INDEPENDENCE Day 2007 marks an important milestone in the nation’s journey through time. The 60th anniversary of freedom is a moment for remembering the covenant it made to create a great Muslim democracy in South Asia where a proud heritage of power and glory was lost largely because of a failure to evolve a state that drew strength from the assent and participation of the people and from an unquestioned adherence to the rule of law.

An alien imperial power sensed the fragility of a dispensation that imagined itself to be an empire ruled by men who had not kept pace with the flux of time and who visualised themselves as the shadow of God on earth and claimed infallibility.

Having experienced a lapse into the same error more than once in the last six decades, the nation needs a reaffirmation that sovereignty belongs to the people and that the government is the agency for the articulation of their collective will. In such a reaffirmation lies the renewal of hope and the promise of a better tomorrow.

Instead, over the Independence Day in 2007 hangs the dark shadow of a plan that nearly took away their right to express that collective will. A bewildered people are confronted with the joyless quest for answers to questions which simply should not have arisen at this critical juncture.

All across the globe the news about their country is that a state of emergency was to be imposed on it by the rulers who had lost the nerve to ascertain the will of the people and that it was averted or deferred because of “a gathering storm of media, political and diplomatic pressure”.

A self-assured celebration of freedom gained and defended at a huge cost has been overwhelmed by doubts and uncertainties.

The questions that flow from this bizarre episode will not easily go away, not at least until the people manifest their will in a free and fair election. What precisely had happened that forced the top leadership to discuss the imposition of emergency? If it was as imminent as the deliberate disclosures made by authoritative sources indicated on that fateful day, what exactly were the immediate and long-term objectives?

No less importantly, was the decision shelved or postponed because saner counsels prevailed over the advice given by some self-seeking partners in the present power structure or because of the two telephone calls from Washington, one made, according to usually well-briefed American media sources, at the witching hour of 2 am? Was it only a trial balloon and if so who decided to play with the hopes and aspirations of 160 million citizens of a republic that still has a Constitution, a parliament and a Supreme Court virtually on the eve of the 60th Independence Day?

The gravity of these questions is compounded by the timing of the initial reports of an impending proclamation of emergency and by the first hastily put together explanations emanating from government circles.

As another day dawned, the Supreme Court would take up Mr Nawaz Sharif’s petition on his fundamental right to return to Pakistan. There was instant speculation that emergency would somehow abort this process. It was fuelled by dark hints from some ministers that any developments that complicated President General Pervez Musharraf’s resolve to get elected while continuing as the chief of army staff would “derail” the political process altogether.

Uncomfortable about the linkage that the media quickly sought to establish with the Nawaz Sharif case and with an independent judiciary, people speaking for the government indulged in wild speculation. It was almost unthinkable that President Musharraf was using the foreign policy debate in parliament to signal a change of policy towards the United States.

Not even the fiery rhetoric of the parliamentary secretary for defence could be interpreted to mean that Pakistan was ready to exacerbate the strains caused by a torrent of allegations of inadequate collaboration in the war against terror or, more gravely, by the discriminatory law passed by Congress and already signed by President Bush attaching unilateral pre-conditions to the continuation of American assistance to Pakistan.

The objective realities that determined the alignment of Musharraf’s regime with the United States have not changed at all and the two sides still need each other.

In utter disregard of this fundamental fact, an unbelievable suggestion that the imposition of emergency was warranted by the American threats to Pakistan’s sovereignty was injected into the debate by governmental figures. This sub-text made a mockery of the great claims made by this Pakistani regime for full five years about the eternal new compact forged with the United States.

More intriguingly, the imposition of emergency would be the first notable defiance of the pre-condition of Pakistan’s progress towards full democracy written into the new congressional law. It did not take long for the people to work out why the bogey of American military strikes was once again being resurrected.

The media coverage in the West quickly confirmed that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had cautioned Pakistan against plugging this line in our domestic political contest.

For the second time during a short span of five months, it has become all too obvious that President Musharraf is saddled with supporters who are simply not capable of anticipating consequences of their advice to him. This is inherent in the time-worn tactic of erecting a civilian façade for what is quintessentially a military dictatorship.

In trying to control every facet of the national life, the army has surrounded itself with politicians with an existential dread of true democracy. The accumulated experience of past coups had unmistakably enabled the military to extend its control in space and time. It had, however, gravely miscalculated the after-shocks of the detonation it carried out on March 9. The forces it generated now demand a new dynamic equilibrium.

The present crisis dramatised by the need for emergency or, worse still, a return to absolute military rule springs from the refusal by some elements in the present regime to acknowledge this transformation.

In trying to maintain their stranglehold on power, which is more shadow than substance after the eventful developments of the last five months, these elements are once again asking the army to sweep aside these pro-democracy forces through another fiat of arms even if it leads to the fragmentation of the nation-state the historic birth of which 60 years ago we celebrate now.

If President Musharraf remains exclusively dependent on these men of straw for support and legitimacy, the ship of state cannot hope to weather the storm raging around him.

In hours of crisis, nations survive and even flourish by transcending parochial vested interests. History beckons President Musharraf to do the same by opening up Pakistan’s polity to new synergies. It has never found a place, except in its bottomless dustbin, for people who are unable to adapt, change and muster courage to take the road not taken before.

First and foremost, President Musharraf must acknowledge that if his power and influence depend on retaining the direct command of the army after eight years of absolute rule, then they are not worthy of his effort. Any further renewal of mandate for him must come from the people and not from a diminishing cabal of unworthy men who cannot spell ‘national interest’ but incessantly invoke it.

Secondly, he must accept the overriding necessity to replace the politics of confrontation and exclusion by the politics of national reconciliation and inclusion in order to reduce various kinds of polarisation in society. Third, the country must undergo the relatively painless process of cleansing through a free and fair election. Fourth, the results of the people’s verdict, be they at the national or regional level, must not be scuttled with palace intrigues, and the state of Pakistan should enter the 61st year of its independence with necessary adjustments in the constitutional framework and governance.

Fifth, in view of the fact that Pakistan’s participation in the new Afghan war is now threatening to become its own civil war, a major review of foreign policy should be undertaken. It should focus immediately on reinforcing by words and deeds that part of the declaration made by the grand bilateral jirga in Kabul that aims at restoring time-honoured avenues of reconciling conflicting viewpoints in a society that, despite three decades of wars, refuses to abandon its tribal traditions of dignity and freedom.

Bold new initiatives and not the hackneyed resort to another demonstration of power flowing out of the barrel of a gun will save Pakistan at this crucial moment in its chequered history.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

THE next 14 months will generate some insulting and at times irrational tirades from prospective American presidential candidates seeking to distinguish their views and gain attention, but they will also produce well-reasoned and apt foreign policy prescriptions meant to better US-Pakistan relations.

Islamabad must understand that the next American presidential election will be determined by a candidate’s competency in foreign policymaking and that Pakistan will remain a central focus for US foreign policy.

Most recently, Senator Barack Obama’s foreign policy speech created a firestorm in Islamabad by making a case for conducting unilateral military operations against Al Qaeda camps in Pakistan.

His speech was preceded by Republican congressman and outlier presidential candidate Tom Tancredo’s unveiling of his declaratory ‘preventive Islam doctrine’ that argued for attacking Muslim holy sites, including Makkah and Madina, as a means to deter or retaliate against potential nuclear terrorist attacks against the US homeland.

The ‘Tancredo doctrine’, though representative of a ‘minor-minority’ of Americans, embodies long-held fears of many leaders throughout the world that America is waging a crusade against Muslim nations and peoples and not just its most radical adherents.

Regardless of the intention of the presidential candidates’ speeches, they stir controversy in a world that is already sceptical of American leaders. Pakistani leaders rationally responded to Senator Obama and Tancredo’s claims with great consternation, forcing Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri to say, “as the election campaign in America is heating up we would not like American candidates to fight their elections…at our expense.”

As a result, the State Department in a rare public statement scorned all presidential candidates and advised them to choose their words cautiously so as not to complicate on-going American foreign policy operations and aspirations.

The Pakistani establishment should not interpret every message or “sound byte” produced by an American presidential candidate to reflect core beliefs or potential foreign policy approaches. Rather, they should view statements, such as Senator Obama’s, for what they really are, namely: deliberately provocative political speeches with nuggets of truth.

Pakistani leaders should engage American presidential campaigns to determine how American policymakers and politicians really intend to shape policies towards Islamabad in the years to come. Moreover, they should figure out how best to “filter out the noise” of election year rhetoric that is polarising and at times divisive and to better inform and influence presidential candidates policies towards Pakistan. Pakistan’s leaders must understand that many of the statements, regardless of their excessive provocation, have underlying truths that could guide how Pakistan shapes and develops foreign policy.

Even though sloganeering garners political votes, it also has the potential to galvanise American enemies who pay close attention to American domestic politics in an attempt to spin the message for propaganda. For example, religious clerics and the MMA’s organised protests in Karachi chanting anti-Obama and Tancredo slogans and further infuriating many Pakistanis about their government’s relations with America.

With tensions increasing in Pakistan it is important for presidential candidates to choose their words carefully so as not to catalyse greater unrest in Pakistan.

However, this is not a reason to censor the views of presidential candidates or to continue to emaciate debates. Rather, it should be seen as a learning opportunity for Pakistani leaders to understand how segments of America’s diverse political spectrum and leadership view their nation and how Pakistan can best influence the thinking of the next American president.

Recent discussions between Benazir Bhutto and President Musharraf highlight the potential for the rebirth of a secular Pakistani government. In order for Musharraf to commit resources to develop a democratic Pakistan capable of negating the impact of extremist Islamist groups he must listen to prospective American presidential candidates. Musharraf can’t do it alone and these candidates will either continue America’s relations with Pakistan or abandon them out of faltering faith in Islamabad’s ability to get the job done.

The ball is in Pakistan’s court — listening and adapting to candidate speeches is a difficult task, but with a little elbow grease they can and should turn negatives into positives and help influence and shape the US presidential debate on Pakistan. Engaging the candidates now will make the 2009 transition more productive and useful for Pakistan’s quest for security and stability.

The writer is a research associate specialising in Asian security issues at the Centre for a New American Security in Washington D.C.