THE sectarian divide is widening and intensifying in Pakistan. It is not only shaping trends and behaviours but also gradually changing the country’s socio-cultural landscape. Apart from its social, cultural and political implications, the widening sectarian discord in Pakistan has catalysed the transformation of certain radical tendencies into violent expression. Hence, we have seen increased sectarian and faith-based violence in recent years.

An important factor contributing to this growing sectarian divide and violence is the rise and empowerment of sectarian groups. These groups are not only changing socio-cultural patterns but have also transformed the traditionally nationalistic, anti-Indian discourse into a sectarian one. Sectarian discrimination in daily life is increasing and sectarian-based ghettos are growing in Pakistan. Different sects and sectarian groups are encouraging the establishment of separate housing societies and localities.

Sectarian violence has manifested itself in three major forms in Pakistan: sectarian-related terrorism; community and tribal sectarian violence; and irregular or instant sectarian violence. Sectarian-related terrorism is a form of organised and structured violence in Pakistan; the other two strands represent a non-structured pattern of sectarian violence mainly arising from hate speech, growing sectarian intolerance and efforts to secure sectarian interests at the community, tribal or group level.

All three forms complement each other, and if one type is triggered by an incident, the other two may be activated. If triggered, the second pattern of sectarian violence has a long-term impact and can activate the other two forms of violence. For instance, tribal sectarian tensions in Kurram Agency took four years to come down.

The third form is a new phenomenon. When an incident of a sectarian nature occurs, it can trigger attacks on mosques, shrines and religious symbols of rival sects. This happened in Rawalpindi last year when sectarian clashes in the city during a Muharram procession triggered sectarian tensions and violence across the country.

Though sectarian violence is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan, sectarian groups have increasingly resorted to triggering and exploiting sectarian tendencies. For example, the first major anti-Shia riots took place in Khairpur district in Sindh during Muharram in 1963 but the government and religious scholars overcame the crisis through dialogue.

Similarly, based on scattered sectarian incidents in the 1970s, a poster campaign was launched throughout the country inciting Sunnis to take over Pakistan with the slogan ‘Jag Sunni jag, Pakistan tera hai’ (‘Sunnis, wake up, Pakistan is yours’); however, it failed to catch the attention not only of the public at large but also of major Sunni parties. The reason was that radical sectarian groups were absent from the national scene.

But when similar sectarian tensions rose in Karachi in 1983, it became a difficult task for the police to overcome the violence. By then, not only had religious communities become conscious of their sectarian identity, groups based on sectarianism had also started to emerge on the national scene.

International players also moved in at that stage. In Karachi’s sectarian violence of 1983, the Deobandi Sawad-i-Azam Ahl-i-Sunnat led by Maulana Samiullah and Maulana Asfandyar was an anti-Shia movement launched in the city with financial support from Iraq. However, the movement was overshadowed with the establishment of the Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba in Jhang, Punjab, later renamed Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi.

The establishment of the SSP triggered the phenomenon of sectarian-based groups, and other sects also established organisations as a reaction, leading to escalating sectarian tensions. At the same time, hardliners in these groups got involved in sectarian-related terrorism.

Apart from the proliferation of sectarian groups, madressahs also contributed to the rise of sectarian divides in society. Both sectarian groups and madressahs have tended to promote sectarian-based identities among their respective sects. The sectarian brotherhood also makes it easy for some groups and madressahs in Pakistan to develop a nexus with like-minded terrorist groups in Pakistan and abroad.

Though the clergy denies that madressahs have any link with terrorism and the spread of hatred in society, law-enforcement agencies have a different view. They claim they have evidence that some madressahs have links with terrorist organisations. In this context, controlling violent sectarian groups and their affiliated madressahs is of critical importance. A zero tolerance approach towards terrorism and the groups and institutions involved in violence can help minimise the scale of the problem.

At the same time, both state and society can take initiatives to defuse violent sectarian tendencies. Despite the existing sectarian divide in the country, the majority of religious scholars believe in sectarian harmony and coexistence. In the late 1990s, they launched the Milli Yakjahti Council (council for national unity) to bring on board all sectarian representatives. As the clergy leads the larger religious discourse in Pakistan and holds considerable sway over public opinion, they could be engaged usefully and effectively to create awareness among people about the need and significance of sectarian and communal harmony, peaceful coexistence and national unity.

One more significant factor in the sectarian divide is the effect of foreign influence. The religious clergy cannot detach itself from the developments taking place in the Arab world and the wider Middle East as they associate themselves with certain countries and consider themselves the custodians of those countries’ interests in Pakistan. No doubt, there is a need to chalk out measures at a regional and global level, but one thing the state can demonstrate for the sake of internal security is an impartial position on the conflict raging in the Muslim world.

The writer is a security analyst.