I HAVE just finished an edited book on the counterterrorism (CT) challenge in Pakistan in which the contributors converge on a number of fairly pessimistic conclusions. The volume confirms that Pakistan’s CT domain is lacking the most basic prerequisite for a state to overcome a multifaceted terrorism challenge: having across-the-board consensus on who your enemy is and being able to galvanise your institutions to work together to tackle it.

I am pointing to the specific and practical concern about knowing who within the militant enclave represents what threat and how (and by whom) they are to be tackled.

Of course, nothing profound here. From the streets of Pakistan to policy pundits in Washington, you hear people questioning Pakistan’s sincerity on CT. But that debate is distinct in that it features people from outside Pakistan’s decision-making enclave. One can live with lack of clarity there. But the situation becomes intolerable when one finds Pakistani decision-makers as confused and incoherent about whom they are after.

The civilian decision-makers seem to have little visibility on what the military is thinking in terms of the ‘good’ vs ‘bad’ militants. Everyone I speak to suspects that parts of the establishment are still up to no good when it comes to making a clean break with the militants. Their reasons for believing so are varied. Regardless, they do not feel the military is being upfront about this whole business even behind closed doors.

Within the government’s ranks itself, there is much confusion on where the prime minister stands. There are those who strongly feel that he’s got the militancy question worked out and the path of reconciliation will deliver. Others, including some close to him, worry that he’s being manipulated by those who see the Punjab-based militants favorably and that his timidity will lead us to disaster.

As for the military, it is always ready to offer you its set piece explanation of how they are approaching the CT challenge, why they can’t target all groups at once, why the Afghan militants must not become Pakistan’s problem, how the civilians essentially blame them for everything that goes wrong without playing their role effectively, etc.

Their story doesn’t add up. In fact, it’s often indefensible. But it continues to be perpetuated nonetheless.

So where does this leave the executers of the CT policy — those who actually have to go out and do things. Let us take the three aspects believed to be key to successful CT: military, police and the legal system.

The military/ISI combine feels that it is the only one competent enough to hold the fort. Despite having realised they cannot master the CT space without the police’s support in the urban areas, they see the police as woefully incompetent and operating at the whims of politicians — themselves seen as compromised creatures for the most part.

Get into their minds and their distrust for the police and their tendency of ignoring the police’s jurisdiction, withholding information and technology from the police, etc. becomes rather unsurprising.

The police have countless anecdotes of their own. They say they regularly apprehend militants, only to be forced to let a number of them go under pressure either from the khakis or influential politicians. Many of them are not sure if serious CT efforts are worth it given that part of their state seems to be working against them.

Then there is the disconnect within the criminal justice system. The judiciary is dismissive of the police and prosecutors’ performance in terrorism cases. Police keep repeating mistakes in their investigations; the judiciary finds these as evidence of incompetence and lack of seriousness.

The police argue that the judiciary is oblivious to their constraints. And even if these officers understand the judiciary’s compulsions to follow the law in letter and spirit, those actually investigating the cases have even ended up losing their lives at the hands of the acquitted militants. Their peers feel that the judiciary is timid, or worse yet, lenient towards the militants. Again, why risk your lives, they ask!

And finally, members from all state institutions relevant to CT would tell you that their institutions have been penetrated — to varying degrees — by the Islamist mindset. Yes, the West exaggerates the problem multifold. But no, the concern is not made up. Many in these institutions no longer know who to trust.

To use a term of art, it’s a royal mess. If the state is not convinced of its own sincerity, the rest hardly matters.

The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington D.C.

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