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THERE is little doubt about the deal that ended retired General Pervez Musharraf’s rule of more than eight years. But what is, perhaps, not known are the back-room negotiations that made it possible. There were many actors in the game that manoeuvred Musharraf’s departure. Surely the exit was to be dignified under the bargain brokered by the military leadership and Washington and tacitly approved by all major political parties.
Undoubtedly, it was Asif Ali Zardari who shrewdly manoeuvred the endgame; yet a deal could not have been secured without the other two key players — the military leadership and Washington — being on board. The PML-N leadership may not have been involved in the negotiations, but it was certainly in the loop. There was no opposition to a safe passage agreement from any political party.
Although Musharraf’s fate seemed to have been sealed by the outcome of the 2008 elections, there was no indication of him stepping down. His confidence stemmed from his delusion of unwavering loyalty from the military leadership and the support of his friend in the White House.
Musharraf failed to realise the shifting power matrix that came with the shedding of his uniform and the 2008 elections.
‘I have nothing to worry about with Gen Kayani as army chief,’ he would assure his aides. He seemed to have no idea that his handpicked chief would not stand by him when it came to the crunch. And that point had long arrived.
Musharraf failed to realise the shifting power matrix that came with the shedding of his uniform and the 2008 elections. He was confident that the new PPP government would adhere to the reconciliation pact brokered by Washington and London and not rock the boat. But Zardari had different ideas. He had his own ambition of occupying that post. He waited for an opportune moment.
Initially, the PPP government maintained working relations with Musharraf. But the tension between them started mounting, triggered by some political statements given by the president. Zardari decided to act.
It was mid-July 2008 when Zardari sent retired Gen Mahmood Durrani, the then national security adviser, to Musharraf with a message promising safe passage if he agreed to step down. Durrani had served earlier as ambassador to Washington and had a long association with Musharraf. With this background, he seemed the right person to deliver that highly sensitive message to his former colleague.
Lt-Gen Nadeem Taj, who was then chief of the ISI, also joined the meeting that afternoon at the president’s camp office in Rawalpindi. Musharraf was definitely not prepared for the message. He lost his temper. His reply was clear: no stepping down.
There was a good reason for him to decline Zardari’s offer at that point. Earlier that day, Musharraf had received a phone call from president Bush assuring his old pal his full cooperation. Continuing American support was crucial for Musharraf’s survival in office.
The Bush administration was concerned that the ouster of its key ally would destabilise Pakistan and adversely affect the US ‘war on terror’. There was also deep suspicion in Washington that a weak PPP-led coalition government might not be able to serve its interest in the same way as Musharraf could.
From that tense meeting, Durrani went straight to see Gen Kayani who seemed to have already realised that it had become untenable for his former chief to stay in power. Musharraf had clearly become a liability for the military leadership. Gen Kayani’s only concern was to secure a dignified exit and ensure personal security for Musharraf.
A major challenge for Zardari then was to swing Washington’s support for his move. He had good allies in US ambassador Ann Patterson and Richard Boucher the assistant secretary of state for South Asia. They were finally able to convince Washington of the inevitability of Musharraf’s exit.
Meanwhile, Zardari with PML-N support threatened to impeach the president. That prompted an intense back-room effort from the military and the US to convince Musharraf to bow out and avoid impeachment. Simultaneously, they moved to secure guarantees from the PPP not to take any action against him. The government was willing to oblige, as its only interest was to get Musharraf out of office and pave the way for Zardari’s election as president.
There were also some minor hitches on getting the other coalition partners — the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and the Awami National Party — on board. The MQM had remained a staunch ally of Musharraf over the past eight years and it was difficult for it to abandon the man who helped the party consolidate its political base in Karachi. The ANP had also developed a soft corner for the military ruler but there was no problem in getting the party leaders on board.
To get the MQM to withdraw its support for Musharraf, the PPP government used British leverage over the party. A three-hour meeting between Adam Thomson (who was then head of the Pakistan desk in the Foreign & Commonwealth office in London) and Altaf Hussain clinched the MQM support for the move. (Thomson later became the British high commissioner in Islamabad.)
It was all over for Musharraf, yet he took time to decide. The die was cast on Aug 18, 2008 when he announced his decision to quit in an hour-long speech on national television. Ironically, he became Pakistan’s first head of state to leave office with a guard of honour. All these events give credence to what former prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani revealed last week.
Musharraf stayed in Army House under the military’s protection for many months without being haunted by the civilian administration before he left the country. ‘I am not going to drag Musharraf into the mud,’ Zardari was quoted as telling one of his close aides after he was elected president. There was no protest from the PML-N or any other political party on giving of safe passage to the former military ruler then. That was what the deal was all about.
The writer is an author and journalist.
Published in Dawn, July 16th , 2014
