ON Dec 14, Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) issued a veiled warning about the regional and global consequences of an emerging neo- nuclear apartheid.

The message was lost in the cacophony of subsequent political events. However, the statement must have received close attention in every capital interested in global and South Asian security.

It indicated that peace and security are indivisible and that the goals of non-proliferation can only be advanced by ensuring equal and undiminished security by all states. This is left for others to explore and should not be lost on the one billion plus South Asians as their intertwined fates are at stake. So let's attempt to understand the statement's policy context, the environment that prompted it, the consequences and the way forward.

After reviewing recent regional and global developments and their implications for Pakistan's national security, the NCA gave four broad messages. If circumstances demanded, Pakistan had the will and capability to use nuclear weapons. As a responsible nuclear power, Pakistan opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and observes the norms in letter and spirit. Pakistan will not accept any discrimination that is detrimental to the stability in its nuclear-armed neighbourhood and beyond. Lastly, Pakistan desires peace and stability in the region but not at the cost of its national security.

The statement came out in the context of three major regional developments — India's civil nuclear energy deals with the US and other states that are inconsistent with international norms and even their domestic laws; America's conditional support for India's permanent Security Council seat; and, most significantly, promised membership of export-control cartels like the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

These groupings emerged after India's 1974 nuclear test and were designed to control the proliferation of WMD. In a strange twist of fate, India is set to enter the same barriers that were raised against it, and gain unparalleled civil and military industrial advantage. These export-control groupings are well-knit, work on the basis of consensus and can arbitrarily decide trade terms with non-members.

Their stringent export controls encompass an entire spectrum of goods and technologies. They control trade of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies; export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapons development; impose restrictions on chemical and biological materials and related technologies; and slap restrictions on the export of missiles and their components. These dual-use items can have military as well as perfectly legitimate civilian purposes. An item can be used to make soap as well as a chemical weapon.

Critics of these cartels argue that their restrictions are designed to impose a technological cap on developing countries. For instance, on Dec 21 the US penalised a Shanghai-based PPG Paints Trading Co. $3.75m for supplying 'high-performance coatings' produced in the US to the Chashma-2 Nuclear Power Plant in 2006-07.

It isn't difficult to imagine the political and other consequences of a situation where one of the de facto nuclear powers enjoys access to these cartels without obligations, while another is left out in the cold. The statement referred to these policies and trends of selectivity, exceptionalism and discrimination related to export-control regimes. Thus it rejected the preferential treatment to India that seeks to de-hyphenate Pakistan to a lower cadre amongst nuclear powers and destabilise its strategic deterrence.

The body asserted Pakistan's right to work as an equal partner in a UN system where all states are equal, but where some states are more equal than others. The consequences of this detrimental neo-nuclear apartheid may not be limited to South Asia and will undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. Pakistan has long suffered from the 'Indyopia' syndrome — myopic security policies centred on India — but the current developments may compel it to diversify its security paradigm.

The statement also referred to the on-going stalemate at the UN's Conference on Disarmament (CD) over a fissile materials treaty that Pakistan wants to negotiate as a disarmament measure. Pakistan supports a complete elimination of fissile materials while the nuclear-haves want to retain their current stocks and stop future production.

Pakistan will face increased pressure in the 2011 meetings at the CD. So far Pakistan stands in splendid isolation and others are taking its cover. Once the chips are down, they may voice their concerns over inconsistencies in the non-proliferation regime's norms. Meanwhile, Pakistan may utilise its lever on the US, till the latter withdraws from Afghanistan, to ward off pressure.

This neo-nuclear apartheid, however, should not be mistaken as a conspiracy against Pakistan. It is rather a confluence of interests between the West and India in which Pakistan does not appear to offer investment opportunities. Nevertheless, this revisionism will accentuate asymmetries and perpetuate a destabilising arms race in South Asia and beyond. This argument may sound Kafkaesque but the reality is that India offers an alliance against China and a big market for western goods.

According to some of my colleagues at the National Defence University, the NCA's statement also pointed to a departure from its policy of credible minimum deterrence to credible deterrence — the word 'minimum' was missing. A change to credible deterrence implies that Pakistan may develop an assured second-strike capability and build advanced, compact and boosted fission warheads and even develop thermonuclear weapons.

The NCA's statement will not bring about a behavioural change in the western tilt towards India. Hence, while Pakistan may build a credible nuclear 'deterrence', it must devise and follow policies of credible economic 'reassurance' that increase its power potential. This is the advice Jiabao gave to the Pakistani leadership during his visit. Pakistan can adopt the Chinese example in treating economic opportunities separately from security concerns and the world will automatically gravitate towards it. Thus Pakistan will be seen as part of the solution rather than remaining part of the problem.

The writer is a scholar of Strategic & Nuclear Studies at the National Defence University, Islamabad.

zahir.kazmi@gmail.com