BEFORE 1947, the best dry fruit came to India from Afghanistan. Since then, with India losing any contiguity with Afghanistan and experiencing unremitting hostility with a sandwiched Pakistan, this fruitful trade came to an abrupt halt.

In a post-Nato Afghan scenario, will the flow of fruit still remain dry or will Indians be able to relish what their forefathers once did? Pakistan again gets to decide this choice of Indian palate.

A bloodied Nato wants to negotiate with the Taliban and confine the latter to certain parts of Afghanistan. But in war to the victor go the spoils, and it is inconceivable how the Taliban will not wrest control of Kabul, and thereby the whole country, at some point. Perceived as the Taliban’s foremost ally, Pakistan can determine whether the world will this time see a saner version of the Taliban emerge or a revanchistic one.

During Karzai’s era, India poured billions of dollars to rebuild Afghanistan and gain influence. Karzai might escape the fate of his hapless forerunner Najibullah but it is unlikely he will stay on as Afghan president. Washington, D.C. does not like him and neither of course do the Taliban.

While India was busy building bridges in Kabul, it never perhaps anticipated that Nato would experience such a sudden reversal of fortune there. So much so that a disenchanted western citizenry is imploring their leaders to bring their troops home. Suddenly, New Delhi’s money in Kabul appears to have been not so well-spent.

As Pakistan and India talk to each other, there appears to be a clear fork in the road ahead. The left one leads to a world of déjà-vu, where Pakistan revels in ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, and India and Pakistan continue to keep the world on edge.

That Musharraf’s Kashmir formula, which in effect gave the region dominion status under a joint Indo-Pakistani dispensation, and which Manmohan Singh almost accepted, has been lying on the wayside for the previous four years indicates that Pakistan seeks more from any future deal.

The Indian side on the other hand is quite comfortable with the status quo. The pressure to resolve Kashmir has come from the West, which at one point had become convinced that only if this sore thumb healed, South Asia would not beget more 9/11s. Pakistani diplomacy played a key role in shaping this thinking. But Osama bin Laden’s discovery in Pakistan discredited the country in a West already suspicious of what it saw as a Janus-faced approach to Afghanistan. India can now comfortably propagandise that Pakistan, and not Kashmir, is the real problem that needs to be fixed.

The right turn in the fork may not lead to the promised land but at least it could keep India and Pakistan off each other’s throats. Both countries though would have to generate smaller doses of testosterone and exhibit more magnanimity. There still has been no apparent breach between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Only Pakistan can restrain the Taliban and make it sever ties with Al Qaeda.

The West will do anything to prevent another 9/11. Nato bases are mooted in Afghanistan but this proposal is unrealistic if the Taliban comes to power. Influential voices have even called for the carving up of Afghanistan to box in the Taliban. Time for this option appears past. But if the Taliban remains intransigent and the Af-Pak theatre continues to look like the premier staging ground for a 9/11-type attack, expect to see thinking around breaking up Pakistan emerging out of western capitals.

Any such discussion justifiably raises Pakistan’s hackles, with the response that no one can touch us when we are nuclear.

Which, of course, would make the balkanising hawks even more assertive.

If the regional situation remains as is, India might experience an attack on the scale of 26/11 in the foreseeable future. The Indian government has gone on record that if there were clear footprints of its origin from Pakistan, it will strike back.

Pakistan for its part has repeatedly warned India that any incursion into its territory will meet a fitting riposte, leaving the Indian army no option but to activate its Cold Start doctrine. To deter Cold Start, Pakistan has developed the Nasr, a reportedly short-range tactical nuclear missile.

Twice in the previous decade alone, once in 2002 after India’s parliament was attacked and the second time shortly after 26/11, India and Pakistan went to the brink of nuclear war. Since then both Cold Start and the Nasr have been thrown into the potboiler, making Armageddon seem so inviting.

But even assume Pakistan can rein in the Taliban and a face-saving compromise is reached on Kashmir, there is much fundamental unfinished business between India and Pakistan. India believes that even after Kashmir is resolved, Pakistan will continue to incite its Muslim minority. Pakistan is convinced that India still wants to hive it into pieces and is meddling in Balochistan and Sindh.

Kashmir would be a great starting point but any agreement must ensure that the two countries stop creating further mischief for each other. If not as friends, they can at least coexist as unthreatening neighbours. Threats of nuclear annihilation one day and bear-hugging cricket diplomacy the next just makes it look as if the countries’ leaders suffer from bipolar disorder.

sunil_sharan@yahoo.com