Not by military means alone

By Ejaz Haider

A week after the attack on the Karachi airport, Operation: Zarb-i-Azb has been launched in North Waziristan. But Pakistan’s security doctrine and practices still need to evolve to face the militant threat

The attack on Karachi airport, brazen as it was, was not the first of its kind. Nor will it be the last attack on a high-value vulnerable area with multiple vulnerable Points.

The question is: how did we fare in our response?

There are two levels of response analysis. One deals with preemption, the other with responding to an attack after it is underway. The first is proactive, the second reactive. Preemption presupposes the existence of a highly effective and coordinated intelligence apparatus. The reactive is about fire-fighting. Proactive strategies are about preventing a terrorist group from doing damage. The reactive is about limiting damage.

The state, in its war on terrorism, is putting too much emphasis on military operations and too little or almost no stress on counterterrorism policing and policy

Consider the Karachi attack.

A group of ten terrorists, heavily armed with small arms and light weapons, chose a less-frequented side of the facility. Their plan seemed to be to get to the tarmac and destroy aircraft parked along the gates or in the hangars. They also fired at the fuel dump which was a diversion as well as a successful attempt to start a big fire and cause chaos. Chaos works to the advantage of the attacker. It forms an integral part of his plan and acts as a force-multiplier. Conversely, it makes the defender’s job more difficult by forcing him to also respond to the suboptimal part of the attacker’s plan instead of focusing on the attacker’s optimal objective.

Additionally, as we saw in this case too, the element of surprise was with the attacker. Once the men reached the building, they caught the Airports Security Force (ASF) personnel by surprise. It is for this reason that any area-defence plan stresses layers. But a layered defence itself must have layers on the outside and on the inside. The layered perimeter defence must be set up in a way that can blunt the element of surprise of the attacker before he gets to the VA. If the attacker can be engaged outside the main target and neutralised there, the response, after the attack has started, will be considered very good and efficient.

In this case, as in the previous cases, that did not happen. There are many reasons for that. Here are some: the airport is too close to certain localities, the approaches are not fully covered, there’s too much human traffic, we do not have a security culture and while the ASF is responsible for protecting the airport and its main buildings, it has no presence on the outside.

Further inquiries into the attack could also throw up other questions, like who did the reconnaissance and for how long, what VPs were utilized by the attackers and whether there was any insider-outsider collusion.

Preemption presupposes the existence of a highly effective and coordinated intelligence apparatus. The reactive is about fire-fighting. Proactive strategies are about preventing a terrorist group from doing damage. The reactive is about limiting damage.

That said, the attackers did reach the gate from where they had to enter. They also managed to take out ASF personnel posted at the gate. Round One went to them. Beyond that the going got a little tougher. Inside the VA the ASF had a layered defence and it allowed them to fight back, hold the attackers and prevent them from spreading out. This bought crucial time. The ASF was still fighting when better-trained and equipped reinforcements arrived. By then, however, the attackers had managed to create a spectacle and shown the facility to be vulnerable to any such attack. That part of their mission had been accomplished.

For the responders it was important to get the passengers out safely and confine the terrorists to a single area and take them out as quickly as possible. The attackers wanted the fight to drag on. The defender wanted to finish it quickly. That’s a constant in any such situation.

The attackers were ultimately taken out. They couldn’t damage the aircraft as they must have planned, though some reports suggest partial damage to a few aircraft. A part of the building was gutted by the fire they had started and 29 people, excluding the ten attackers, were left dead. The news had flashed across the world. The state appeared weak and vulnerable.

A large part of the attackers’ mission had been accomplished. As for the response, the plus side is that it could have been worse.

That is the point of concern. The nature of this war will not change, nor will the tactics of the attacker. Is there no way of denying the terrorist his mission?

This is where we have to revisit the idea of pre-emption: stop the enemy before an attack gets underway.

I do not have numbers but it seems, on the basis of nuts-and-bolts information, that we are spending more money on training and weaponising responders than we are on enhancing the capacity of the intelligence apparatus. The irony is that even the money we are spending on intelligence is being wasted because there are too many agencies that are working in silos and, if insiders are to be believed, often at cross purposes.

Put another way, we are not only spending less money on intelligence, we are wasting even the money we are spending. The solution is not just to give more money to the spooks but to also ensure the money is spent efficiently.

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government began with the promise to chalk out a National Internal Security Policy (NISP). That policy was finally unveiled end-February this year. It was sent to me about two months before it was made public and I reviewed it – in terms of talking points – and sent it to the Interior Minister. We were supposed to meet and discuss those points further but for some reason that meeting never materialized. I made public the review after the government released some parts of the policy.

The NISP begins by correctly identifying several factors, from the short- to the medium- and long-term. It also stresses the need for coordination. It concedes that the National Counterterrorism Authority needs to play an important role and that there should be a joint intelligence directorate. It details an ambitious agenda for a counter-narrative and the need to streamline seminaries et cetera. But as I pointed out, it has no plan for how to enhance the capacity of the organisations that will be implementing this agenda, including irony of ironies, the capacity of the interior ministry itself, the lead agency in this effort.

Result: all the good intentions contained in the NISP remain just that – intentions. There’s nothing in the appropriations bill for FY2014-15 that indicates allocations for making the NISP dream come true.

This translates into something simple. The state, in its war on terrorism, is putting too much emphasis on military operations and too little to almost no stress on counterterrorism policing. The enemy’s asymmetric advantage lies in urban terrorism. That is precisely where the army cannot be used. And yet, while we continue to add more weaponised units for responding to attacks, there is little effort to improve pre-emption.

If we couldn’t pick up militant chatter on preparations for the Karachi attack and prevent it, our intelligence apparatus needs a drastic overhaul. The only way to make military operations work is to complement them with effective counterterrorism effort in the cities.

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 22nd, 2014

Still fighting the last war

By Hassan Abdullah

The script is so predictable it has lost the climax. Militants attack a sensitive installation. While destruction and mayhem are still ongoing, there are clumsy statements apparently aimed at damage control. Statements claiming that strategic assets are safe and the attackers have been pushed back. Once that particular saga is over, condemnations follow. Then there are calls from the highest executives at provincial and/or federal levels directing the concerned departments to investigate the incident and present a “report”.

“You get the impression that a chief minister or the prime minister has to instruct the relevant agencies to investigate a matter and that they would not do what they are supposed to do unless specifically told to. It is kind of demeaning and reflects red-tapism. Is there anything called a system? This is basically mocking yourself and reflects reliance on individuals instead of having a functioning system in place,” argues Dr Jawed Aziz Masudi, a criminologist and lawyer.

So, after engagement in a conflict spanning over a decade and having lost over 30,000 Pakistanis, what have we learnt?

“Probably we haven’t learnt anything,” says SSP Saqib Ismail Memon.

Despite hundreds of attacks on targets ranging from military installations to airports, our security forces have yet to adapt to the threat posed by terrorists. Why?

While Memon’s remarks may come across as too pessimistic, many argue they are a reflection of our miserable state of affairs.

Abbas Haider, a security expert who has spent much time working in Iraq as a private security contractor before returning to Pakistan, argues: “Pakistan is in a state of war. This is an emergency situation and requires a certain response. But we do not see that when we look at the state policies or the public response.”

After nearly 13 years of a non-conventional war that still rages, Pakistan is not even sure if this is “our war” or an American one. Who are the friends and who are the foes?

While in official circles abroad, Pakistan likes to describe itself as America’s “frontline ally” in the global “war on terror”, at home the state appears to promote confused narratives. If most Pakistani politicians, retired military officials, local analysts and the general public are to be believed, almost all terrorism in the country is carried out by “agents” of America, India and Israel. According to this skewed narrative, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is sponsored by the American CIA in a bid to destabilise this nuclear power. Then there are the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban.

“Pakistan has suffered a lot because of this flawed understanding of good and bad Taliban. There is clear nexus between the two. They may have different strategies or priorities, but the core ideology and goals are the same. While our policy has been to benefit some of them, the fact of the matter is that the ‘good’ Taliban have strengthened the position of the ‘bad’ Taliban and we have suffered,” says Hamza Ameer, a journalist who reports on jihadi groups from Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan is in a state of war. This is an emergency situation and requires a certain response. But we do not see that when we look at the state policies or the public response.

Certain political leaders and analysts in Pakistan, including one who often boasts of his association with some state agencies, have been openly glorifying the Taliban in Afghanistan. This has resulted in a largely positive perception of the Afghan Taliban among the public who have and continue to financially assist the ‘good’ jihadis. Of course, the fact that these ‘good’ jihadis shelter and support the ‘bad’ jihadis in different ways does not form part of the equation. However, officials well-informed about the security establishment believe that change is in the making.

“I think they have already revised their policies. Afghanistan, once a security concern, is not so any more as the Pakhtunistan issue has died down,” said Asad Munir, a retired brigadier and a former chief of ISI Peshawar.

“The state has also realised that the world will not accept and tolerate cross border terrorism now. We also know that this jihadi concept has not yielded the desired results and ultimately the people of Pakistan suffered,” he says.

The missing ideological response is not the only weak link; there is extreme corruption within government departments and even national security is not spared.

Take the example of the 30,000-strong Sindh Police. While it is supposed to be the first line of defence and the hold force, its priorities are different. “The overwhelming majority of people join the police force knowing the element of power and money-making that comes with it. You do not pay hefty bribes just to get in without knowing about the return,” says Kamil Arif, a Karachi-based crime reporter.

“This is not even a secret. There is a lot of money that flows in the police department. Every day begins with policemen on the roads extorting money from the public. From the cop on the street to the officer sitting in his air conditioned office, everybody gets a share so naturally the practice continues. While policemen are busy extracting bribes from powerless citizens over frivolous excuses, terrorists are probably driving past them,” he asserts.

Corruption is so rampant that most senior officers make little effort in even denying the reality. However, they highlight other concerns.

“The police force is hugely demoralised. Even the handful of people who had been very keen to take on the militants are now unwilling to fight. We put our lives in danger and took on the jihadis. Now we have been demoted and deprived of security. This is very discouraging,” said Khurram Waris, a former Superintendent of Police who has now been demoted to the rank of an inspector after the Supreme Court declared shoulder promotions as null and void.

“When the Karachi airport was attacked, the Airport Security Force and police were the first to respond. We managed to take out all the terrorists. Later on the army arrived, took control of the airport and suddenly the impression was that they were the ones who had done all the work. Do you realise how my men feel?” said a senior police officer while requesting anonymity.

“Some security forces feel they are superior to others. This creates a sense of deprivation among others and affects their morale and performance. This also leads to coordination problems between different departments,” he added.

“We haven’t employed technology/gadgetry as done worldwide. Our security apparatus is yet to sync itself with the prevalent security threats,” says SSP Saqib Ismail Memon. One of the most obvious examples of this is the use of a ‘bomb detection scanner’ at a number of Pakistani airports. The scanner does not work. Dawn had reported back in January 2010 that it was modelled on the ADE-651, a device invented by a British conman who is now behind bars for fraud. When Dawn approached the ASF four years ago, senior officials had claimed that they had invented their own version and it was so successful that even the ISI was acquiring it from them. However, the officers simply failed to comprehend that their claims about the method of operation of the device were laughable from a scientific point of view. Dawn had even physically tested the device and it had failed to detect explosive material. However, despite the passage of four years and the Karachi airport attack, the device is still in use.

“This is what happens when you get non-technocrats to fill technical positions. It just sends shivers down the spine when such people or those above them fail to pay heed to valuable advice,” said Abbas Haider.

Haider highlights another security loophole. “Our people easily get carried away by a display of wealth and power. Drive around in a Land Cruiser and note the difference in the attitude of law enforcers. Jihadi groups will increasingly rely on such tactics in the coming days,” he said.

Jihadi groups have already used camouflage in a number of their attacks. The Haqqani network has attacked bases stationing Nato troops while driving there in stolen security vehicles and wearing their uniforms.

Security experts say the prevailing VIP culture in Pakistan is adding to the security woes. “When you are dealing with a terrorist attack, it is simply not the right time to be entertaining politicians and looking after their protocol needs. It is not too difficult for terrorists to camouflage and send in reinforcements while taking advantage of VIP visits,” said a former intelligence official.

Memon agrees and offers some advice. “Technology should be coupled with human deployment. Areas around sensitive installations need to be combed. Entry/exit on sensitive buildings should be protocol free. Mock exercises should be done on professional lines,” he says.

While security experts offer tips on beefing up security, a number of other experts closely monitoring the developments in Pakistan have their share of scepticism. 

“Do we even want to learn? Or is it a case that this present state of affairs and protracted conflict help attain a lucrative financial scenario for some people in the country?” questioned a professor at the University of Karachi while requesting anonymity.

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 22nd, 2014

‘Internal security doctrine has changed’

By Hassan Belal Zaidi

Have we really learned anything from over a decade of war?

Things have changed ever since we entered the war on terror; in particular, our policy towards Afghanistan has changed. Since 1947, we had genuine security concerns with our western neighbour — Pakhtunistan being the major bone of contention. There were incidents such as the Chaman border post attack and the Bajaur attack, which sounded alarm bells in Pakistan.

Back then, the tribal areas were only 30 per cent ‘open’. This means that government buildings and the military controlled only 30 percent of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata). The rest of the area was dark, it was closed to outsiders. This was true for the entire border region with Afghanistan, except for the border post at Torkham.

After 1973, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made industrial units everywhere. This helped open up maybe 60 percent of the tribal areas. The Afghans, on their end, worked vigorously towards their goal; they set up two educational centres in Kabul to preach their doctrine of Pakhtunistan, they recruited people from this side of the border to go to these centres and be indoctrinated. They sought to divide the Pakhtuns in Pakistan.

Now though, Pakistan’s Pakhtun population has become very integrated. So much so that Karachi, not Peshawar or Kandahar, is the largest Pakhtun city in the world. Hence, the fervour for Pakhtunistan has died down too.

What about the doctrine of ‘strategic depth’? Have we moved on from our traditional myopic view of Afghanistan?

The realisation that the US is leaving but we will be left to pick up the pieces has begun to set in. But the doctrine of strategic depth has been exaggerated. It was never as in vogue as it is thought. It was primarily Aslam Beg and before him, a brigadier in the 1960s, who used to espouse this doctrine. But on the ground, this doctrine didn’t hold much sway.

All the military wanted was a government that accepted the Durand Line. They saw that even when the Taliban, who were their ‘own people’, were asked to recognise the Durand Line as an international border, they simply turned around and said, “Islam has no concept of borders or boundaries”. So they are wary now. Moreover, the Taliban threat has domestically awakened the realisation that a Taliban government in Kabul will be harmful for Pakistan as well.

The contention that the British leased the Frontier province from the Afghans and now it must go back to them is not true. Under the UN convention, the agreement between the British and the Afghans has now been transferred to Pakistan, and this is governed by international law. I cannot comment on what seem to be political statements by Abdullah Abdullah, but overall, this issue has died down now. What is most significant is that the US has given statements to the effect that the Durand Line is the recognised international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This has laid the border question to rest.

What about our internal security doctrine? In terms of victimisation and silencing of dissent, particularly when questioning state institutions such as the military. Are they still as unquestionable as they were in the past?

The internal security doctrine has changed as well. Gone are the days when you could brand someone a traitor simply because they didn’t agree with your policies. Among political leaders, victimisation has all but faded away. But this has more to do with the mindset of the people than anything else. Geo TV, for example, were declared traitors for speaking against the army, so there are still red lines. We’ve come a long way, but there is still more to be done. I believe the situation can improve further if democratic governments continue.

The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) still looks to be an unrealised dream. Do you think having a centralised intelligence infrastructure will help us with this war?

In any country where there are several agencies charged with collecting intelligence, you can never have perfect inter-agency cooperation. Look at the US: they have the CIA, FBI, NSA, and they are all quite competitive. This is the bottom line; if the government tries to rein in the agencies through NACTA or any other centralised body, which is answerable to the Interior Ministry, they will face resistance.

In my opinion, sectarian organisations such as the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi must also be tackled in the wake of the action on North Waziristan. One could have a small cell supported by highly-trained operatives, who can swoop in and conduct surgical operations against militant hideouts in Bahawalpur, for example. Timing is key in all such operations, so it must be a small cell with a highly-trained and well-equipped force at their disposal. Now if you ask the Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, and the Special Branch to share intelligence on sectarian organisations, they will be far more willing than if you were to simply ask them to share information with each other.

Following the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) split and Maulana Fazlullah’s flight to Afghanistan, how do you see things shaping up?

The Afghan government does not control the area where Fazlullah is in hiding. But you can be sure that when a player such as Fazlullah is out in the open, all major intelligence agencies in the region will get involved. Be it the Afghan NDS, Russian intelligence, the Iranian, Indians or even our own Inter-Services Intelligence.

The TTP is primarily a Mehsud-led group. Baitullah Mehsud wanted Waliur Rehman to succeed him, but after his death, Hakeemullah took charge. Then both Wali and Hakeemullah were killed in drone attacks, leading to a deadlock. Fazlullah was the consensus candidate; a temporary solution. Now, with the split in the TTP, I see that the Mehsud-led faction will hold sway in Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai and the Frontier Regions (FRs), Darra Adam Khel and Lakki Marwat. The Fazlullah camp will be strong in Mohmand, Bajaur and Malakand, areas where the Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) is present, and will include hardliners like Umar Khalid Khorasani.

With regards to the operation specifically, what does it really mean when the army says that such and such area has been ‘cleared’?

When an agency is ‘cleared’, it means that the military has ‘dominated that space’ and disrupted the status quo, i.e. taken away the power base from militants and sent them packing. But even after an agency or any area is cleared, continued army presence is necessary to maintain stability.

As in the case of Swat, even today, military presence there is necessary because there is a chance that if Swat is left to its own devices, militancy might resurge in the area. The Swat valley and even the Mohmand Agency aren’t 100 per cent clear, but the writ of the state does prevail there now. Things are definitely better than before, at least Fazlullah is not in charge anymore.

So how do we deal with the remnants of these militants, those who blend back into society once their masters are killed or imprisoned?

Those who used to sympathise with militants must be rehabilitated. Those who surrender should be allowed safe passage and must be screened. Former combatants who reform must also be vetted to analyse why they were swayed by the extremist message in the first place. Above all, the children who have been either brainwashed by the terrorists or are simply traumatised by their experiences, must be rehabilitated. There should be aam maafi (general amnesty), like we’ve seen before in Balochistan in the 1970s. Ataullah Mengal, Bizenjo, they were all part of the Hyderabad tribunal, but now they are in the political mainstream.

Does the action stop with the operation in North Waziristan or do you think that there is more to this fight?

The momentum from this operation must be carried forward. After North Waziristan, if the military wants to proceed against terrorist hideouts in, for instance, Bhara Kahu or Jhang or Balochistan, they should go in and act swiftly.

Why has the operation taken so long? If the military wanted to move into NWA since 2011, what was stopping them?

It is always the concerns of the political leadership that hold up or delay any action on the ground. Even now, the biggest impediment to a final decision on the matter was the narrative built up in Punjab, that this action is being taken at the behest of the US. The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) mantra about talks was hurting the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) in Punjab and they had to counter that perception, which is why things took this long to materialise.

Not that they didn’t give peace a chance. But the committee formed to negotiate with the Taliban was a non-starter in the first place. It was obvious that apart from Rahimullah Yousafzai, no one else knew what they were talking about. The Talibs themselves were the architects of the breakdown of talks.

The army needs the sanction of the civilian government before entering any area for an operation. The governor of the province must explicitly request army action and they can only proceed with his orders. But in Fata, interestingly, the orders issued by the governor of the area in 1909, before partition, remains in force. Action was ordered in both Pata and Fata and technically, that order was never rescinded.

What do you think the fallout will be like in the rest of the country?

Look, it’s not possible to stop the terrorists from all their activities. There will be a backlash and it must be tolerated through a national consensus. Only that will ensure the operation’s success. The terrorists will try their best to fragment society’s opinions, but we must remain committed to this action.

There are currently two narratives on the drone issue; that they are a violation of our sovereignty, or that they are the best and most efficient way of taking out high-value targets. Where do you stand on this?

I believe the number of civilian casualties in drone attacks is exaggerated. The Taliban are masters of propaganda. I put it to you that if civilians were dying in drone attacks in as great numbers, as people are claiming, the Taliban would be all over the story. They have massive communications and public relations machinery at their disposal and in the immediate aftermath of a drone strike, they cordon off the area and clear it. So if we had instances of widespread civilian deaths, the Taliban’s media offensive would have been unstoppable. But they are reduced to sharing forged images, taken usually from the Middle East.

They don’t have anything, so they resort to faking ‘proof’.

Discuss the complexities of war on Twitter with Asad Munir @asadmunir38 and with Hassan Belal Zaidi @mightyobvious_

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 22nd, 2014

Scattered yet dangerous

By Ali Arqam

The ferocious attack on the Karachi airport by the militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and claimed by both the IMU and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) seems to have been the catalyst for the much awaited offensive in North Waziristan. The bids to negotiate with the TTP and the rhetoric of needing a political consensus for a military offensive have fizzled out and now, with the exception of a very few, almost all the political forces and segments of society have willingly or reluctantly thrown their weight behind the decision to take on the militants.

But one of the intended aims of the attack was to make the security establishment realise the possible backlash of an armed offensive in North Waziristan. It may well have succeeded, as it seemingly did in 2012, post the Kamra Airbase attack.

On August 14, 2012, the then COAS General Kayani made a speech at the military academy of Kakul vowing to eradicate militancy, restore peace in the troubled region and to not tolerate a parallel system or militant presence. The speech was well received by most analysts but it didn’t go down well with the militants who responded with an attack on Kamra Airbase.

The attack was then linked by some to the swirling rumours of a military offensive in Waziristan, and soon a clarification was issued that “No military offensive in North Waziristan” was on the cards. The attack and subsequent obfuscation by pro-Taliban elements seems to have worked.

The attack on the Karachi airport proved to be the last straw, but what are the potential weapons in the militant arsenal?

But this was not the case with the attack on the Karachi Airport. The reactive military strategy of aerial bombing on the militants’ hideouts has now been extended to a full-fledged military offensive.

Perhaps very little has been said about the objectives of the military offensive as the targeted region is also home to the ‘good’ Taliban faction of Hafiz Gul Bahadur and the estranged Mehsud faction of TTP led by Khalid Saeed alias Sajna. Initial reports have hinted that aerial raids were aimed at territories with a presence of Uzbek and foreign militants. If the offensive specifically aims at the TTP and its IMU allies, the possible backlash of the military offensive in the settled areas and urban centres will be from the sleeper cells of TTP Mohmand and Swat factions.

In view of the recent hyperbolic statement by the TTP spokesperson Shahidullah Shahid in response to the military offensive, we need to realise and understand the nature of the threat. It should be evident that militant factions and non-State actors pitted against the state for whatever reason cannot face the unfettered might of the state. It is this clear disparity in powers and resources which forces them to resort to unconventional means of fighting the state, and creating fear among the common people is a potent weapon in their arsenal.

Peshawar and other districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have faced the brunt of terrorists’ backlashes, with bomb blasts and attacks killings civilians, political workers, leaders of ANP, members of peace militias and Police officials alike. After KPK, Karachi tops the list of cities with supporting terror networks, terrorist-related financial crimes and other acts of terror. It is not only the militants’ ATM machine, but also a place where they settle scores.

If the offensive specifically aims at the TTP and its IMU allies, the possible backlash of the military offensive in the settled areas and urban centres will be from the sleeper cells of TTP Mohmand and Swat factions.

A look at recent terror attacks indicates that they were carried out with the help of a local support base, be it the ‘Punjabi Taliban’, the LeJ or the TTP Mohmand or Mehsud factions. The attack on the Mehran Airbase, very similar to the Karachi airport attack, was perpetrated by the militants of the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), a conglomeration of Uzbeks, Chechen and Ughur militants, with the alleged support of the Punjabi Taliban faction led by Qari Shahid.

The Mohmand faction has emerged as the firmest ally of the Fazlullah-led TTP and has one of the strongest network of recruits and militants in Karachi. Attacks on Law enforcement agencies, including those targeting CID officials such as Chaudhry Alsam and Shafiq Tanoli were claimed by the Mohmand faction. But the targeted operation in Karachi has reportedly taken on the militants from Mohmand and Swat faction, curbing their networks to a larger extent. Militants killed in ‘encounters’ with the LEAs or whose bullet riddled bodies were found in the outskirts of the city were mostly from the Mohmand faction.

Recent fractures in the TTP, as evidenced by their infighting in Waziristan and Karachi have curtailed their ability to perpetrate big attacks, and perhaps this was the reason that the IMU itself had to come forward in planning and committing an attack on Karachi airport. Previously, the IMU has shown its preference for operations in which it storms targets and takes hostages. However, exact details as to their objectives have yet to emerge and the exact identity of the local supporters has yet to be determined.

For its transnational roots, rhetoric’s of international Caliphate, Salafist ideology and its inclusive network of support, IMU may seek allies in other Jihadi offshoots as well. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the IMU and its affiliates have also often been associated with Hizbut Tehrir (HuT), from which they are said to gain ideological inspiration.

Pakistan’s military establishment has also been targeted by HuT, and has conducted internal investigations of affiliates of HuT in the lower ranks of the military. Perhaps, further scrutinising and investigation might help in thwarting attacks on military installations such as the one at Mehran Base or others which pointed towards inside help.

Another factor which may favour the militants is the absence of independent sources of news and information from the region. The military’s bid to check the flow of news and information has its share of drawbacks. Due to lack of independent sources, one has to rely on the official sources for the news or on militant sources for an alternative version. Neither version can be taken as objective.

The militants also have a huge and efficient presence in cyberspace, social networks and also a deep penetration in society, which will help them in disputing the official narrative and magnifying or exaggerating the civilian losses in the offensive. Along with counter-terror, a counter-propaganda campaign will also need to be conducted.

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 22nd, 2014

Who are the IMU?

By Aamir Mughal

Photo shows Qari Tahir Yaldashev, a leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). —File Photo

Operating from Pakistani territory since more than a decade, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has fought shoulder to shoulder with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

But they began as a semi-criminal group, under the name Adolat, led by Juma Namangani, a soldier of the USSR army, and a firebrand cleric named Tahir Yuldashev. Both men sought to use religion to justify their organisation’s existence but sustained themselves through extorting businessmen and traders in Uzbekistan.

As Uzbekistan gained independence from the former Soviet Union on September 1, 1991, both Namangani and Yuldashev believed in a different direction of nationhood and statecraft than held by the country’s first president, Islam Karimov. They wanted their hardline views imposed on the country while Karimov, a dictator in the Soviet mold, saw the need for a more secular nation.

Namangani and Yuldashev thus attacked Karimov and his regime, prompting a ruthless retaliation from the government against their organisation. In 1992, the IMU was banned, its cadres decimated, and Namangani and Yuldashev both, fled to Afghanistan.

Of course groups such as what later became the IMU had been encouraged as strategic assets during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was still intact. As argued by Brigadier (retd) Mohammad Yousaf, author of The Bear Trap, the Quran as well as jihadist propaganda was translated into Uzbek in 1984 and smuggled into Central Asia as an ideological counterweight to Communism. After the disintegration of the USSR, Islamic extremism in Central Asia began to take root and burgeon — till Karimov chucked the IMU out of Uzbekistan.

But Yuldashev and his warriors weren’t going to remain restricted to Afghanistan; soon, IMU warriors would cross into Pakistan, and find ideological allies in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

In Pakistan, the Uzbeks were recognised as fierce fighters and fiercely loyal – they were part of the inner circle of al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, also serving as their personal bodyguards. Their ideological bent was rabidly Anti-Shia – something that worked for them as they went about making alliances with other like-minded Islamist groups.

Political developments and a ceasefire agreement in Central Asia meant that the Uzbeks lost their allies, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) led by Said Abdullah Nuri. The IRPT would later support Ahmad Shah Masood’s forces in Afghanistan. This sparked the formation of the IMU in 1998, as a force that was insistent on imposing its brand of Islam in Uzbekistan.

In 1999, the IMU became allies of the Taliban, but suffered the loss of Namangani in November 2001. The United States had attacked Afghanistan in the wake of the 9-11 attacks on America; one of the attacks killed Namangani but Yuldashev managed to join the warring resistance.

Yuldashev became sole commander of the IMU in late 2001/early 2002, as the organisation moved to and settled in South Waziristan. In a state of being permanently homeless and permanently at war since 1992, the IMU appeared to have weakened.

But South Waziristan afforded an opportunity for the IMU to regroup, reorganise, and even build a semblance of a life for themselves. Local tribes took in members of the IMU as guests; some even offered their daughters’ hand in marriage to the Uzbek warriors.

The IMU’s alignment with the Taliban meant that the Uzbek warriors periodically clashed with Pakistani armed forces. These clashes, in turn, sparked a reaction from the tribes hosting the Uzbeks, who bore the brunt of counterattacks from Pakistani forces.

In 2007, the IMU was evicted from South Waziristan by Taliban warlord Maulvi Nazir, in part because he believed that Uzbek fighters offended local customs and acted like an “occupation force” in Pashtun land.

As they moved to other territories, they soon found patronage from Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud. “When the IMU joined Baitullah Mehsud’s faction of the Taliban, it had to accept Mehsud’s priorities, foremost of which was fighting the Pakistani state,” writes Jacob Zenn, in his paper The Indigenization of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

The Uzbeks would also find legitimacy from faith-based parties in Pakistan. Under the guise of protecting the “ummah,” Sunni Takfiri groups welcomed the Uzbeks, providing them with relief and funds.

The writer is a blogger. He tweets @mughalbha

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 22nd, 2014