THE statement by Gen Javed Zia, Quetta corps commander, that the “army considers the killing of missing people an abhorrent act” is perhaps the first time that a senior military commander has directly addressed an issue that goes to the heart of the fifth insurgency in Balochistan: the 'missing persons' whose bodies are appearing in so-called 'kill and dump' operations over the past year. Gen Zia also made another remarkable statement, going so far as to say that 'patriotic elements' had hit back against Baloch insurgents and those involved in desecrating the Pakistani flag. Was this a tacit admission that the ISI and the Frontier Corps have been involved in the extrajudicial killings, as independent and Baloch observers have repeatedly alleged?

It remains to be seen if the comments by the senior security officials — Gen Zia was accompanied by the IGFC and other officials at the Quetta Press Club — are the beginning of a new policy towards Balochistan or not. Sensible Pakistanis will fervently hope that it is. Controlling or taming an insurgency through the use of state violence never has been and never will be a solution to Balochistan's problems. The security forces may, at great cost to principles and moral authority, be able to tamp down the fifth insurgency, but perhaps only by making a sixth insurgency a virtual certainty. Gen Zia was correct in pointing out that killing Baloch insurgents and their political supporters will only fan the flames of hatred among the Baloch. He was also correct in pointing out that the state had a higher responsibility and the onus was on it to use the judicial system to prosecute and punish anyone taking up weapons against the state. But why doesn't that happen? Perhaps part of the reason is that the security establishment dominates policy towards Balochistan and as such is predisposed to looking at the province through a security prism rather than a human one. Many of the Baloch people's economic and political grievances are legitimate; however, with one eye on the natural resources in the province and another on threats to the stability and territorial integrity of Pakistan, the security establishment has been unwilling to take a more moderate line in the province.

Blame, however, must be shared by both Baloch moderates and the political governments in Islamabad and Quetta for their passiveness. The hardliners in the security apparatus and among the Baloch have attacked each other in an environment in which no political leader has had the moral courage or statesmanship to force their way into a mediator role. Is it any wonder Balochistan is still racked by violence?