons belong in an investigative report?
The authors are clearly confused themselves, but dutifully following a brief: make sure that the blame does not land at our doorstep, they appear to have been told by their political bosses. And they have complied.
If others can be asked to put politics in abeyance, the government must itself lead the way in doing so first. One thing the report makes clear, if we are to take its findings at face value, is that the oil supply chain and its various officials failed totally to articulate themselves as the crisis approached. Whose job is it to oversee all these officials and ensure that they are doing their job, coordinating with each other, setting goals and pursuing them?
Some critical questions appear to have not been asked by the commission. At what point did the government become aware at the cabinet level that a serious shortage of petrol was developing within the country? The report does not say. When were the declines in inventory first detected up there? It doesn’t say. What course of action was taken when the MD PSO sounded the alarm, starting in October by his own telling? It doesn’t say.
In order to rid ourselves of these sorts of coordination failures forever, it is necessary to merge the various ministries under which key parts of the energy supply chain operate. How could the commission members advocate long-term measures such as building reserves and directly transferring Tariff Differential Claims funds to PSO, but make no mention of an integrated ministry when by their own telling the biggest failure here was a coordination failure?
This crisis has failed to galvanise the government towards making the necessary changes at the top to prevent a recurrence. That’s a sad fact to absorb, because it means we’re more likely to go back to business as usual rather than mount a spirited effort at reform. What exactly are those at the top supposed to be doing, in the eyes of the prime minister?
Perhaps it’s too much to expect that a major national crisis could serve as a wake-up call for this government, to get them to realise that somewhere they are doing something drastically wrong.
Crises can spark some introspection, a few difficult questions can be asked that would otherwise never be raised. Perhaps the centralisation of power in a few hands doesn’t work. Perhaps they need to widen the circle of people advising them. Perhaps they’re selecting the wrong people for important posts. But thus far, every indication they’re giving, is they prefer to keep those rose-tinted spectacles on rather than face the brute facts of rule in this country. A very sad fact to absorb.
The writer is a member of staff.
Published in Dawn January 29th, 2015
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