Even by the record of the tortuous course of ties between India and Pakistan, the former’s decision to cancel the foreign secretaries’ talks, scheduled for Aug 25, is a grave mistake of lasting consequences.

The summit at New York on Sept 25, for which the secretaries were to prepare, might not be held at all. If every promising moment is followed by another of despair, it is because each side is in thrall to its own public opinion but has scant regard for public opinion on the other side; seldom adopting a negotiable stand. These enduring constants bedevil ties.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accepted Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s thoughtful invitation to his swearing-in on May 26 ignoring criticism at home; a fact which was widely noted in India as was his circumspection on Kashmir.

By every rule of sound diplomacy, the tempo should have been maintained as determinedly as it is on Sino-India relations. Recurring reports of ‘incursions’ on the border do not affect the quest for better relations with China. At Leh on Aug 12, at a gathering of personnel from the armed forces, Narendra Modi fired a salvo at Pakistan for engaging in a “proxy war of terrorism”. The next day Pakistan’s Foreign Office criticised the “baseless rhetoric against Pakistan”. A few hours later the Indian external affairs ministry defended the prime minister’s remarks as an “articulation of India’s core concerns with Pakistan”.

By cancelling talks with Pakistan, what does Modi intend to convey?

The atmosphere was effectively spoilt on Aug 18. All hell broke loose over Pakistan’s high commissioner Abdul Basit’s meetings with Kashmir’s Hurriyat leaders. The talks were cancelled.

Three points are in order. First, such talks have been held for nearly two decades in Delhi since May 1995 when president Farooq Leghari attended a meeting of Saarc, the regional South Asian forum.

In July 2001, Gen Musharraf met ‘separatists’ before the Agra summit and again in April 2005; in April 2007 prime minister Shaukat Aziz met them on a visit for a Saarc meeting. So did foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar in July 2011 and foreign affairs adviser Sartaj Aziz in 2013. None of the three prime ministers of the day — P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh — lost his sleep over it.

Secondly, it is a ritual, fatuous exercise. Hurriyat has leaders who are barely on speaking terms with one another, and meet visitors separately. They have no constructive proposals to offer beyond demanding a place at the high table. Leghari and Musharraf were taken aback by Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s reproach at Pakistan’s lapses from the Islamic code. It is no secret that Musharraf advised them to talk to New Delhi.

Thirdly, the meetings on Aug 19, a week before the foreign secretary talks, were ill-advised nonetheless. The aim should be to promote dialogue, not to do anything which would be perceived as provocation by a new and consciously hard-line government. No gains were achievable and the risks were palpable.

The reaction was utterly disproportionate. The talks were cancelled. Every Kashmiri leader across the board criticised it, as did some in New Delhi. What message does the Modi government intend to convey to other neighbours and to the big powers? Is it a portent of worse to follow?

The omens were none too propitious. On July 8, the UN Military Observers Group was asked “to vacate the government bungalow”. The same month the visiting UN peace-keeping chief Hervé Ladsous made it plain that quitting India was ruled out. Only the Security Council can “undo the decision”. Based on its resolution of April 21, 1948, Rosalyn Higgins, a former judge of the International Court of Justice, held the same view in her book.

One hopes that all this does not indicate a desire for a new format spaw­ned by a new diplomatic culture, for the reasons for the cancellation make no sense. The Shimla pact itself envisages “the final settlement of Jammu & Kashmir”.

Arun Jaitley, defence minister, was sent to Kashmir as an interlocutor on July 22, 2003. L.K. Advani met the Kashmiri leaders in New Delhi in February 2004.

The record of pronouncements on unquestionably ‘internal’ matters is unedifying. Pakistan’s cabinet ministers spoke volubly in 1984 when Punjab in India was in turmoil. In 2006, India’s external affairs ministry attacked Pakistan on the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti.

Are we doomed to a persistent deadlock? As for trust, Prof Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, has pointed out that “mutual trust is a result rather than a premise of long-term cooperation. Instead of ‘mutual trust,’ Beijing and Washington should drop the wishful thinking and spend more effort on building a realistic relationship based on their interests.” That applies to India and Pakistan as well.

The writer is an author and lawyer based in Mumbai.

Published in Dawn, August 23rd, 2014