ON July 26, two bombs exploded in Parachinar leaving 60 dead and more than 200 injured. Ansarul Mujahideen, a Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan-affiliate, claimed responsibility, saying that the group targeted the Shia population of Parachinar to avenge the atrocities committed by the Syrian regime.

This twisted rationale raises the question: to what extent will continuing turmoil in the Arab world further escalate sectarian strife — already at intolerable levels — in Pakistan?

Since the Parachinar attack, sectarianism has claimed more lives: the TTP killed four Shia prisoners during the audacious jailbreak in Dera Ismail Khan; six men on motorcycles killed the Shia Council’s divisional president and his son in Rahimyar Khan. These attacks seemingly have little to do with events in the Middle East, but the same could arguably be said of Parachinar.

By now, Pakistan has an indigenous history of bloody sectarianism which needs little encouragement from distant geopolitics.

The myriad local reasons for soaring sectarian violence are well known: the easy proliferation of anti-Shia Deobandi groups, initially known to have had state support; the deeply sectarian outlook of madressahs; prejudiced government school curriculums; the nexus between political parties (including the ruling PML-N) and sectarian groups; impunity for sectarian militants thanks to the entropy of our criminal justice system; and the rise of the TTP, which has bolstered anti-Shia groups through operational and financial support.

Sadly, the widening sectarian divide across the Muslim world is likely to be a fillip for home-grown sectarianism in Pakistan. This is particularly tragic because there is nothing inevitable or organic about the mounting sectarian standoff, which has been sparked by disparate political events — poor choices in Iraq and Syria; Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons; the empowerment of previously marginalised Shias as part of the Arab Spring; and the growing access to sectarian hate speech thanks to spreading media and internet access.

Historically, sectarian strife in Pakistan has been fuelled — though not necessarily sparked — by developments abroad. In 1981, Pakistan’s first major Shia mobilisation occurred to protest Gen Ziaul Haq’s imposition of a zakat tax. At the time, many believed that Pakistan’s Shias were emboldened by the Islamic Revolution that had unfolded a few years earlier in Iran. While this effect is difficult to quantify, it created the perception amongst extremist Sunni groups that Pakistan’s Shias had aspirations to the state, and perhaps even Iranian backing.

Buoyed by the perceived threat of growing Iranian influence, Gen Zia sanctioned the creation of anti-Shia extremist groups such as the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). These groups have since set the tone for the exclusion of Shias from Pakistan’s top-down Islamic identity.

Sunni extremist groups perpetuate fear of a ‘Shia takeover’ of the country in order to justify and drive their hate-filled activities. They point to prominent members of the community in the government, army, and media, and, in recent years, to Pakistan’s growing diplomatic and economic ties with Tehran. It is this particular strand of twisted sectarian rhetoric that is likely to be impacted by events in the Middle East, which are being framed as a Sunni-Shia showdown for control of the ummah, one Muslim state at a time. It is this warped logic that led the Ansarul Mujahideen to connect their brutality in Parachinar to events in Syria.

Pakistan’s Sunni extremist groups will piggyback on the growing sectarian rift in the Muslim world for other reasons as well. As international tensions escalate, sectarianism will become an increasingly lucrative business, with more funds flowing in from Gulf and Arab states seeking to check the perceived threat from Iran.

Extremist groups will also use sectarianism to spur recruitment, since a grand narrative about a battle for control of the ummah is inspiring, and cashes in on deep-seated prejudices amongst post-Zia Pakistanis.

Involvement in sectarian warfare also offers Pakistan’s extremist groups a stepping stone on the path to their ultimate goal, global jihad. The TTP have already claimed that they’re sending fighters to Syria. Online, too, militant groups are amping up the virulence and reach of their anti-Shia hate speech to attract wider audiences.

The Muslim world as a whole needs to urgently address the sectarian framing of troubled politics. But Pakistan must act more swiftly, not least because it has the second-largest Shia population in the world. A surge in sectarian violence in the context of regional trends will also amplify Pakistan’s role as an incubator for global militancy. Moreover, the country has democratic aspirations that do not sit well with exclusionary tactics, particularly given that subcontinental Islam has always been a pluralistic phenomenon. Endless schisms within our population mean never-ending violence, perpetually expanding to encompass other vulnerable groups.

If Pakistan has an opportunity to check this nightmare scenario of spiralling sectarianism, it’s now. In the late 1980s, thousands of militants returning from the anti-Soviet ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan were co-opted by sectarian groups and re-deployed against the internal rather than external ‘infidel’. There could be a horrifying replay of this in coming years as US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan unleashes a slew of out-of-work jihadis across Pakistan.

It is important to remember that Pakistan is in a position to curtail sectarianism. The state can start by severing all links with sectarian groups (the security establishment maintains it has already done so, though counter-allegations persist that it is using these groups against Baloch separatists).

The PML-N, in particular, must rise above its sordid entanglements with the SSP, and take a strong stance against sectarianism, identifying it as a separate challenge in its much-awaited counterterrorism strategy. The time for ignoring this trend is fast running out.

The writer is a freelance journalist.

huma.yusuf@gmail.com