IT was an intriguing question. Last week as it became clear Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych was not ready to sign an association and free trade pact with the European Union, a friend called up to ask just why the EU was so anxiously courting Kiev but continued to cold-shoulder Turkey which has been trying to negotiate membership of the 28-nation bloc for years and years.

“Please explain,” my friend persisted. One is a country of little global relevance, in the midst of a financial crisis, whose leaders clearly want closer relations with Russia, not the EU. The other is a major regional and international power, with a booming economy, whose government is beginning to tire of knocking on Europe’s doors.

“Where’s the logic? What kind of EU foreign policy is this?” he asked.

It was a good question. But I’m not sure there is a satisfactory answer.

Partly of course it’s good old-fashioned geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the EU, with Ukraine and others in the region including Moldova and Georgia being pulled in two directions.

Ukraine is part of the EU’s much-touted ‘Eastern Partnership’ initiative meant to offer trade, aid and other forms of assistance to draw six one-time Soviet satellites — Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan — closer to the EU.

The countries themselves often see special ties with the EU as a stepping stone to membership. But despite the continuing East-West tussle with Russia over winning friends and allies in the region, EU has made no promise it will welcome these nations into the club.

Ukraine’s stinging snub to the EU was made at a two-day Eastern Partnership summit in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, last week.

Soon afterwards, of course, protests erupted across the capital, with people demanding the resignation of President Yanukovych and insisting they wanted closer ties with Brussels. Mr Yanukovych, meanwhile, left for a tour of China in search of economic aid.

The consensus is that Ukraine’s government gave in to pressure from Moscow which strongly opposes the EU deal. A Russian squeeze has cut Ukrainian trade with its main economic partner by some 25pc this year and the country’s steel exports are suffering amid weak global demand. The former Soviet republic has long pressed Russia for a discount on gas supplies, arguing that high prices are suffocating its economy.

But, despite Ukraine’s reversal on the EU deal, Russia has yet to offer new loans or other support, such as cheaper gas.

The crisis has again exposed a tug-of-war in Ukraine. Since the Orange Revolution nine years ago, Kiev remains undecided on whether to go with the EU or remain closely allied with Moscow.

Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to bring the Ukraine into his sphere of influence through integration into a Moscow-led customs union which in the future shall be transformed into a fully fledged ‘Eurasian Union’. In the past few months, the Kremlin has put considerable pressure on Ukraine to move over to this camp.

Trying to defuse the protests, the Ukrainian government has defended its foreign policy switch by saying that it marks only a pause in moves to integrate further with Europe, rather than an about-turn. As the furore continued in Kiev, the EU took the modest step of starting visa liberalisation talks with Turkey, a first step in a process that could last years.

True, Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu described the decision as “a historic day for the Turkish people and the EU” — the agreement will finally allow Turks to travel visa-free to the EU — but the reality is different. Ankara’s bid to join the EU — made at least four decades ago — remains in quasi-limbo even as Turkey gains international recognition as a regional leader and an important global actor.

Although it is recognised as an official EU candidate country and started membership negotiations in 2005, talks have been long and painful. In addition, Germany and France have insisted that the entry discussions be “open-ended” meaning the country will not automatically become an EU member at the end of negotiations.

The Turkish government crackdown on protesters earlier this year put the talks on freeze until October. They have now resumed, but several so-called negotiation chapters are permanently blocked by Cyprus, whose northern part is recognised only by Ankara. Even the visa negotiations are likely to be difficult. Turkey believes the visa agreement will be negotiated within three years. But EU home affairs commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom has refused to be drawn into a time frame.

In fact, starting visa freedom talks puts Turkey in the same boat as other ‘neighbourhood’ countries which have even more distant membership prospects: Moldova and Georgia. So why the difference in EU approaches to Kiev and Ankara?

For one, unlike Turkey, Ukraine is not in line to join the EU. The EU offer of an association and free trade pact is in no way comparable to the rights and obligations that are part and parcel of becoming an EU member. Second, the EU is determined not to allow Russia to bully and coerce its neighbours and views the ‘Eurasian Union’ initiative as a ploy to reduce the attraction of its own Eastern Partnership pacts. Third, Ukraine is recognised by all as a European and Christian country while many in the EU continue to insist that Muslim-majority Turkey is neither European nor Christian and therefore has no place in the Union.

In the end, however, there is probably nothing like a little East-West competition and Cold War-inspired geopolitical rivalry to sharpen the EU’s sometimes slow foreign policy reflexes.

The writer is Dawn’s correspondent in Brussels.