TWO-YEAR-OLD Zala, cradled in her uncle’s arms and chewing gum, was completely unaware that she was participating in the funeral procession of her father. She had no idea of the tragedy that had befallen her and her mother. It would never have occurred to the young widow of Awami National Party (ANP) worker Mian Mushtaq, the victim of a targeted killing, that three years after her marriage she would be a widow.

Mian Mushtaq’s hundreds of friends could have never believed that their ever-smiling, compassionate comrade would be killed just because he belonged to a political party that held strong views about religious militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Fata, the rest of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mian Mushtaq was killed in his village Masho Khel southwest of Peshawar on Jan 12, 2014.

Similarly, the four bereaved brothers and two shocked elderly sisters of Fida Muhammad must have been trying to comprehend why Fida would be killed simply for supporting the ANP’s political stance. A small businessman running a pharmacy in the southern suburbs of Peshawar, young Fida left three children behind. Belonging to Badaber, Fida was targeted and killed in his shop in Mathani bazaar south of Peshawar.

A prominent member of an anti-Taliban jirga, Abbas Khan would never have imagined that his grandson would pay the price of his vehement opposition to the intolerant worldview espoused by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-i-Islam (LI). The grandson of Abbas Khan was targeted and killed the same week and in the same market as Fida Muhammad.

More than a dozen incidents of murder have taken place in the last one and a half month alone in small villages a few miles away from Peshawar in the south and southwestern suburbs of the city. A few patterns are clear when one observes the nature, frequency and modus operandi of what can only be termed as an unabated series of targeted killings in the suburbs of Peshawar over the past several months.

First, most of those who have died in these attacks belonged to the local cadres of political parties other than the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) and the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl. Their numbers have also included those who were prominent in anti-Taliban jirgas.

Several interviews with local people suggest that the frequency of targeted killings has increased since the government announced tentative dates for the local government polls. This seems to indicate that the militant network plans to repeat its strategy of the May 2013 general elections in which it successfully marginalised the ANP and PPP. In the scenario of local elections, local political workers will be the victims.

Second, it is important to note that most incidents of targeted killings happen in areas where the TTP and LI are engaged in extortion and kidnapping for ransom. These crimes have been traditionally major sources of resource generation and have strengthened the militants’ control by perpetuating fear.

As the local cadre of political parties and anti-Taliban jirgas are the only force that can hamper the militants’ goal of amassing resources and sustaining their control, they are targeted with full vigour. This hypothesis gains credence when one looks at the retreat of state institutions after the unceasing targeted killings of prominent police officers in KP, especially in Peshawar, Swabi and Malakand.

This pattern can also be interpreted in terms of the strategy by militants to widen the space for extortion and kidnapping for ransom. If this is the case, then it can be understood that the militants are in for a long war with the state.

Third, these targeted killings are carried out with consummate precision and decisiveness. This pattern shows the presence of a well-entrenched network of militants around the provincial capital. The militant network seems to consist of an alliance of the TTP and LI as fighters of both banned outfits have been seen roaming around in the area on different occasions.

Fourth, civil society organisations, especially development and welfare organisations, with the exception of those associated with religious outfits, are warned to take a lesson from the targeted killings of political workers and anti-Taliban jirga members. The inability of these organisations to move around has not only given rise to immense fear among ordinary folk but has also started isolating local communities from the rest of the country and the world. This pattern indicates the strengthened social control of the militant network.

Ordinary people in KP perceive that the state of Pakistan has abdicated all responsibility for their security and wellbeing. They hold the provincial government and central leadership of the PTI responsible for such insecurity and its attendant hardships. The alienation of these people has increased tremendously especially after statements by members of the federal cabinet pertaining to water and electricity, the Kalabagh dam and the reversal of the 18th Amendment on certain issues such as education.

Interviews with ordinary residents also suggest that frustration with the PTI leadership on issues of governance and terrorism has resulted in anger and depression. In the wake of the vacuum deliberately created by the militant network whose terrifying and bloody tactics have marginalised the ANP, PPP and the PML-N, disappointment with the PTI and JI might result in the strengthening of certain forces. That is perhaps what the militant network hopes to see.

It would appear that the time has come for a comprehensive, compact and consistent counterterrorism strategy.

The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar.

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