THE situation is not just about talks vs operation. The plot is far more complex than it appears. At the moment, an operation seems to be the better option; but there are many constraints. And as opposed to the state, it is the Pakistani Taliban, both ‘good’ and ‘bad’, that appear to be benefiting more from the current situation.

The political and security establishments have different perceptions of and responses to the quagmire of terrorism. While the security establishment takes a broader view, and factors in regional and strategic concerns, the political leadership has focused primarily on internal security. Nonetheless nothing should stop the two from evolving a common approach, though the government’s view of national security is still developing.

But the current dynamics of the Taliban insurgency demand a quick and vigilant response. As the situation is changing daily, the government has to come up with a flexible approach.

It appears that the security establishment is in a hurry to strike hard against the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) before 2015 so that no one can use the banned group as a strategic tool against Pakistan — including the Afghan Taliban and Afghan security institutions.

As time passes, the feeling of uncertainty and unease is growing vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban behaviour after Nato troops withdraw from Afghanistan. The major reason is that the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network have not used their influence with the TTP leadership and other militants on both sides of the border to get them to stop launching attacks inside Pakistan. It is feared that after 2015, the Afghan Taliban will continue to use the TTP as a tactical tool against Pakistan to maintain what they view as a strategic balance.

It is likely that some Pakistanis believe that if the TTP is dismantled or weakened enough before 2015, the Afghan Taliban would not be able to use them as a bargaining lever and will continue to look towards Pakistan for political support.

However, a full-scale operation in North Waziristan cannot guarantee the TTP’s elimination. There are two reasons. First, the TTP and its local and international affiliates have expanded their networks in other parts of the country and the number of terrorists’ sleeper cells is increasing. Second, the North Waziristan militants can relocate to Afghanistan and join Mullah Fazlullah’s forces thus becoming more problematic for Pakistan. It would be a nightmare for the establishment if these militants become strategic assets in the hands of Afghan security agencies.

In this context, a prolonged US presence in Afghanistan could become a stabilising factor in border security and Pak-Afghan ties. The US has its own reasons for maintaining its presence in the region. Apart from the Al Qaeda presence, it is concerned about Pakistan’s nukes. Besides, its presence in Afghanistan will keep up pressure on Iran, China, Russia and the Central Asian states.

There are compelling reasons for Afghans to support the presence of the US troops in their country. The capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces to assume responsibility post-2014 is still a major concern for Kabul, which is not sure whether peace can be achieved without mainstreaming the Afghan Taliban. The latter believe their political and moral position will strengthen after 2014 even without a reconciliation agreement. They want to keep their allies and assets intact both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the former, they may not disturb elections on a large scale; in Pakistan they will support peace talks to buy time. It is for the first time that the Afghan Taliban are experiencing time constraints.

Interestingly, experts do not give a proper place to Al Qaeda in their analyses. Al Qaeda is another beneficiary of the regional conflict. For Al Qaeda, this is a golden opportunity to manipulate the situation in its favour as it enjoys the same influence over the TTP and other regional militant groups as the Afghan Taliban.

After failure in Mali and disappointment in Syria, Al Qaeda is again concentrating on ungoverned spaces in Iraq and the bordering areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kunar and Nuristan provinces have been its primary hubs. This area can pose an even bigger threat than North Waziristan.

Pakistan is central to Al Qaeda strategies as the group’s priority is to bring revolution first in Pakistan and then to export it to other regions. Contrary to the Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda will be the beneficiary of both options — talks with the TTP or an operation against it.

In the case of peace talks, Al Qaeda and its affiliates will gain more political and ideological legitimacy, and in the event of an operation, it will exploit the action against the militants to exert moral influence, and its nexus with the TTP will strengthen. But, the operational capabilities of Al Qaeda affiliates may be damaged temporarily.

In this context, an operation in North Waziristan and other militant pockets in the tribal areas will yield more than talks would. But will a full-scale operation be successful without Afghan and US cooperation? Sealing the border from the Afghan side wouldn’t be Kabul’s priority, while the US and Nato are unlikely to deploy troops on the border which will place them at risk.

Though the US has assured its support if Pakistan wants to launch a full-scale operation in North Waziristan, what can it do except to carry out drone strikes on the militants’ hideouts?

The writer is a security analyst.