VIOLENCE, crime and chaos have become a permanent feature of life in Karachi. What has also become a recurrent reality is the state’s response. Since the late 1980s, various kinds of operations have been initiated involving the police, paramilitary and regular armed forces, intelligence services and special courts like the Anti-Terrorism Courts. Underlining the state’s response is the ‘policing theory’ about the prevention of violence and crime in Karachi.

This theory is based on the fundamental assumption or myth that a radical reduction in violence and crime in Karachi is possible by merely adopting a de-politicised law-enforcement response and through an effective criminal justice system that ensures convictions. Will the present Karachi operations based on this policing theory fail or succeed? A complicated answer follows this question.

Avoiding anarchy: Karachi experienced a complete breakdown of order and violent anarchy from 2007 to 2013.

A fundamental cause of the state’s complete breakdown was both its inability to deal with the causes of this anarchy and its loss over the monopoly of the means of violence. In short, Karachi was handed over to various armed political, religious and criminal gangs, with the state being just one among the armed groups.

The result was expected — a deadly, violent Karachi infected by an unending supply of weapons and bombs.

What the ongoing Karachi operations have done is to try to re-establish the state’s monopoly over the means of violence with operations in various no-go areas and against various elements regarded as untouchable. This is the first step to save a divided and unequal city from complete anarchy.

In Karachi, there are no ideal choices. For the time being, the choice is between the terror perpetrated by the state and terror inflicted by other armed groups. The former is preferable because at least there is some institutional control over state violence and there is nothing worse than violent anarchy in an armed and divided city.

In short, the brave police, Rangers and other personnel, who have lost their lives, have saved this city from complete anarchy.

Understanding violence and crime: But warding off anarchy does not necessarily mean a radical reduction in violence and crime. Half of the violence caused in Karachi has roots in political and religious conflicts, which cannot be solved through a policing and legal response unless the roots themselves are tackled.

As for crime and criminal violence engaged in by persons or groups for personal gain, these are committed by two distinct groups i.e. persons with a criminal record and first-time offenders.

More than a century of research in crime and crime prevention has shown that neither are persons with a criminal record, nor can first-time offenders be, deterred by strong policing and effective convictions.

For example, among the developed nations, the US has the highest percentage of violent crime despite having the largest prison population (over 2.2 million prisoners in 2011) and an effective criminal justice system but still some 67pc of the prisoners commit a crime within three years of their release.

Hence, a policing theory based on the incapacitation and deterrence of criminals will not work because it does not deter them, let alone deter first-time offenders.

Research after research has shown that the ‘criminal justice prevention’ approach by itself does not work unless it is combined with: a) the ‘development prevention’ approach that targets high-risk individuals in broken and excluded families and communities; b) the ‘community prevention’ approach changing socio-economic conditions especially drug abuse; and c) the ‘situational prevention’ approach by reducing opportunities for crime mainly through structural and technological interventions.

In short, a divided, unequal and chaotic Karachi — a situation that results in violent crime — cannot be fixed without political, economic and social intervention.

Same failed story: Instead of dealing with violence and crime as a political, social and economic problem, the state has again adopted the strategy of trying to eliminate terrorism and crime by destroying or incapacitating certain terrorist and criminals.

The strategy is simple. First, label people as terrorists and criminals so that they are seen as devoid of any humanity and deprived of rights and reduced to evil beings. Second, kill them in legally justified encounters, which are never investigated.

Third, torture them on the moral excuse of deterring them, collecting evidence and saving other lives. Fourth, lawfully or unlawfully detain people on the belief (as opposed to evidence) that they are terrorist and criminals. Fifth, have them convicted by special courts on little or no evidence.

As in the past, this will not work because to adapt a political saying to the Karachi situation, how many terrorists and criminals will you kill as they will emerge from other houses unless you deal with the political, economic and social causes of terrorism and crime in Karachi.

A policing strategy will be effective to reduce arms and bombs in Karachi and to avoid anarchy but weapons and bombs don’t kill — people kill people.

Unless the rich and powerful in Karachi are willing to share their wealth and power with the rest of Karachi and are willing to contribute to order and justice in this city, terrorism and crime will continue to remain avenues for persons trying to achieve the good life and power through illegal means.

As a famous American sociologist aptly remarked, Al Capone is really a capitalist by other means.

The writer is a lawyer.