DURING the six months of the current government, there have been few changes on major national issues. Given the rapidly evolving global, regional and domestic developments, the national challenges facing Pakistan demand dynamic management. These challenges are likely to intensify and multiply in the coming months. It would be wise to identify and analyse these challenges, wherever possible, and develop plans on how to address them.

To use former US defence secretary’s amusing classification, many of these national challenges are ‘known’; several can be anticipated — the ‘known unknowns’ — and others may arise unexpectedly and suddenly — the ‘unknown unknowns’.

The ‘known’ challenges are also the most fundamental: the economy, terrorism, Afghanistan, India.

Pakistan has avoided debt default mainly because of the currency swap arrangement with China and the temporary deal concluded with the IMF. Despite some portfolio and remittance inflows, no major policies have been introduced to balance the books or promote rapid growth and sustainable development.

The inability to deal effectively with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and extremist terrorism is perhaps the government’s most visible failing so far. Instead of the almost comical political competition, all patriotic leaders need to display determination to restore the writ of the state over those groups and gangs who are waging war against Pakistan. Any accommodation must be consistent with Pakistan’s Constitution.

Afghanistan has become a Rubik’s Cube for Pakistan’s policymakers. Positions need to be aligned on the several ‘moving parts’ of the Afghan puzzle: US troop withdrawal; talks with the Taliban; Afghan elections; the future role of President Hamid Karzai and the Northern Alliance; alignments of Afghanistan’s other neighbours; the extent and nature of Pakistan’s involvement and implications for dealing with the TTP.

The relationship between Pakistan and India is about to get worse. The Bharatiya Janata Party and Congress will no doubt escalate their rhetoric against Pakistan in the run-up to the Indian national elections this year. Narendra Modi, the BJP’s ultra Hindu supremacist, held responsible for the anti-Muslim Gujarat riots, is favoured to become the next prime minister. In the ensuing hostile environment, new anti-Muslim violence in India, an anti-Indian terrorist incident or another Kashmiri uprising, will become more likely, with incendiary consequences for Pakistan-India relations.

Apart from these known challenges, several others — the ‘known unknowns’ — can be anticipated with varying degrees of certainty.

One, a financial meltdown. This could happen: if the promises made to the IMF are not kept and/or Pakistan’s relationship with the US deteriorates due to differences over Afghanistan, India or nuclear issues. Contingency planning is required to prevent this. The best hope would be financial support from China and the Islamic countries.

Two, an attack by the TTP, or a foreign group, on one or more of Pakistan’s strategic facilities. Apart from the damage this may inflict on Pakistan’s critical capabilities and the pride of our security establishment, such an incident would be used to generate calls for international ‘control’ of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and could activate contingency plans already prepared by some for this purpose.

Three, revived Indian repression in occupied Kashmir. The Kashmiris abhor Indian rule and have risen up regularly against New Delhi. A BJP-Modi election could spark another Kashmiri uprising. India’s inevitable brutal response, and the transfer of blame on to Pakistan, could create a dangerous crisis. An ongoing Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir could stave off such a future crisis.

Four, a major terrorist attack against India. Again, inevitably, the blame would be placed on Pakistan and its security agencies. Apart from exercising vigilance and internal controls over anti-Indian groups in Pakistan, it would be best for Pakistan and India to adopt an agreed ‘Standard Operating Procedure’ for cooperation in case of terrorist incidents in either country as a way of defusing potential crises.

Five, an Indian incursion across the Line of Control or the international border. New Delhi has made threats of ‘punitive’ strikes against so-called ‘terrorist’ camps in Azad Kashmir or Pakistan territory. Pakistan can never be sure that such threats will remain verbal. Mr Modi may want to display his ‘muscular’ credentials by acting on such threats. To avert such a prospect, Pakistan needs to plan a calibrated response to such Indian adventurism and quietly convey this to New Delhi.

Six, a US military intervention in North Waziristan. This can still happen if the US believes that the Haqqani Network is the critical impediment to its post 2014 plans in Afghanistan and Pakistan continues to refuse military action against the group. To avoid this and the consequent crisis, Pakistan needs to activate its diplomatic role in the American endgame in Afghanistan.

Last, there are a number of the ‘unknown unknown’ challenges which are not anticipated but are within the realm of the possible, including:

— A US-Iran nuclear deal. This will change strategic calculations across the entire region.

— Alternately, an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

— An Indian and/or Western declaration of support for Baloch ‘independence’.

— Extension of the Sunni-Shia conflict (from Syria, Iraq and elsewhere) to Pakistan.

— A Sino-Japanese military confrontation over the disputed islands.

— A second series of nuclear weapon test explosions by India (to further refine its bomb designs).

— Popular demonstrations ( a la Tahrir Square) in Pakistan against misgovernance, corruption, unemployment and inequality.

Pakistan must formulate well-considered policies to deal with the known and possible challenges. Given their diversity and complexity, it would be best to set up special high level ‘task forces’ to consider and devise policies on each of these challenges.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.