A narrow vision

Published March 23, 2014

THE recent announcement of the internal security policy is an important development. It is perhaps for the first time that a political government has announced its vision of Pakistan’s security. The policy has three major elements: dialogue with all stakeholders; isolating terrorists from their support bases; and enhancing deterrence through capacity-building to enable the security apparatus to neutralise threats to internal security.

This three-fold approach appears to be built on two threat scenarios. First, internal threats are weakening national political, economic and psycho-social power and potential. Second, protracted internal conflict and weakening national power are shaping the environment for external aggression.

The policy framework to implement this approach is based on two components — soft and hard. The former entails research and understanding, and winning hearts and minds — a familiar phrase that has extensively been used in Western counter-violent extremism strategies. The hard component will consist of a composite deterrence plan. The policy draft describes the soft approach at length but the CPD in brief.

Interestingly, the National Counter-Terrorism Authority will implement both components. For the softer part, the interior ministry’s bureaucratic body will construct a national narrative and facilitate a dialogue to strengthen tolerance in the country. Nacta will develop deradicalisation, reconciliation and reintegration programmes. It will bring madressahs into the educational mainstream framework, develop a youth engagement strategy and undertake a comprehensive review of the legal framework.

The burden of crafting and implementing the CDP will lie on Nacta’s shoulders. Some major initiatives under the CDP would establish a composite arms control regime, regulate the movement of Afghan refugees (the draft describes Afghan refugees as a major factor in terrorism inside Pakistan) and create a directorate of internal security, a joint intelligence directorate and a rapid response force. The focus would also include cyber security, terrorism financing, capacity building and the reorganisation of counterterrorism departments in the provincial police set-up.

Nacta will be answerable directly to the prime minister. This could help remove dichotomies, especially where these concern legal obstacles in the way of coordination between ministries and agencies. Even then, there’s no guarantee that the relevant agencies will be bound to share intelligence with the authority.

Apart from Nacta’s capacity constraints, the implementation and especially monitoring mechanisms are missing. Serious concerns have been raised about how a counterterrorism body can intervene to develop a national narrative, bring madressahs into the mainstream and deal with issues such as militants’ reintegration into society, the promotion of democratic values and social cohesion.

The policy document reflects a defensive approach. It is largely silent on the threats persisting in Fata and Balochistan and focuses primarily on securing urban centres. Though the government is talking to the Taliban, its written ‘dialogue policy’ is silent on the peace initiative.

The dialogue component of the document, apparently conceived in a broader perspective, is too general. It talks about dialogue with all stakeholders for madressah reforms, militants’ rehabilitation and de-radicalisation etc.

It is clear that the government’s internal security vision is based on an approach that engages militants in talks and builds shields to guard major urban centres. The initial steps taken thus far, or the ones the government is serious about taking, relate to countering urban terrorism. These measures include the establishment of a rapid response force and joint intelligence directorate.

Interestingly, the primary features of the policy announced by the interior minister last December included a ‘secret’ part, which has been replaced with the decision to isolate the terrorists. The concept of a terrorist is not clear in the policy document. Does it mean the Taliban to whom the government is talking? Does it mean that the government wants to detach the Taliban from their support bases through peace talks?

As the policy has been conceived in an urban terrorism perspective, its features are not different from Western policy frameworks. The interior ministry has not consulted the provinces. Even the government has not discussed the policy in parliament. The interior ministry’s think tanks may have consulted Western practitioners. If not, then many experts would regard it as a copied piece of work.

Such doubts are strengthened by factual errors and vague terminology used in the draft. For example, Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi, founder of the Barelvi school of thought, has been mentioned as head of a banned sectarian Deobandi outfit.

The policy draft also sheds light on international liaisons for which Nacta will be responsible. It notes that the UK and US governments are keen to develop dedicated counterterrorism bodies in countries with higher radical tendencies.

Many countries have taken similar steps. But it might create functional overlaps and coordination issues further weakening the traditional security mechanism. Another troubling aspect is that when foreign assistance and collaboration stops, overlapping institutional functions will become a huge burden for the governments. There are many other issues that need to be reviewed in the policy, especially on the legislative front. The government is introducing and amending laws in a very narrow security perspective, which will have huge political and social implications. It seems as if Pakistan has joined the club of nations which are in the process of reversing all the civil liberties achieved between the Second World War and Sept 11, 2001.

The writer is a security analyst.

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