THERE is a strange incongruity between the affinity and friendship existing between the peoples of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the hostility, suspicion and constant bickering which characterise the relations between the governments of the two countries.

At the level of the people, there has been intermingling, common history and friendly contact stretching over centuries.

The first Mughal emperor, Babar is buried in Kabul. An iconic figure of Muslim rule in Northern India is Sher Shah Suri, an Afghan born in India. Numerous families in Pakistan and Northern India are proud to claim their Pashtun descent. Allama Iqbal dedicated his magnum opus, ‘Javed Nama’, to the king of Afghanistan. Lately, millions of Afghan refugees have found friendly shelter in Pakistan.

In sharp contrast, the relations between the two governments have been strained, troublesome and even bitter ever since Pakistan won independence in 1947. Nevertheless, disturbed inter-governmental relations did not have any catastrophic consequences, such as war. The problems between the two countries were of interest only to themselves or their immediate neighbours.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent developments, however, Pak-Afghan relations have assumed critical importance, with wide implications for world peace. A review of mistakes made by the two governments is essential because these errors partly contributed to the disastrous foreign interventions suffered by Afghanistan, with grave repercussions for Pakistan.

The principal cause of dispute between the two governments before the Soviet intervention was Afghanistan’s refusal to accept the Durand Line as the border between the two countries along with the support that the Afghan government gave to the Pakhtunistan movement. The dispute did not cause much physical damage. Casualties and destruction of property was minimal. It was largely a propaganda war with minor clashes and provocations dominating the proceedings.

The harm done was mainly in destroying friendship and trust between the two governments and generating hostility and suspicion, which hampered joint efforts to deal with common problems. Afghanistan was unwise in pursuing its claims in an aggressive manner. Boundary disputes are numerous, all over the world but do not lead, except rarely, to war and enmity. Given the relative size and strength of the two countries, it was impossible for Afghanistan to coerce Pakistan into surrendering a large part of its territory.

There was no international support for Afghanistan’s claims. The tribal population concerned were quite content with the status quo, which provided them the amenities of a soft border, with the solid benefits of Pakistani citizenship along with tribal autonomy. The Afghans could have kept their claim alive, as a matter of principle, as is done by most countries in disputes over borders drawn up in colonial days.

On the other side, Pakistan was wrong in treating the protest against the Durand Line as evidence of basic hostility or a threat to its territorial integrity. Pakistan’s reaction should have been more mature and restrained. Pakistan policymakers should have realised that the demand was being made by a small elite ruling group in Afghanistan for domestic political reasons, and was partly reflecting the traditional Afghan psyche which distrusts immediate neighbours (as most likely invade them) and, therefore, to be kept at a distance. We seem to ignore the fact that Afghanistan amply demonstrated its friendship for Pakistan when it scrupulously kept Pakistan’s western borders quiet during the two Indo-Pakistan wars.

Pakistan, with its greater size and advanced economy, should have pursued a policy of friendship and cooperation and played down the differences over the Durand Line. This may have dissuaded Afghanistan from becoming over-dependent on military and economic assistance from the Soviet bloc, which clearly facilitated the Soviet interventions from 1973 onwards.

Since there is no public access to the archives of the two governments, it is not possible to review all the ups and downs of the Pak-Afghan relationship between 1947 and 1973. A low point was reached when diplomatic relations were broken in 1959. However, a rapprochement was in sight in 1973, when a new, broad-based economic agreement was negotiated between the two governments.

A high-level Pakistan delegation, headed by Mr Feroze Kaiser, special assistant to the prime minister, set out one fine morning from Peshawar for Kabul to finalise and sign the agreement. However, when the delegation reached the border at Torkham, it was turned back by the Afghan guards who said that the old government had been overthrown. It is curious that the information gatherers in Pakistan were totally unaware that a revolution was brewing in Afghanistan.

The first step in Soviet intrusion into Afghanistan, culminating in invasion and occupation, was taken in 1973 when the monarchy was abolished and Sardar Daud came to power, with the aid of the communist parties. In important respects, Pakistan played an honourable and helpful role. It became the channel for western and Arab assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters and generously provided shelter to millions of Afghan refugees.

However, forgetting the lessons of Afghan history that foreign intervention in Afghan’s internal affairs is disastrous for everyone, the policymakers in Pakistan began to favour selected Afghan fighting groups with a view to ensuring a friendly government in post-war Afghanistan.

There was talk of acquiring strategic depth through Afghanistan which came dangerously close to the idea of setting up a satellite state.

The pursuit of this objective led to serious mistakes in dealing with Afghan affairs, culminating in the alliance with the Taliban, initially with the support of US. The scale of assistance given by Pakistan to the Talibans remains a secret but this help clearly enabled the Taliban to establish their authority over practically the whole of Afghanistan. Inevitably, the Taliban, once fully established, began to behave independently, rejecting the suggestions and advice of Pakistan and thus slipping out of the control of Islamabad.

The consequences of creating Taliban power (with its alliance with militants from other Muslim countries) has been disastrous both for Pakistan and Afghanistan with worldwide repercussions.

Currently, a UN-backed strategy is being implemented to stabilise Afghanistan and establish a western model democratic state. Despite being broad-based and enjoying international support, the plan has run into serious difficulties. It is perhaps doomed to failure, unless substantially modified. The Afghans dislike external intervention in their domestic affairs and hate the presence of foreign soldiers on their soil. Even if the Taliban insurgency can be crushed totally, the military operations may have created a reservoir of hatred which will erupt sooner or later and wipe out all the gains.

Pakistan, with its greater resources and size must take the lead in forging a common front. As an immediate measure, Pakistan must stop the forced expulsion of Afghan refugees. We are tarnishing a long and honourable record of hospitality to a truly oppressed people.

The two countries must make an effort to secure a reduction in the foreign military component and ultimate phase it out. Aggressive military action which cause heavy civilian casualties do more harm than good for the common cause of restoring stability in Afghanistan and should stop.

Every effort should be made to securing the agreement and support of tribal leaders. Given Afghanistan’s topography and traditions, the consent of tribal leaders is essential to secure the support of the Afghan people.

The basis of agreement should be that there will be no interference with local autonomy but the tribal councils must ensure that no activities prejudicial to other areas or foreign countries would be permitted.

We should not expect instantaneous success and should not be discouraged by the setbacks in Waziristan. It should be realised that securing tribal cooperation is the only viable strategy which can bring success in the long run. Where the tribes are violating the agreement, non-military measures can be used to coerce them to comply e.g. stoppage of supplies, interdiction of movement, withholding of assistance. Economic sanctions can be effective without causing humiliation or arousing anger.

There should be no effort to impose a western political mode on the Afghans. They enjoyed decades of stability under a monarchical system where the king was a symbol of national identity and unity, central control was relaxed and maximum local autonomy was allowed. The developments since 1973 make it impossible to restore the old order but the Afghan preference for local autonomy and aversion to strong central control should be respected.

It will be impossible to eliminate the Taliban physically. The endeavour should be to bring them under control through tribal discipline and strict enforcement of laws. In the past, Afghanistan has managed to control Islamic militants in its own way. Although the locale was in Pakistan’s tribal area, the case of the Faqir of Ipi is illustrative. It shows that despite the best efforts of the British and later the Pakistan government, how difficult it was to capture an individual rebel.

On the other hand, the threat of a religious dictatorship, posed by the Faqir of Ipi faded away because of the strength of the tribal system and the old style political management by government.

In conclusion, an important lesson to be drawn is that decisions on national strategy taken by a small group without consultation even within the government and keeping the public in ignorance or misinformed have led to several mega disasters. The heavy price paid for the errors, committed by a few hundred men, has to be borne by the whole nation.