THOUGH the dharnas started out with less loftier objectives, slowly the rhetoric of the leaders has moved to grander visions of what they would like to achieve. Apart from specifics about action against those involved in the Model Town killings and issues of election fraud, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) and the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) leaders have also articulated demands for changes in the social and economic structure of society.

They want speedy justice, social and economic equality, and a working democracy where the voice of the ordinary and poor citizen is readily heard. They want education and health systems where the rich and the poor are treated the same irrespective of their income status. They want better redistribution of wealth and income, a much more effective welfare state, effective governance and cleaner, more transparent and accountable government. They want a naya Pakistan.

Know more: We agreed to five of PTI's six demands: Saad Rafique

Do PAT and PTI leaders think this naya Pakistan can be created from within the current parliamentary system, with the existing Constitution and the current institutions as well as the current set of players who are managing the affairs of the country? The answer, though crucial, is not clear.

Though their position on the Constitution is not well-defined, PAT leaders do not feel the current set of players, in government as well as the opposition, and at the helm of other important state institutions, would be willing or able to challenge the status quo. They feel that the players in power have benefited and continue to benefit from the current system and status quo, and why would they want to change that. They will not only resist change, if any change does occur, despite their resistance, the current players are likely to work on minimising their impact on the system as well as on their individual and class interests.

The ambiguity surrounding the methods and aims of the PTI and PAT is not a trivial issue.

For the PTI, the answer is a lot less clear. Their leader’s rhetoric, in some of his speeches, hints that the current system will not deliver change and the appeal has to be made to the people of the country directly and it is only direct pressure and people’s presence on the streets and in dharnas that will eventually lead to the momentum for change. Accountability will have to precede rebuilding, institutions will have to be redone, and the rules of the game, even the Constitution, might have to be rewritten.

But, when other leading voices from the party talk, they often take a softer line. They talk of respect for the current democratic arrangements, even for some of the current players. The differences in rhetoric might be a reflection of the party’s strategy or it might even reflect genuine differences within it. Either way, it is something that will need resolution eventually.

For the moment though, it does allow certain ambiguity to persist about the aims and objectives of the party as well as the methods that the party considers kosher or might consider kosher (street agitation, military intervention, in-house changes etc.).

The ambiguity surrounding their methods, aims and objectives, deliberate or not, is not a trivial issue. It can have serious consequences for where we might go, as a people and country.

Before the dharnas and even throughout them both parties very carefully avoided saying anything about the army. They have, publicly, opposed the possibility of army intervention and there has been talk of implicit or tacit army support for them (or not), and there has been plenty of talk of how everyone salutes the bravery and sacrifices of our soldiers. But the conversation has never gone to the important question of what is the army’s take on the social and economic restructuring and re-engineering that the two parties are talking about.

The armed forces in Pakistan, directly and indirectly, have a huge economic stake in the current economic and social set-up. They are and have been one of the most significant beneficiaries of the current system. They, directly or indirectly, are one of the largest owners of rural as well as urban land in the country. They run schools, universities, banks, airlines, fertiliser plants, food processing plants, commercial activity in cantonments, construction companies, heavy mechanical industries and many other enterprises. They have a significant stake in the status quo.

Will they be happy with the social and economic reorganisation that the PTI and PAT are suggesting? It is interesting that neither party has so far addressed the issue. But, clearly, it is a very important question — and one that might not only determine the success or failure of the endeavours of PTI and PAT. But the answer they come up with might have implications for the methods that the two parties can use to force the change they want.

It is worth clarifying that the issue being mentioned above is not about the role of the military in politics or even what is discussed under the rubric of civil-military dynamics in Pakistan. It is also not about corruption or lack of transparency and accountability of military expenditures and the incomes of senior officers. The issue being mentioned is much simpler but much bigger. Will the military, one of the largest and most significant gainers from the current status quo, in terms of its economic and social interests, side with the reformers or with the forces of status quo? Have the PTI/PAT leadership thought about that? Has the military leadership done so?

If a significant revamping of the social/economic order is being thought of and proposed, can a military that has benefited hugely from the existing set-up, be realistically expected to support change? And if they do not, what will this mean for the PTI and PAT? For their aims and for their tactics? It will be interesting to see how this question is addressed in the days to come.

The writer is senior adviser, Pakistan, at Open Society Foundations, associate professor of economics, LUMS, and a visiting fellow at IDEAS, Lahore.

Published in Dawn, September 12th, 2014