LAST week, top secret details about America’s intelligence expenditure were made public as part of the leaks by former US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden.

The leaked “black budget” has never before been subject to public scrutiny, even though the US government has annually increased its overall intelligence expenditure since 2007, now spending more on intel than at the height of the Cold War.

The leaked budget revealed the allotments to America’s 16 spy agencies, which are organised around five priorities: countering terrorism, checking the spread of nuclear and other unconventional weapons, keeping US leaders abreast of political developments abroad, preventing foreign espionage, and conducting cyber operations.

It also showed that in an increasingly complex world, American intelligence agencies, and the CIA in particular, are investing billions of dollars in the next generation of officers, with the intel workforce swelling by thousands over the past decade.

The revelations raise interesting questions within America as well as around the world in countries where the security establishment co-opts significant chunks of national resources without any accountability, all in the name of national security.

The release of such detailed information about America’s intelligence priorities, bureaucracy, and expenditure is unprecedented. But many are welcoming the transparency, making the argument that access to budget details will facilitate a public debate about intelligence spending, and allow US citizens to question the priorities of their intelligence agencies, which, lest anyone forget, are ultimately working on the public’s behalf.

Pakistanis will not be surprised to learn that the CIA uses up the largest portion of the $52.6 billion budget, requesting $14.7bn in the 2013 fiscal year. Spending by the CIA has soared since 9/11, with the agency’s budget totalling almost 50pc more than that of the National Security Agency, which was long believed to be the largest operation within America’s intelligence community. Islamabad has long complained that America’s Pakistan strategy is dictated by the CIA, rather than the State Department. The leaked information sheds some light on this issue, revealing US concerns with Pakistan, which is described in the budget as an “intractable target”. Given the US intelligence community’s priorities —- particularly combating terrorism and checking nuclear proliferation —- the interest in Pakistan is self-explanatory.

More interesting is the fact that the CIA continues to have ‘blank spots’ in its intelligence about Pakistan: two matters of particular concern are the security of the country’s nuclear weapons while being transported, and the security of biological and chemical laboratories in Pakistan.

(As an aside, Pakistan should know that it’s not the only so-called ally of the United States that falls under intense intel scrutiny; Israel, too, is the target of extensive counterintelligence operations, thanks to its history of espionage attempts against America.)

The leaked budget offers a timely reminder of the continuing mistrust between the United States and Pakistan. Although John Kerry’s trip to Pakistan last month sought to ease tensions between the on-again, off-again allies, it seems US intel concerns (terrorism) and Pakistani sensitivities (regarding the sanctity of the country’s nuclear programme) are in conflict.

The leaked budget also suggests that rather than a proactive, political re-engagement, US-Pakistan relations going forward might be predicated on the vagaries of US intelligence spending.

Take, for example, the matter of drone strikes. The leaked budget demonstrates a huge increase in funds to the CIA resulting from the agency’s transformation into a paramilitary force, part of which is the growth of the drone programme.

Although Kerry hinted that drone strikes in Pakistan might “soon” be discontinued, the leaked budget raises questions about whether strikes might continue as a consequence of institutional inertia and the desire not to make redundant a decade’s investment in a programme with specialised infrastructure. In institutional terms, it is also difficult to imagine the agency downsizing a programme that has contributed to its growing size and clout.

For now, according to the leaked budget, US intelligence spending will remain consistent through 2017 (and one can’t help but wonder whether this planned financial outlay will impact the timeline for withdrawing the drone programme from this region). Soon, however, the US intelligence community — CIA included — has to make tough choices on how to rein in spending after a decade of significant budget increases. The need to balance the books (rather than genuinely engage Pakistan) may yet prove an impetus for halting the drone programme in the country.

It would be unfortunate, however, if the US-Pakistan relationship is left to the mercy of dwindling budgets and the quirks of the US intelligence infrastructure. The partnership requires more dynamic engagement. For the moment, Pakistan’s growing role in facilitating a political settlement in Afghanistan necessitates an ongoing dialogue between Islamabad and Washington. But this transactional interest will not cut it in the post-2014 scenario.

The solution may lie in recontextualising US-Pakistan relations. Right now, owing to the priorities of America’s intelligence agencies, Pakistan is only seen through the lens of terrorism. But many of the US intelligence community’s concerns can be addressed through diplomacy rather than a focus on security. For example, the US State Department could seek improved engagement with Pakistan’s civilian government, particularly with regard to its calls for improved ties with India.

Supporting the Indo-Pak bilateral relationship would allow the US to address concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear security in the broader context of improving regional ties. Similarly, Pakistan’s role in the region should be reframed from terror hub to major conduit for trade and energy resources.

More talk of regional integration and trade will spur economic development in Pakistan, thereby addressing the developmental issues that drive terrorism. Without a broader strategy for engagement in place, intel is of only limited use.

The writer is a freelance journalist.

huma.yusuf@gmail.com