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THE PML-Q and Pakistan Awami Tehreek have vowed to topple the PML-N government soon because of its “non-democratic” nature. Ironically, these parties either tolerated or were integral parts of Musharraf’s dictatorship. This makes their aims debatable and raises the question of whether elected regimes should ever be toppled extra-constitutionally.
Given their public mandates, such toppling would seem justified only in rare cases, eg, if they were elected unfairly or were planning to rig future elections or precipitating massive economic or political collapse. Even then, it would be necessary to ensure legality, eg, by pursuing in-house change, that is, within parliament. Do such conditions exist today?
There is increasing evidence of electoral irregularities in the 2013 elections. But it is unclear whether they decisively shifted results and whether they happened due to administrative weaknesses or manipulation. However, the 2013 polls were clearly unlike the 1990s or 2002 elections where the whole machinery of interim governments worked together nationally to defeat non-favoured parties.
Thus, accusing parties, judges and media groups of stealing the election seems premature. There is justification, though, for demanding a thorough inquiry and poll reforms. If the government stonewalls either demand, there would be justification for launching protests — within constitutional limits.
Calls to dismiss the government cannot be justified.
The PML-N’s performance has undoubtedly been disappointing. But this essentially means having failed to resolve long-standing problems which previous governments had also ignored rather than causing an economic or political meltdown. In fact, there is actually limited, even if unsustainable, improvement in some critical areas.
The drone attacks have ceased and murder rates in Karachi have reduced somewhat. Foreign reserves, inflation, fiscal deficit and manufacturing growth have also improved somewhat. The PML-N deserves no big credit for these limited improvements as many of them were obtained through questionable means. However, it is difficult to argue that it should be dismissed within its second year, especially when its main opponents are doing equally badly provincially.
Cynics may argue that it is not performance but civilian-establishment frictions that topple Pakistani civilian governments. Some even accuse (without proof) Qadri of facilitating an establishment-led intervention. However, while launched more whimsically in the 1950s-60s or when the easy 58-2(B) dismissal option existed, even soft interventions are seen as dependent on stringent conditions — serious civilian-establishment disagreements, adequate support for the establishment and a transition plan. These conditions do not exist.
Sharif is largely toeing the establishment line on critical issues, eg, foreign policy, and is meeting security-related budgetary demands. Differences exist on peace talks and Musharraf’s trial. But neither issue has seen decisive government decisions, just endless delays that signal government sensitivity to establishment reactions. Ministers have made provocative statements. Again, such minor issues do not provoke interventions by themselves anymore.
Nor is there friction on issues where the establishment could gain widespread public support. On Musharraf, the public may back PML-N more, given Musharraf’s unpopularity. On peace talks, opinions are divided. However, within all-important Punjab, the majority may support talks since Punjab has escaped major terrorism.
Even in terrorism-ravaged KP, many favour talks, as reflected by the popularity of pro-talks PTI there. Other opposition parties, the judiciary, media and civil society would also oppose intervention. While this opposition may not obstruct action on D-day, it would create problems subsequently in sustaining the intervention.Externally, intervention could lead to sanctions.
Nor is there any guarantee that intervention will produce better civilian governments. Re-elections within three months of intervention may bring the same parties back unless one uses questionable disqualification methods or massive rigging, which may provoke huge legal, media and street challenges.
Longer interventions will run into legal obstacles and cause popular street and media backlash while still not guaranteeing desired election results later. After Zia and Musharraf, the PPP won elections both times despite major efforts to exterminate it. Ironically, it lost badly after five years of its own rule. This highlights the superiority of democracy over unconstitutional means in weeding out non-performing parties.
Given limited disagreements and the risks associated with intervening, exerting behind-the-scene pressures on Nawaz still represents a better option for the establishment given its still considerable soft and economic powers. The planned street demonstrations by PAT that many interpret as preparations for intervention may represent such pressure tactics.
The writer is a development and political economist.
Published in Dawn, June 12th, 2014
