The emergent need
By Rifaat Hamid Ghani
ALTHOUGH Pakistanis had been speculating about the declaration of an emergency for months, no sense of déjà vu attended the proclamation when it came.
There was just a horrified numbness that an unbelievably rash measure — it can only heighten political alienation —had been taken in full deliberation. There is also a valid reason for not being haunted by déjà vu: In a country with an unprecedented experience in precedents, this emergency is like no other.
Other emergencies indicted aberrant political incumbents and targeted self-perpetuating legislatures. This emergency reinforces the intended goals of those in office and protects their methods. It bids farewell to the existing parliament reluctantly. Its guns are turned on an independent judiciary and free media. The obvious and immediate impacts are alarming enough but muzzled watchdogs feel a need also to caution against what may unfold insidiously.
Professional bodies, human rights activists and social organisations are showing great courage under threat. But regime sympathisers are freer than ever to feed the ‘silent majority’ propaganda that if the president is no longer the COAS, Musharraf’s candidature never violated the democratic principle and spirit and, therefore, concern that it may have been unconstitutional is not valid.
It becomes rather easy for surrogates to make it seem that a future allocation of two separate persons to the separate offices of president and COAS signifies the retrieval of the civil political process from military usurpation: For despite the COAS’ declaring an emergency he had to retire and announce elections.
Actually, the general would have found it difficult not to retire by Dec 2007 as the commitment was not just to disposables like the people of the country, its constitution and its courts. It included the army and its enviable institutional consensus personified in the corps command. No ‘Provisional Uniform Order’ has ever violated their protocol. Could post-emergency tumult help the incumbent make a persuasive case that it is wise not to change horses in a very turbulent midstream? One thing is crystal clear: This emergency is aimed at maintaining the status quo and it uses the algebra of varying factors for equal equations.
Ms Bhutto’s pre-emergency politicking transited her into (rather than General Musharraf out of) a militarily determined civil political playing field. Rather like her erstwhile partner in democratic dialogue, she too is transiting through two offices. One is that of a leader of a mainstream national political party. The other is that of chief executive of the limited company interest of the PPP. But post-emergency her options are narrowing and unless she discards her casuistry it may be hard to distinguish between her sort of reasoning and a PCO-returned judge’s. Flexibility is of the essence in a working democracy but in a dysfunctional democracy principle is foundational. There is a point when compromise becomes surrender. It is important that politicians be able to make the distinction in a country in crisis.
One of the ostensible reasons for the emergency was that General Musharraf was restricted by conventional civil law in the anti-terrorism effort. Amendments to the Army Act make any legal demur about missing persons a thing of the past: Dissenters beware! The establishment is yet to go on to reiterate that the only way of keeping the lid on a Pandora’s Box of terror is by not taking it off for elections.
‘Virtual’ campaigning was already being advocated after the Oct 18 fatalities. Ms Bhutto’s people-power having been demonstrated locally and relayed by the media for scrutiny by international public opinion, it suited many scripts including those of PPP and establishment forces to keep other political contenders from demonstrating their electoral realities. Given administrative expertise in rigging and spin, any such scripts could have been played out had General Musharraf not panicked in anticipation of supreme if not celestial judgement.
His shift into emergency mode has enhanced feelings of clear and present danger in Pakistan. The popular fixation about American involvement in Pakistan’s political narrative used to occasion amusement. But we now receive unabashed instructions from America’s president and Great Britain’s prime minister as well as media and think tank pundits in their countries as to what is required from Pakistan and its leadership. Their governments exert a tangible pressure on ours to obtain their formulations of positive outcomes and to circumvent what they deem negative developments in Pakistan’s political landscape.
For Neocons and their ilk, the violence and terrorism that Pakistan’s street politics are recording in a dramatically rising graph, intensify reasons for gaining pre-emptive controls of this nuclear-armed state where democratic politics have no nucleus and the army’s role is controversial. The Pakistan theses for guided transition and Musharraf-continuity also build on a fear base.
Even so, any putative nexus inevitably contradicts itself for there are no coinciding interests: no representative politician in Pakistan and certainly not the military institution that is so much under assault can share the western wish to neutralise Pakistan’s nuclear defences. Voluntary nuclear disarmament demands mutual assurance. Applying force would be catastrophically foolish. But that attribute disturbingly characterises President Bush’s management of the war on terror. Nobody denies the critical situation in Pakistan. Terrorism is a grave threat to the state. But terrorism has a varying range of causes, manifestations and repercussions — in the American context, the Pakistan context and then in their joint waging of the war on terror. Any normative measures that do not take into account the gamut in the Pakistan perspective will be conceptually distorted. Having almost solely engaged with a military regime here, the well-meaning West is now making the further blunder of seeking to ensure its preferred menu for regime change.
Engagement with Pakistan’s military probably acquainted America with the scope of the ISI interventions in the domestic political process as well. America should know how justified scepticism, cynicism and even downright disbelief of political appearance and avowal is in Pakistan. Post-emergency gagging of the media and the asphyxiation of dissent will not help clarify political actualities. The only constructive first step is a credible national election that also gives that other former prime minister and mainstream party leader, Mian Nawaz Sharif, of devout disposition and nuclear-test deed, due access to place an unequivocally levelled playing field. Pakistanis are not politically callow. They emerged doubly: from the British Raj and from prospective domination by the Indian Hindu majority. That they are impelled by the quest for political justice not the colour of their creed is endorsed with tragic irony by the secession of their eastern wing. And now it may be time to be haunted by déjà vu, for that secession too was preceded by emergency declarations.
The tactics thrust on Pakistan as America’s frontline in its misconceived war on terror are bringing the conduct of Afghanistan’s chronic civil war past the Durand Line. This looming crisis disturbs every Pakistani. And they have as many misgivings to place before America’s people and government in the context of Islamist extremism and inept nuclear regional policy as America has become accustomed to placing before Pakistanis. Substantial communication is an urgent need for those who love peace and hate war. And interlocutors need reference to a representative government in Pakistan that its people not just its allies trust.

