The talks between the PPP and the PNA entered a crucial phase in the first round. On June 5, 1977 a day before the second round of talks scheduled for June 6, Professor Ghafoor told newsmen that the PNA wanted to reach a deal at the earliest and in that regard he wanted to hold meetings with former air chief, Asghar Khan, and Maulana Noorani, chief of Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan.

This had a peculiar background: From the very beginning it was being claimed by certain quarters that Asghar Khan did not want the dialogue to succeed. He believed that the armed forces were ready to take over, and so considered the talks process a futile exercise. Nobody took the responsibility of confirming or rejecting this but Rao Rashid, a police official and Bhutto’s Special Secretary, later narrated how on July 3, Asghar Khan became enraged when he learnt that an accord had been reached between the PPP and the PNA. Rashid writes that Asghar Khan, accompanied by Mahmood Ali Kasuri, rushed to the venue where the PNA leaders, Prof Ghafoor Ahmad and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, were to address a press conference to announce having reached an accord.

Reaching there Asghar Khan expressed his displeasure by snubbing them and told the two leaders that they have again been befooled by Bhutto. “There had been no accord. I don’t accept it. You too should not accept it.” Having said that he put his hand on his chest and said: “I give you the guarantee that if you people do not arrive at an accord, I will hold elections in 90 days.” Then physically replacing the two leaders he took the chair and told the press conference that there had been no accord. “We sent 10 more points which are to be decided.”

Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Begum Nasim Wali Khan also subscribed to the same view and, to some extent, wanted to sabotage the talks process. This divergence of views within the PNA ranks continued, with these leaders expressing their dislike for the talks till the end. However, Prof Ghafoor wanted Asghar Khan and his three like-minded leaders to keep silent till a breakthrough was attained. Prof Ghafoor records that late on the night of June 15 Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Begum Nasim Wali Khan went to Mufti Mahmood at his temporary residence in Rawalpindi and advised him: “You should not reach an accord with Bhutto. Let martial law be promulgated which will guarantee elections in 90 days.”

On June 4, Asghar Khan arrived at Islamabad and immediately called a news conference, and refuted all reports about the differences among the PNA leadership. On the following day the PNA leaders met and decided to stay at Islamabad so that they are available for consultation anytime the need arises.

During the June 6 meeting all the leaders advanced in a satisfactory manner. However, regarding the issue of re-election or re-polling, the final decision was left for the PNA leaders and all the participants left the venue. When they met again on June 7, the PNA team agreed to hold fresh elections across the board. Hafeez Pirzada and Prof Ghafoor were assigned the task of sorting out the details and finalising the constitutional amendment to give legal cover to the deal.

In the evening, the PNA met at Islamabad where an 11-member legal committee was constituted which comprised Khalid Ishaq, Barrister Anwar, Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri, S.M. Zafar, Amir Raza, Nasim Farooqi, Zahoorul Haq, Chaudhry Mohammad Ismail, Abdul Ghafoor Baig, Rana Abdur Rahim and Ahad Yousuf.

On June 8, the legal committee presented its report before the sub-committee which was assigned the task of drafting details of the re-election. When Hafeez Pirzada, PPP’s representative at the two-member committee, saw the report, he noticed many things that were beyond the parameters of the experts’ opinion. These included a blueprint of the whole process including the date of elections, the mechanism of election machinery, the infrastructure of the Election Commission, its powers and the proposed laws dealing with the rigging of polls, dissolution of federal and provincial governments and the guidelines for the formation of caretaker governments.

This caused almost a deadlock in the proceedings, and the committee could hardly proceed; therefore it decided to send the report back to the PNA for reconsideration by its leadership.

Here an altogether new situation emerged. The PNA head Mufti Mahmood said that they could not accept new elections until cast-iron guarantees are made. He, along with Nasrullah Khan and Maulana Noorani, called on the Saudi ambassador Riazul Khattib and informed him about the development and their viewpoint. It was a near deadlock which could reverse the whole exercise. To an independent observer perhaps it was the PNA which overstepped its parameter in its legal experts’ report while Hafeez Pirzada also appears to have acted in a hurried manner. In the background of the earlier agreement, accepting the formula of re-election, had he taken a recess and consulted Bhutto with the idea of saving the talks, things would have been different and possibly the deal would have been achieved in the next day or two.

When the talks resumed on June 9, both sides seemed stuck to their point of view. While Prof Ghafoor wanted guarantees about the whole election process, Hafeez Pirzada raised objection to every demand presented by the PNA. Finally, the two-and-a half hour high-pitched discussions were stalled. Many observers believe that Pirzada’s handling of the situation was due to some directive from the high command. This was perhaps a coincidence that by this time Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the former PPP leader who had joined the opposition, had rejoined Bhutto’s team; he was noted for his policy of toeing a hard line in dealing with the opposition. Perhaps this development made Mufti Mahmood issue a warning that if the differences were not resolved in the next meeting they would not be able to continue the negotiations.

This was a clear indication about what could happen in future.

Next week: Mufti Mahmood warns of walkout creating an impasse shaikhaziz38@gmail.com