Militancy: the predicament in Fata
By A.R. Siddiqi
ONE would rather dismiss the statement of the US Democratic presidential candidate, Barack Obama, about the intrusive deployment of US troops in Pakistan’s tribal territory, as a case of talking too much too soon. In a speech the other day, he said that President Pervez Musharraf “must” do more to shut down “terrorist” operations in Pakistan and “evict” foreign fighters or “risk” a US troops’ “invasion”.
What cannot be dismissed so lightly is the time span contemplated in Mr Obama’s statement for a militarised US presence in Pakistan’s volatile north and southwest for an indeterminate length of time. If lucky, Mr Obama would make it to the White House not before January 2009 and would take at least a few weeks, if not months, to order an “invasion” of Pakistan.
Whether he would be able or need to take the extreme measure is not so important as the murky prospect of his country’s military forces being there for a long haul in much the same disastrous way as in Iraq and in no less a wanton mode as in Afghanistan.
While Iraq stands virtually in ruins, Afghanistan seems headed for a similar fate. Unlike the nine-year-long Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, the US-led forces stationed there have played havoc with Afghan civilian life and property — many times more than the Soviet occupation forces did.
Visiting Afghanistan in 1992, less than three years after the withdrawal of the last Soviet contingent in February 1989, I found Kabul, by and large, in one piece, barring skeletons of urban property here and there. Up north from Mazar-i-Sharif all the way to Juzjan, close to the Tashkent border, it bore hardly any glaring traces of war damage to civilian property.
The Soviet Union’s was a regular war — even if between two such asymmetrical forces as the Mujahideen guerillas on one side and the Soviet military on the other. The Soviets suffered some 57,000 war casualties as against just a few hundred by the International Security Assistance Force and Nato since 2002 to date. The Afghan loss of civilian life and property — from the devastating Tora Bora bombings of November-December 2001 to date — remains unaccounted for in an on-going operation entailing heavy collateral damage, more or less on a daily basis.
Senator Obama’s democratic rival, Senator Hillary Clinton, denounced his statement as “naďve” and “irresponsible”. She also accused President Bush of “botching” the war on terror. She would nevertheless upstage Obama in warning Pakistan against direct military action by US forces on the basis of “actionable intelligence”.
Clinton’s statement differed with Obama’s more in rhetoric than in substance. Both expressed their country’s disappointment with Pakistan’s not doing enough to combat the Taliban- and Al Qaeda-led terrorism and the possibility of having to redress it unilaterally if and when necessary.
In a recent interview with the CNN’s Larry King, US Vice-President Dick Cheney rhetorically admitted to having captured and killed “a lot” of Al Qaeda elements in Pakistan. When asked if the US was “going to go” after the Al Qaeda activists (allegedly) holed up in their “safe havens” in Pakistan’s tribal belt, Mr Cheney said, while he didn’t expect that to happen, “they make good reason to go after Al Qaeda.” Pakistan, he said, was “obviously” a sovereign state and the US recognised Pakistan’s sovereignty.
It is a sinisterly loaded and uncalled-for re-statement of an established fact relating to Pakistan as a sovereign entity. Whether it is a reassurance of US friendship or a reflection on the status of Pakistan’s sovereignty as real or obvious remains open to interpretation.
Historically, the US has always associated Pakistan’s strength and durability as a state with an individual, especially a solider, in power at a given time — from Ayub all the way down to Musharraf. Yahya, for all his eccentricities as a ruler, enjoyed the best of relations with Washington — President Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger — for his role in providing an opening to China.
Zia was President Reagan’s most trusted ally. He and the Afghan Mujahideen reminded him of the “founding fathers”. Zia’s Islamic lore might have been music to the ears of the administration. Musharraf, in the aftermath of the 9/11, became the administration’s other name for the state of Pakistan. As a strategic regional player, he held the key to success in the global war on terror. No longer.
Obama vows to act within Pakistan’s own territory with or without Musharraf. “If President Musharraf won’t act, we will… there are terrorists holed up in those mountains (Pakistan’s tribal belt) who murdered 3,000 Americans. They are plotting to strike again…” The presidential hopeful, blissfully ignorant of ground realities, was confusing 3,000 American casualties in Iraq with a few hundred in Afghanistan.
The US Congress recently adopted the draft bill linking the continuance of US military and economic assistance for Pakistan to effective anti-terrorist efforts — another dig at Pakistan’s status as a sovereign and independent state with its own national agenda.
Is this what Pakistan is all about in American eyes? To endure only as an American ally in the latter’s global anti-terrorist war or fade away as a failed state. It happens to be an election year in Pakistan. Musharraf may still stay on as president for the next five years.
However, in the post-election diffused and volatile scenario, his powers as an absolute ruler would be considerably diluted. Born out of a prolonged political vacuum, he would be confronting a variety of challenges following the end of seven years of high-powered presidential rule.
To revive the atrophied political process on a national scale would call for maximum moral and political resource and resolve of the emerging political leadership. There will be no end to formidable challenges waiting to jump out of the sealed Pandora’s Box suddenly unsealed.
In an article on the ‘Implications of Bush-Musharraf Alliance’, Paula Newberg identified some as follows:
i. Rising border instabilities with Afghanistan.
ii. Renegade Islamic militancy in the heart of the capital (the Lal Masjid episode) and
iii. Resurgent Taliban — “the bread and butter” of Pakistan’s relationship with the US overshadowed by the “deepening problems of Pakistan’s failing governance.”
In Pakistan’s peculiar context where the government of the day is practically the other name of the state, “failing governance” would be little better than a failing state. This is a point well worth engaging the attention of those in authority and the political leadership to pre-empt the rage of the masses and the resulting anarchy beyond the normal law of the land to control.
In yet another paragraph, she goes on to point out a fundamental flaw in the US-Pakistan security relationship “grounded in profound illegality. Pakistan’s Constitution upheld by its highest court forbids Musharraf from holding concurrently the office of president and army chief.”
The president, despite his promises (under the Seventeenth Amendment to retire from the army by December 31, 2004), wishes to retain both offices and wouldn’t step down and run for reelection.
Washington Post’s gadfly, David Ignatius remains bitterly critical of Pakistan’s (Musharraf’s) inadequate performance in Waziristan and argues for a joint US-Pakistan operation there. Such a combined military operation would inevitably entail the physical deployment, intrusive presence and active operational role of the US forces across our tribal areas to make a mockery of our sovereignty.
Isn’t the existing tripartite commission consisting of the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan good enough for the task of fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda without impinging on the sovereign status of the parties involved? Would Pakistan ever approve of stationing foreign forces within its national territory? Furthermore, if ever a contingency like that is allowed to emerge, wouldn’t that call into question the competence of Pakistan’s own armed forces and their patriotic sentiment?
According to the US National Intelligence Estimate, “Al Qaeda has regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability and a safe haven in the lawless frontier area of Waziristan”. The question is: what is the United States going to do about it?
For us the question is: What is Pakistan going to do about it? Are we going to put at risk the stability and future of the state as an independent and sovereign nation to protect our security relationship with the US?
More to the point, are we going to allow our haphazard and wayward power politics to endanger the social, economic and constitutional fabric of the state — even perhaps the very existence of the country?
Tail piece: Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Burns joins Obama in urging Pakistan to defeat Al Qaeda in the battlefield or else the US would not hesitate to use its own forces to achieve the objective. A virtual ultimatum!
The writer is a retired brigadier.


