PERIODICALLY the issue of Fata reforms crops up in the national discourse, but then disappears quickly enough without much of substance seemingly ever achieved. Now it is the turn of the PPP to once again renew its commitment to bringing reforms to the tribal areas.

The resolution moved by several PPP parliamentarians calls for legislative powers for Fata to be given to parliament as opposed to the current constitutional scheme of the president, via the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa governor, being the supreme governing and legislative authority in the area.

The idea is neither new nor surprising — in theory and in practice, parliament ought to have the right to legislate over the entire territory of Pakistan and there is absolutely no question whatsoever that Fata is an original and legitimate part of Pakistan.

Furthermore, the argument that Fata should be maintained as an anachronism that is at odds with the constitutional structure and fundamental rights applicable to the people in the rest of the country because of the security and social realities of the agencies is deeply flawed.

No one argues, for example, that Balochistan, swathes of which are similar to Fata in terms of tribal structures and socioeconomic indicators, should not be governed by the Constitution and that the judicial, legislative and administrative institutions of the state should have their powers curbed in Balochistan.

The very fact that much of Fata’s security, economic and social predicaments today can be traced back to the insistence of the state to keep it separate from mainstream Pakistan ought to be enough of a reason to now find ways to gradually but surely integrate the tribal areas into the rest of the country.

Yet, desirable and even necessary as the constitutional and administrative changes may be — where else, for example, is there a region represented in both houses of parliament but unable to legislate for the region in question itself? — the issue of Fata reforms confronts a significant challenge: the presence of an overwhelming military war machine in the tribal agencies that by its very existence tends to displace civilian authority.

Even in Swat, the most integrated, settled and socioeconomically developed of all the regions in which a counter-insurgency has been fought by the state, the civilian apparatus has found it difficult to reassert its authority in the presence of a military that is historically viewed as the most powerful institution by the public and other institutions of state.

While the army leadership focuses on the lack of civilian capacity and will, the problem is often one of space. Does the pre-existing configuration of power inside Pakistan — referred to euphemistically as the civil-military imbalance — allow for civilians to lead? Until that happens — until the civilian leadership feels more confident to lead and the military more amenable to follow — little real change in Fata can be effected.

Published in Dawn, July 25th , 2014