THINGS were just starting to look up for relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Afghan President Hamid Karzai met in London in the last week of October and pledged to improve ties.

Pakistan announced that it would let Afghan officials meet with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, and members of the High Peace Council are expected soon; trilateral talks, including the UK, broadened the discussion from terrorism to trade, and even a proposed joint dam project in Kunar.

Following Hakeemullah Mehsud’s killing, President Karzai also joined the Pakistani chorus against the American drone strike, saying it was ill-timed and threatened regional peace initiatives.

But the appointment of Mullah Fazlullah as the new chief of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is likely to undercut this bonhomie, and pose one of the greatest challenges to relations between Islamabad and Kabul.

At the time of the TTP’s announcement, Fazlullah’s whereabouts remained unclear. News of his promotion was shared by a TTP spokesman via a phone call from Afghanistan. But hours before the announcement, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar hinted that Fazlullah had returned to Pakistan. Whatever the case, one should hope the government has reliable means of tracking Fazlullah’s movements because his choice of the location of TTP’s operational headquarters is suddenly of critical importance to regional dynamics.

Chances are Fazlullah will try to keep everyone guessing, and move between the eastern Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan (where he has reportedly been based since 2009) and settled parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa — including his home territory of Swat where he has organised attacks against the Pakistan military, and Swabi, where his new deputy hails from. A permanent relocation to Waziristan or other parts of Fata is unlikely not only because of the risk of death by drone, but also to avoid stepping on Waziri toes and triggering internal power tussles.

This means Fazlullah’s reign could cause Pakistan’s greatest concern about the post-2014 scenario in Afghanistan to materialise pre-emptively: Pakistani militants launching terrorist attacks in Pakistan from Afghanistan, where they enjoy sanctuary and, it is believed, operational support — the ‘reverse blowback’ of Pakistan’s nightmares.

Such an outcome would lead to incriminations at a time when cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan should be the highest priority. Afghanistan has long blamed Pakistan for undermining its chances for stability by providing safe havens for the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network within its territory.

In turn, Islamabad has seized on the opportunity provided by every brutal cross-border attack to slam Kabul for failing to apprehend Fazlullah. This finger-pointing will become far more shrill, and destabilising, if the new TTP chief chooses to run the show from Afghanistan.

Kabul is also likely to question anew Pakistan’s role in the Afghanistan endgame. The Afghan government has sought Pakistan’s help to facilitate peace talks with the Afghan Taliban, over whom Pakistan is believed to have some influence. But the extent of that influence is now going to be tested.

Unconfirmed reports from dubious sources suggested Fazlullah’s promotion was pushed through by Mullah Omar, implying close ties between the new TTP leader and the Afghan Taliban. This may not be impossible given the amount of time Fazlullah has spent networking in Afghanistan. But it does raise questions about the linkages between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban — why would a group that enjoys Pakistan’s support (to whatever extent) nominate its ultimate arch enemy (anti- talks, anti-army, and the type to shoot schoolgirls) as the leader of the TTP?

Whatever the true nature of relations between the TTP and Afghan Taliban, it is likely to raise suspicions and prompt nefarious strategising on both sides of the border. Pakistan has previously relied on the Afghan Taliban to keep the TTP in check. It will probably again try to exploit interlinkages between the groups and bank on the Afghan Taliban to monitor the TTP or mediate. This tack will continue to muddle public rhetoric and indefinitely postpone Pakistan’s final reckoning with homegrown militancy.

Afghanistan, meanwhile, will continue to distrust Pakistan. Kabul will probably assume that Islamabad feels beholden to the Afghan Taliban (owing to its leverage over the TTP), and ask whether Pakistan has influence over the Afghan Taliban, or if it’s the other way around.

Much analytic energy and conspiracy theorising will be spent in coming weeks determining where Fazlullah is based, what the nature of his relations with the Afghan Taliban is, and what the implications of all this are for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. This will be both compulsive and misguided.

Now is not the time for games, for distinguishing between ‘good’ Taliban and ‘bad’ Taliban, ‘our’ Taliban and ‘their’ Taliban. Nor is it the time to try and deploy one so-called strategic asset against another. Pakistan is extremely vulnerable and internally embattled, and Afghanistan is preparing for make-or-break elections.

Instead of machinations and accusations, this is an opportunity for both countries to take a strong stance and subsequent joint action against all militants on either side of the border who refuse to recognise their respective country’s constitution and participate in the democratic process. A clear and consistent rejection of militancy is the only option.

Pakistan and Afghanistan must discuss their shared future in terms of stability, trade, economic integration, transnational energy projects, cultural exchange, and people-to-people interactions. Anything else would be a disservice to citizens of both countries. Hopefully that’s something Islamabad and Kabul can agree on. n

The writer is a freelance journalist.

huma.yusuf@gmail.com