December 30, 2006

The Cabinet Mission Plan of May 16, 1946 represented the last British effort to settle the Indian problem on an united India basis. The Plan, envisaging a confederal India, was designed to secure the greatest measure of agreement among the two major parties - the Congress and the Muslim League - in the context of their conflicting claims and counter claims. In short, it tried to concede, as far as possible, the basics of their demands.

To the Hindus and the Congress, the Plan offered Indian unity and freedom, the twin goals they had long aspired and worked for, though not a unitary form of government and a strong centre which they had envisaged in the Nehru Report (1928), and had been insisting upon since then.

To the Muslims and the Muslim League, it offered complete autonomy for the six Provinces claimed for Pakistan, but with a limited centre, supreme only in three subjects - defence, foreign affairs, and communications. While the Plan denied the Muslims their demand for a sovereign Pakistan, the compulsory grouping of the six demographically dominant Muslim Provinces into two groups was meant to allay the Muslim fears of the centre riding rough shod over the Muslim provinces, the prime reason that had triggered the formulation of the Pakistan demand in March 1940.

And for India and the Indians as a whole, the Plan offered the last chance to keep it and them united.

Interestingly though, in the face of mounting Congress's ridicule and provocation at the Cabinet Mission having so emphatically rejected the Pakistan demand, Jinnah had shown utmost restraint, "courage and statesmanship". "Last nail in the coffin of Pakistan" - headlined The Hindustan Times, a leading Congress's daily. "Thank God Pakistan [is] out of picture", revelled K.M. Munshi, in his congratulatory telegram to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, "the Polestar of the Congress and the high priest of 'the sacred ideal of National Unity'". To which he replied on May 17, 1946, "Since many years, for the first time, an authoritative government pronouncement [i.e., the Cabinet Mission Plan] in clear terms has been made against the possibility of Pakistan in any shape or form". (Munshi, India's Constitutional Developments, 1967, Vol I, p. 102).

Despite all this, Jinnah, in advance of any pronouncement by the Congress, induced the Muslim League to accept the Cabinet Mission proposals on June 6, 1946. As Lord Pethick-Lawrence confessed, the Mission Proposals "differed substantially from the views held until then and vigorously expressed by his followers", but Jinnah carried the day with them, arguing that if only by virtue of the compulsory grouping of six provinces claimed for Pakistan, "the basis and the foundation of Pakistan" were to a large extent inherent in the Mission Plan. Even so, the sacrifice involved in accepting a Union Centre, weak though it was, was not a trifle one. And since with Jinnah, the overriding consideration was "not to allow the situation to develop into bloodshed and civil war", as he confessed later, he got the League to accept the Proposals unconditionally.

The League's acceptance represented the chance of a life-time, perhaps of centuries, to keep the subcontinent united. But the overweening ambition of the Congress leadership, from Gandhi downwards, to swamp the League and "finish" Jinnah for once and all, led it to let this momentous chance slip through their oily fingers. And in that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the newly elected Congress Rashtrapathi had, or seemed to have, played the most decisive, if not the dominant role at the moment.

Having been inducted as the Rashtrapathi, replacing Maulana Abul Kalam Azad who was elected way back in 1940, he had declared in his July 10, 1946 press conference statement that the Congress had agreed to nothing in the Plan except for the mode of election to the Constituent Assembly. "What we do there", he asserted, "we are entirely and absolutely free to determine. We have not committed ourselves in any single matter to anybody." (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru [SWJN], Vol. 15, p. 242).

As if this was not enough of a bombshell to provoke agonizing reappraisal of its acceptance of the Plan by the Muslim League, Nehru came down heavily against the grouping and limited-centre provisions, which alone had induced the League to accept the Plan. He said,

The big probability is that from any approach to the grouping question, there will be no grouping. Obviously, Section A will decide against grouping. Speaking in betting language, there is a four-to-one chance of the North-West Frontier Province deciding against grouping. Then Group B collapses.

It is highly likely that Assam will decide against grouping with Bengal, although I would not like to say what the initial decision may be, since it is evenly balanced. But I can say, with every assurance and conviction, that there is going to be, finally, no grouping there, because Assam will not tolerate it under any circumstances whatever. Thus you see this grouping business, approached from any point of view, does not get on at all. (SWJN, Vol. 15, pp. 242-43)

About the Centre, he predicted:

However limited the Centre might be, you cannot help the Centre having wide powers, because the past few years have seen that the absence of central authority had created conditions far worse in the country… It is obvious that without a central authority, you cannot deal with the problems I have mentioned.

There must be some overall power to intervene in a grave crisis, such as a breakdown of the administration, or an economic breakdown or a famine.

The scope of the Centre, even though limited, inevitably grows, because it cannot exist otherwise. Though some people might oppose this broadening of the scope of the Centre, the Constituent Assembly will have to decide on the point. (SWJN, Vol. 15, p. 245)

Most authors have laid the blame for the failure or torpedoing of the Plan to Nehru's door. They include several authorities - Michael Brecher, Maulana Azad and M.J. Akbar, among others.

From this general thesis, however, I have differed in my assessment of the Plan's failure in my Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation. Although published in 1981, this study was actually done in the late 1960s when access to primary sources was not available; hence my conclusions therein could only be termed tentative. In my study, I had, of course, singled out Nehru for the Muslim League's withdrawal of its acceptance of the Plan, but had also "blamed" the entire top leadership of the Congress for its negative approach to the grouping and limited-centre provisions, saying, "Every Congress leader of note, Patel, Kripalani, Prasad, among others, fulminated against the grouping provision and put his own interpretation on it. (p.170)

Without sounding too self-conceited, I would like to point out that my research since the late 1960s has confirmed what I then wrote, all the more. In his autobiography, K.M. Munshi, for instance, confesses that "he [Nehru] spoke what was in our hearts". That this was not an ex-post-facto claim may be seen by a reference to the pronouncements of some of the top Congress leaders.

It is true that in his posthumous autobriography, India Wins Freedom, Maulana Azad disowns Nehru's statement, saying that "it was not correct to say that Congress was free to modify the Plan as it pleased" (p.152), for compulsory grouping and restricting the centre to three subjects were settled facts under the Plan. But, as Congress Rashtrapathi, Azad, in his letter to Lord Wavell on June 14, 1946, had disputed the Mission's interpretation of the Grouping Clause. Among other things, he said,

You are no doubt aware of the strong feeling of resentment which exists among large sections of the people against some of the proposals in the statement, notably the idea of grouping. The Frontier province and Assam have expressed themselves with considerable force against any compulsory grouping. The Sikhs have felt hurt and insolated by these proposals and are considerably agitated. Being a minority in the Punjab, they become still more helpless as far as numbers go in Section B. We appreciated all these objections especially as we ourselves shared them. Nevertheless, we hoped that according to our interpretation of the clauses related to grouping, which we will hold is the correct interpretation, for any other interpretation would endanger the basic principle of provincial autonomy, we might be able to get over some of the obvious difficulties. (Italics for emphasis) (Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, p. 939).

Likewise, Mahatma Gandhi had also put his own interpretation on Section 15 of the May 16 Statement of the Cabinet Mission, which related to grouping. This contention is confirmed by a reference to the following abstracts from his speeches and statements:

The provinces were free to reject the very idea of grouping. No province could be forced against its will to belong to a group, even if the idea of grouping was accepted. (Speech, Prayer Meeting, May 17, 1946; Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi [CWMG], Vol. 84, p. 162)

Can those who enthusiastically welcome the [State] Paper but are discerning enough to repudiate, for instance, grouping, honourably seek to educate the country and the Constituent Assembly against the grouping clause? If your answer is 'yes' does it not follow that the Frontier and Assam province delegates would be free to abstain from joining the sections to which they are arbitrarily assigned? (Prayer speech May 19, 1946; CWMG, Vol. 84, p. 165).

But what about the units? Are the Sikhs, for whom the Punjab is the only home in India, to consider themselves against their will, as part of the section which takes in Sind, Baluchistan and the Frontier Province? Or is the Frontier Province also against its will to belong to the Punjab, called "B" in the Statement or Assam to "C", although it is a predominantly non-Muslim province? In my opinion, the voluntary character of the Statement demands that the liberty of the individual unit should be unimpaired. Any member of the sections is free to join it. ("An Analysis" by Gandhi, Harijan, May 19, 1946; CWMG, Vol. 84, p. 171).

When asked by Louis Fischer on July 17, 1946 to comment on Nehru's press conference statement on grouping, Gandhiji said, "I have said the same thing - unless the Federal Court or some other Court gives a different decision". (CWMG, Vol. 85, p. 9)

Surprisingly though, Gandhi even incited Bardoloi, the Congress Premier of Assam, to revolt against the grouping clause. "I have striven all this time to give you courage", wrote the Mahatma. "If you do not act correctly now, Assam is finished", he warned. In pursuance of this edict, the Assam Assembly, which had a Congress majority, directed its representatives in the Constituent Assembly, through a resolution, not to go into a Section with the Bengal (thus violating the procedure laid down in the Mission's Plan), and not to cooperate with any other province in framing Assam's constitution.

About mid October 1946, in the course of his reply to a Deputation from Assam, Gandhiji said that "Assam need have no fear, Pandit Nehru's broadcast [of September 2, after the inauguration of the Interim Government] had made no change in the Congress stand as regards the grouping of provinces and Assam would be able to frame its future constitution by itself … The Congress would certainly help Assam if she marches on with courage. (CWMG, Vol. 85, p. 466).

The British Statement of December 6, 1946 (in the wake of the hurriedly called London Conference to save the Mission Plan and the Constituent Assembly, which was due to meet on December 9) had upheld the Muslim League's viewpoint on the Grouping Clause. Nine days after that Statement - i.e., on December 15 - Gandhi told two Congressmen from Assam who were seeking his "guidance" in regard to Grouping on Bardoloi's behalf:

I told Bardoloi that if there is no clear guidance from the Congress Committee, Assam should not go into the Sections. It should lodge its protest and retire from the Constituent Assembly. It will be a kind of sataygraha against the Congress for the good of the Congress.

…If Assam keeps quiet, it is finished. No one can force Assam to do what it does not want to do. It is autonomous to a large extent today.

It must become fully independent and autonomous. Whether you have that courage and grit and the gumption, I do not know. You alone can say that. But if you can make that declaration, it will be a fine thing. As soon as the time comes for Constituent Assembly to go into Sections, you will say, 'Gentlemen, Assam retires.' For the independence of India, it is the only condition. Each unit must be able to decide and act for itself. I am hoping that in this, Assam will lead the way.

I have the same advice for the Sikhs. But your position is much happier than that of the Sikhs. You are a whole province. They are a community inside a Province. But I feel every individual has the right to act for himself, just as I have. (Tandulkar, Mahatma, Vol VII, p. 286; CWMG, Vol. 86, p. 228).

Not only Assam, Gandhi also instigated the Khan Brothers to take the Frontier (which had a Congress ministry) out of the North-Western group.

By early 1947, the top Congress leadership, in the context of the working of the Interim Government, was out to ditch the Cabinet Mission Plan. Indeed, they were far from helpful when Mountbatten, upon his arrival in India on March 22, tried to revive it. Sardar Patel was an early convert to partition, and Munshi reveals that it was he that had convinced him that outright partition was better than the Mission's Plan with its grouping and limited-centre provisions.

Partition would make them complete masters in their own homeland while the Plan would call for accommodation with the "recalcitrant" Muslim provinces, thereby abridging their powers to fashion their areas as they liked.

Patel revealed in March 1950 how the pressure of the Hindu industrial and business community of Bengal to rid them of the League ministry and Suhrawardy had influenced Congress thinking at the time. A clue to Hindu thinking is also provided by Shyama Prasad Mukerjee (Hindu Mahasabha leader)'s letter to Patel, dated May 11, 1947. Inter alia, it said,

I hope there is no possibility of the Muslim League accepting the Cabinet Mission Scheme at the last stage. If Mr. Jinnah is compelled to do so by the force of events, please do not allow the question of partition of Bengal to be dished. Even if a loose Centre as contemplated under the Cabinet Mission Scheme is established, we shall have no safety whatsoever in Bengal. We demand the creation of two provinces out of the present boundaries of Bengal - Pakistan or no Pakistan. (Sardar Patel's Correspondence, 1972, Vol.IV, p. 400).

In view of all this, I feel that Nehru alone is not to be blamed for wrecking the Plan, although so far as the Muslim League's attitude was concerned, Nehru's intemperate July 10 press conference statement provided the causus belli - or the "last straw", to change the metaphor.

The Congress leaders' pronouncements, detailed above, indicated beyond doubt that the over-ambitious Congress was in no mood to be satisfied by its gains, however spectacular. The overweening Napoleon III and his equally presumptuous Foreign Minister, the Duke of Gramont, says Erich Eyck, "threw away a splendid chance" against Bismarck in the Franco-Prussian Crisis of 1870 "because they did not know where to stop". Nor did the Congress leaders in 1946. Had they accepted unreservedly the Cabinet Mission Plan, they would have been still victorious, and the Pakistan demand might have, in all likelihood, lost its force and fury in a considerably large measure. But in denouncing and attempting to erode, on the one hand, the grouping provision, and promoting, on the other, "the inevitable enlargement of the powers of the Union Centre", the Congress had unwittingly provided new point and force to Muslim fears, and to the validity of the Pakistan demand.

In any case, the dubious, even somewhat perverse, Congress's interpretations had obviously distorted the Plan and divested it of the two key features that had induced Muslims to accept it in the first place. Hence Jinnah and the League had no alternative but to rescind its earlier acceptance, put up a stern posture of resolute inflexibility, and resolve to wrest Pakistan, through "direct action" if need be. And this decisive step was finally taken on July 29.

But even if the Muslim League had not rescinded its earlier acceptance, it is crystal clear (from the documentation on the Congress side that has now become available) that the Congress leaders, in their overweening ambition to outbid themselves, would have made things so difficult for Muslims, the Muslim majority Provinces and the Muslim League that they would have had to disown the Plan, sooner than later.

It is on record that despite the fact that the Congress had had its way for the most part during 1946-47, it was yet disillusioned about working the Plan. The Plan called for political accommodation and goodwill on both sides, and, these were, alas, in short supply during 1946-47.

— Sharif al Mujahid

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