THOUGH the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) was announced in the National Assembly on Feb 26 before being shared with parliamentarians and analysts, the broader contours of the policy can be gleaned from subsequent press reports.

A policy or strategy is usually formulated to unravel the complexity of an issue for the purposes of achieving particular objectives. Hence a comprehensive policy must have clear objectives, balanced analysis and it must contain implementation strategies.

The discourse part of the document needs to clarify confusion with respect to the terms ‘militancy,’ ‘extremism,’ ‘insurgency’ and ‘terrorism’ that have been used interchangeably in Pakistan for several decades now. It should also have elucidated misconceptions of parallels between violent religious extremism and nationalist militancy on the one hand and violent extremism and political militancy elsewhere in the world on the other. A multi-pronged policy should initiate a gradual paradigm shift in strategies and implementation.

But what we have got seems to be perpetuating the status quo. At best, the present policy gives the contours of the use of force. It is a good omen that gaps in the lack of coordination in the use of force might be filled with the reactivation of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta) supported by a Rapid Force. The much needed coordination between intelligence services might be possible if Nacta is duly funded and autonomously governed, and reports to the elected chief executive.

The present policy overlooks the complexity of the issue at stake. It should not have been confined to the internal aspect because intersections of regional and international factors are involved.

It was expected that a comprehensive, compact and coordinated policy would be divided into political, socio-cultural, strategic and foreign policy aspects, and it would discuss and outline the use of force.

The aspect concerned with the use of force should have been shared for feedback with the security establishment, security analysts and the leaders of parties in parliament. In the same vein, political, socio-cultural and strategic/foreign policy aspects should have been shared broadly with academia, parliamentarians and civil society.

The political aspect should have been about the construction of an alternative discourse. A discourse on human rights and inclusive pluralism, and the exclusion of all forms of violence, must replace the prevailing one that perpetuates homogenisation, exclusion, isolation and the glorification of war.

The country’s education system doesn’t even pretend to develop critical thinking, promote multiple skills or teach civic responsibilities, indigenous wisdom and aesthetic sense. Our younger generation is unable to celebrate diversity, respect human dignity, or tap its curiosity to create and invent. Instead, our education system — public and private, religious and secular — develops rigidity. This needs to be changed. The media also need to be orientated towards disseminating a pluralist discourse.

The implementation of existing laws through strong prosecution and enforcement agencies and legislation for reforming these and making new ones can also lead to a paradigm shift. Another consideration of the political aspect could be integration and reconciliation. The state should open its doors to individuals that have been co-opted by militant organisations. For this to happen, a comprehensive framework for dialogue and repatriation needs to be developed, and post-traumatic counselling centres established.

The revival of indigenous culture, languages and arts, and the linking of them to modern civilisation, can be one of the most important tools of dealing with militancy. The second part of this socio-cultural aspect would be to replace the economy of war with the resource-based and equitable economy of peace.

All the mafias of kidnapping, drug trafficking, human trafficking and car-lifting need to be broken. For this to happen, the political, administrative and economic mainstreaming of Fata and the abolishing of the Frontier Crimes Regulations seem to be the only way. The state and government have to muster the will power to do away with Fata as a strategic space for private militias.

The strategic aspect includes the revision of both the method and content of foreign policy. Pakistan needs to base its foreign policy on pro-people politico-economic interests which can only happen if policymaking remains the domain of the elected government. Pakistan also needs to find convergence among the conflicting interests of regional states.

The military aspect of the strategy should be based on a meaningful framework for the use of force. The targeted use of force, coordination between intelligence agencies and the rehabilitation of internally displaced persons would be the constituent parts of this aspect of the policy. This would also require capacity-building of the law enforcement agencies.

The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar.

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